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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
February 15, 1985 Conference 
List 5, Sheet 1 
No. 84-805-CFX 
O'NEILL Cert to CA3 
(Trustee in Bankruptcy) (Garth, Higginbotham: 
v. 





SUMMARY: This case is curve-lined with Midlantic National Bank 
v. New Jersey Dep't of Environmental Protection, No. 84-801. Please 
see the memorandum prepared for that petition. 
I recommend denial. 
There are two responses. 
January 26, 1985 Lazerwi tz Opn in petn No. 84-805 
r r-~ ., ... .. "~ , ... ~ - ·.. .. .. .. • ... ... .. 
... 
PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
February 15, 1985 Conference 
List 5, Sheet 1 
No. 84-801-CFX 
MIDLANTIC NATIONAL BANK 
(creditor with perfected 
security interest) 
v. 
NEW JERSEY DEP'T 
OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
No. 84-805-CFX 
O'NEILL 
(Trustee in Bankruptcy) 
v. 




NEW YORK, et al. Federal/Civil Timely 
(state environmental 
authorities) 
SUMMARY: Does 11 u.s.c. §554(a) permit the Trustee to aban-
don property of the bankrupt estate when that abandonment may 
'-
violate state environmental protection laws? W ~ ~f 
~. cA3'~ ~1~ ~b ~~. r ~~ . s sl.rJJ wc:..J ~ oJh.; (A'J - ~ --~;Jtr- R.l ~.ttu.J~ ~.h~· )...ca_ 
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FACTS AND HOLDING BELOW: These curve-lined cases arose out 
of the bankruptcy of Quanta Resources Corp, which owned and oper-
ated waste oil storage and processing facilities in Long Island 
City, NY, and Edgewater, NJ. 
No. 84-801: Petr, by virtue of a $600,000 loan to Quanta 
for working capital, obtained a security interest in certain as-
sets of Quanta. Resp had authorized Quanta to operate its 
Edgewater site on the condition that it not accept PCB-
contaminated oil. (PCB's are extremely hazardous chemicals.) 
After resp discovered PCB-contaminated oil at the plant, Quanta 
agreed to cease operations on July 2, 1981. While resp and Quan-
ta were negotiating as to the latter's obligation to clean up the 
contaminated oil, Quanta filed a petn for bankruptcy under Chap-
ter 11 on Oct 6, 1981. A month later, this action was converted 
to a Chapter 7 liquidation. On Oct 7, resp had issued an admin-
istrative order requiring Quanta to clean up all hazardous mate-
rials. 
O'Neill (petr in No. 84-805) , the Trustee in Bankruptcy for 
Quanta, gave notice of proposed abandonment of the Edgewater fa-
cility under §554(a). That section provides: 
"After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any 
property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate or 
that is of inconsequential value to the estate." 
The Trustee realized that the expected costs of cleanup would 
exceed the minimal value of the facility. Resp opposed the aban-
donment, contending that this would violate state law because 
contaminated oil must be stored and disposed of in compliance 
with state regulations. Abandonment would pose a threat to pub-
#,-. .., ;- -- "' • ,...,, .. .,, •-ro-..,. ..- .-- ..... , - _,..., .T"''T"'""" " 
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lie health and safety because the oil would be left at the facil-
ity. 
After a hearing, the Bankruptcy Ct, on May 20, 1983, author-
ized the abandonment: the Trustee vacated the premises on July 1. 
Thereafter, the par ies consented to resp's taking a direct ap-
peal to the CA3. 
Ro. 84-805: Petr O'Neill, the Trustee, also filed a notice 
of intention to abandon Quanta's Long Island City plant. At the 
time, the plant housed at least 70,000 gallons of contaminated 
oil. The Trustee determined that compliance with applicable NY 
laws would have required substantial expenditures to guard, re-
pair, and clean up the facility and to dipose of the waste. Giv-
en the facility's low value, the Trustee decided that the requi-
site expenditures would render the property a burden on the es-
tate. 
Resp opposed the abandonment, claiming that abandonment 
would, in effect, constitute disposal of the hazardous wastes in 
violation of NY law, and would create a continuing violation of 
state and local hazardous waste storage laws. In addition, resp 
argued that S959(b) prohibited abandonment under S554(a). Sec-
tion 959(b) requires that a trustee 
"manage and operate its property in his possession as such 
trustee ••• according to the requirements of the valid laws 
of the State in which the property is situated, in the same 
manner that the owner or possessor thereof would be bound to 
do if in possession thereof." 
The Bankruptcy Ct issued an order, on July 7, 1982, permit-
ting abandonment. That court refused to stay the order pending 
appeal, and refused to grant resp a first lien on the property to 
- 4 -
the extent of any monies that resp might expend to bring the 
abandoned property into compliance with state law. Following the 
abandonment, apparently resp did clean up the facility at a cost 
of roughly $2.5 million. 
The DC affirmed the Bankruptcy Ct's order. (Resp did not 
raise the question of its right to a first lien.) 
Holding Below: The CA3 considered both cases together and 
held that §554(a) does not permit the Trustee to abandon property 
when that abandonment may violate state environmental laws. Ac-
cordingly, the court reversed and remanded the cases either to 
the DC or the Bankruptcy Ct. Initially, the court recognized 
that the purposes of the bankruptcy law and state environmental 
laws cannot be reconciled where the trustee legitimately invokes 
his power to abandon an asset whose manner of abandonment the 
state regulates. The issue thus boiled down to whether Congress 
intended the trustee's abandonment power to be unrestricted by 
public health and safety regulations. 
In concluding that Congress had no such sweeping intent to 
displace state environmental laws under the circumstances, the 
court pointed to pre-1978 Code practice. These cases held that 
the trustee's abandonment power was subject to the "application 
of general regulations of a police nature." The court also found 
support for this conclusion in the automatic stay provision of 
§362(a), which grants an exception "where a governmental unit is 
suing a debtor to prevent or stop violation of ••• environmental 
protection ••• laws •••• " 739 F.2d, at 918. Lastly, the court 
cited §959(b), which contained the "implicit notion" that the 
"'r .,._,. <t •. • -, • '' •..,..,. .,..,.""'!',.., . _.... • .,, , -· •- ., .. 
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goals of the bankruptcy laws, including rehabilitation of the 
debtor, "do not authorize transgression of state laws setting 
requirements for the operation of the business even if the con-
tinued operation of the business would be thwarted by applying 
state laws." Id., at 719. The court made it clear that §959(b) 
was not an independent prohibition of the trustee's abandoning 
property in contravention of state law~ rather, that section in-
dicated that Congress did not intend to subjugate state and local 
regulatory laws. 
The court thus stated that it must balance the relative 
weight of the state and federal policies in determining whether 
the trustee may abandon property in contravention of state law. 
In the end, the court concluded that the states' interest in pub-
lie health outweighed the need to preserve as much of the estate 
as possible for distribution to creditors. 
"If trustees in bankruptcy are to be permitted to dispose of 
hazardous wastes under the cloak of the abandonment power, 
compliance with environmental protection laws will be trans-
formed into governmental cleanup by default. It cannot be 
said that the bankruptcy laws were intended to work such a 
radical change in the nature of local public health and 
safety regulation -- the substitution of governmental action 
for citizen compliance -- without an indication that Con-
gress so intended." 739 F.2d, at 922-923. 
In a footnote, the court rejected the Trustee's claim that pro-
hibiting abandonment may effect an unconstitutional taking, es-
sentially concluding that the states' enforcement of their envi-
ronmental laws must be characterized as permissible exercises of 
regulatory power, rather than as takings. 
Finally, the court noted that resp NY may be entitled to 
reimbursement from the estate for its clean up costs as "adminis-
.. _ - --- , ... ·- ........ 
- 6 -
trative expenses," §503(b) (1) (A). The court declined, however, 
to reach the issue of the priority, if any, of the state's claim. 
Judge Gibbons dissented. The language of §554(a) is clear: 
the trustee may abandon the properties at issue. The majority's 
reliance on pre-1978 Code cases is off the mark because Congress 
chose not to provide an express exception to the trustee's §554 
abandonment power. Judge Gibbons believed that the majority's 
approach created a substantial issue under the Fifth Amendment~ 
in this respect, the majority flouted United States v. Security 
Industrial Bank, 459 u.s. 70 (1982), which held that the Bank-
ruptcy Act should not be construed to destroy creditors' inter-
ests when a substantial question arises as to whether the Act 
constitutes an unconstitutional taking. Accordingly, §554 should 
be construed consistent with its plain meaning to allow the 
trustee to abandon the properties. 
Judge Gibbons also criticized the majority for sidestepping 
the difficult issues of whether the state's expenses may be re-
covered and whether the state has a priority over other credi-
tors' claims. The court has the responsibility to determine 
whose pocket will supply the funds for compliance with state law. 
CONTENTIONS : 
Petr in Ro. 801: 
Petr reiterates Judge Gibbon's argument that Security Na-
tional Bank compels a reading of §554(a) to avoid an unconstitu-
tional taking. Section 554(a) should be interpreted according to 
its language and so as not to extinguish creditors' perfected 
.... ..-- ~ ...... ~ ... - -~ -
- 7 -
-
security interests under the guise of promoting state environmen-
tal laws. 
Resp in Ro. 801: 
Resp maintains that the CA3's holding, although one of first 
impression under the 1978 Code, follows the pre-Code decisions 
establishing that the trustee's abandonment power is limited by 
the need to comply with state public health regulations. ~., 
Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F.2d 289 (CA4 1952). The Court need 
not address this issue absent a conflict. Moreover, resp points 
out that the CA3's decision has limited importance because it 
merely concluded that the trustee must retain the property rather 
than abandon it; the CA3 did not decide what, if any, funds of 
the estate must be expended on compliance with state law. 
Resp also disputes the relevance of Security National Bank. 
~ Given the CA3's limited ruling, it is difficult to perceive any 
potential unconstitutional taking at stake. 
Petr in Ro. 805: 
Petr, the Trustee, contends that the CA3's decision con-
flicts with the underlying rationale of NLRB v. Bildisco & 
Bildisco, 104 s. Ct. 1188 (1984). In that case, the Court re-
fused to engraft an exception to §365(a) for collective bargain-
ing agreements, reasoning that Congress knew how to draft an ex-
clusion when it wanted to. Similarly, the language of §554(a) 
admits of no exceptions for state environmental laws. 
Petr echoes the Security Industrial Bank argument raised by 
Judge Gibbons and the companion petition, and asks this Court to 
grant cert in order to insure conformity with that decision. 
- -'"'- -- ... --·:-:; ........ 
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Petr takes a pot shot at the CA3's reliance on §959(b). 
Citing Professor Moore's treatise, petr asserts that §959(b) ap-
plies only to an ongoing business and thus has no application to 
the abandonments at issue. 
Petr chides the CA3 for misstating the issue because the 
record does not support the court's assumption that abandonment 
would violate state law. The critical issue is whether state 
governments, acting pursuant to environmental laws, can restrict 
a trustee's abandonment authority and require him to expend and 
distribute the estate's assets in a manner not required by the 
Code. Section 554(a) vests in the trustee the broad authority to 
unload burdensome assets. When the trustee abandons property, 
the property reverts back to the debtor; the trustee (assuming, 
as is the case here, he does not "operate" the property) stands 
as if he never had an interest in the property. Under the cir-
cumstances, the trustee cannot be denied the statutory right to 
abandon the estate's assets. 
Finally, petr points out that the CA3's decision will throw 
an unnecessary wrench into the Code's application. Congress spe-
cifically declined to grant governmental entities a priority over 
other creditors for "administrative expenses." Similarly, §510 
does not provide the statutory basis for subordination of admin-
istrative, secured, or other unsecured claims to the claims of NY 
and NJ. Petr also suggests that the CA3's decision will deter 
persons from serving as Trustees in Bankruptcy. 
Resp RY in Ro. 84-805: 
. .,.. ~ . . ~ - _ -- - • . - .-.. · · . •. , .. " - .;: ~r, · , • - , - ,... ::- .... · • - • · • -
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Resp asserts that the CA3 correctly determined that Congress 
did not intend the trustee's abandonment power to be unrestricted 
by state public health law. Bildisco is not controlling because 
the statute at issue in that case, §365(a), contained a number of 
limitations, whereas §554(a) contains none. (I cannot fathom the 
reasoning behind this argument. Fortunately, it is not that rel-
evant.) The CA3's application of §554 does not create any uncon-
stitutional taking given the indirect exercise of state regula-
tory power. Accordingly, petr's reliance on Security Industrial 
Bank is beside the point. Finally, resp points out that the CA3 
did not address the precise questions that trouble petr -- the 
availability of reimbursement from the estate and the priority of 
the states' claims. Thus, the Court need not review this case in 
order to decide whether the CA3's decision will frustrate the 
objectives of the Code. 
Resp NJ in Ro. 84-805: 
Resp merely reiterates the arguments raised before. Resp 
does discuss the Court's recent decision in Ohio v. Kovacs, No. 
83-1020 (Jan 9, 1985), and states that the CA3's holding does not 
conflict with it. Kovacs specifically left open the question at 
issue in these cases. See slip op. at 10, n. 12. 
DISCUSSION: Resp NJ is correct that Kovacs left for another 
day the difficult issue decided by the CA3. On the one hand, the 
CA3's holding makes a good deal of sense. The estate (and pre-
sumably the creditors) should bear the burden of complying with 
applicable state environmental laws. Moreover, it is not far-
fetched to assume that Congress never intended S554(a) to permit 
- . . . ~ .. ~ ·- -.. ,.,. ... - . ~. .. . 
. -· ....... . 
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trustees to shift the burden of paying state-imposed cleanup 
costs to the state. On the other hand, the "plain meaning" of 
§554(a), in light of the pre-1978 Code practice recognizing the 
constraint, 1 and decisions such as Bildisco, indicate that per-
haps the provision does grant a trustee a broad and unfettered 
abandonment power. As Judge Gibbons' dissent noted, "trustees 
are appointed not for the benefit of the world at large, but 
solely for the purpose of liquidating property for the benefit of 
creditors." 739 F.2d, at 923. 
The Security Industrial Bank issue seems to be a smokescreen 
for the central question in the case -- the interpretation of 
§554(a). Moreover, the complicated statutory questions about the 
state's ability to recover expenses and the state's priority over 
other creditors were not resolved by the CA3 and are not properly 
subject to review at this time. 
The CA3's §554(a) holding seems to be a case of first im-
pression. I do not think the Court needs to review the case at 
this time given the unknown importance of the ruling. The CA3's 
holding preserves the states' authority to enforce their environ-
mental laws, certainly a vital interest, although this may be at 
the expense of certain surprised and annoyed creditors. Unless 
the Court views the CA3's treatment of the issue as flatly incor-
1Assuming Congress was aware of the case law, one school 
of thought might presume that Congress rejected those decisions 
by not having any qualifying language in §554(a). Of course, the 
contrary argument would be that Congress merely intended to 
codify the status quo and saw no need to spell out the existing 
practice that all followed • 
.. . ~ ... , of ... - . .. ... ~ • • - • •• , . , · - .., !' .. . "'"J, ...... .. -~ ·--· ~ 1-
rect, the Court might be better served by having other courts 
explore the matter before ultimately resolving it. 
I recommend denial. 
There is a response in No. 84-801: there are two responses 
in No. 84-805. 
January 26, 1985 Lazerwitz Opn in petn No. 84-805 
., I • • - , -. '9 ...... .,. ; - · - "':" • • .- - -· • I "' • "f • 
February 15, 1985 
Court ................... . Voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .. .' ............ . .. , 19 . . . No. 84-801 
Submitted ................ , 19 .. . Announced ................ , 19 .. . 
MIDLANTIC NATIONAL BANK 
VB. 
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Mr. Justice Powell 1 Augus~8, 1985 
Cabell 
No. 84-801 & 84-805, Midlantic National Bank v. New 
Jersey Department of Environment Protection 
Question Presented 
To what extent must a trustee in bankruptcy comply with 
environmental laws in abandoning property under 11 u.s.c. § 554? 
1. Background 
The file memo from Mr. Justice Powell regarding this 
case contains all of the material facts. 
Go 
II. Discussion 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals prohibiting the 
trustee from abandoning property in contravention of police regu-
latory powers should be affirmed. Before the 1978 codification, -
courts consistently interpreted the judicially-created abandon-
ment rule as yieldin~ the states' p~lice powers, and this 
Court should similarly deem section 554 to encompass this quali-
fication. Congress did not intend. for the bankruptcy code to 
~e-~~~~ state environmental laws: Other provisions of the bank-
ruptcy code are subject to a similar exception for states' police 
powers, and recognizing that qualification for the abandonment 
power would be consistent with these interpretations. Finally, 
strong reasons of public policy support a restriction on the 
trustee's powers to abandon property in violation of laws safe-
guarding public health and safety. 
A. Congress incorporated within section 554 the judicially-
recognized limitations that subject the trustee's aban-
donment authority to general police powers. 
The judicial history of the~andonment power shows that 
A, 
a trustee must abide by generally applicable state law safeguard-
ing public health and safety. This reliance is properly placed. 
There is universal agreement that section 554 is a codification 
of the judicially developed rule of abandonment. The SG asserts 
that prior to codification, this power to abandon was subject to 
the application of general regulations of a police nature. This 
statement is correct. See Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F.2d 289 
(CA4 1952); 4A Collier on Bankruptcy 11 70.42[21 (14th ed. 1978). 
The general rule is that when Congress intends for a codification 
.j. 
to make an important change in the ope~ation of a judicially cre-
ated concept, it says so. The SG therefore contends that in en-
acting the 1978 codification of this judicially created rule, 
Congress adopted the recognized judicial limitations on the 
trustee's abandonment power by its silence in this matter. 
Judged by any measure of Congressional intent, it appears that 
Congress did not intend for the public interest exception to the 
abandonment power to be overruled by the codification of section 
554. 
[Nor can a single footnote in Ohio v. Kovacs, No. 83-
------~ 
1020, at 10 n.l2, be taken as support for petrs position. That 
footnote says, in pertinent part, "If the property were worth 
less than the cost of cleanup, the trustee would likely abandon 
it to its prior owner, who would have to comply with the state 
environmental law to the extent of his or its ability." In the 
present case, the trustee removed the guards and fire-prevention 
equipment from the Long Island site. This abandonment goes be-
yond the "legal fiction" of revesting title to the property in 
the debtor. Kovacs said nothing to cast doubt on the continuing 
vitality of the public interest exception to the abandonment pow-
er.] 
Midlantic suggests that Ottenheimer would have been de-
cided differently if if section 554 had then been in existence. 
Congress, however, must be presumed to have codified not only the 
judicially-developed rule of abandonment, but also the well-
established corollary that the trustee must exercise his abandon-
ment power in conformity with federal and state police powers. 
4. 
There is thus no merit to the contention that Ottenheimer would 
be decided differently post-1978. 
B. There is no federal preemption problem in recognizing a 
trustee's obligation to obey state environmental regula-
tion: Other sections of the Bankruptcy Code meant to 
maximize the debtor's estate are subject to state and 
federal police power regulations for health and safety 
and because Congress has repeatedly expressed a special 
interest in environmental regulation to be undertaken 
co-extensively with the state. 
The bankruptcy code was enacted to provide an order~ 
distribution of the debtor's assets by avoiding the arbitrary 
payoffs of creditors that would result from a race to the court-
house and by maximizing the value of the debtor's estate by al-
lowing for coordinated sale of various assets. Petr s contend 
that the bankruptcy law trumps state environmental legislations 
and that the trustee's power to abandon property is absolute if 
the property is found to be burdensome or of inconsequential val-
ue to the estate. 
O~er sections of _:he ban~ptc~de, however, ~n-~~ 
strate that the Bankruptcy Act, taken as a whole, supports the (J,t.<...~ 
legitimate use of stat~ce power for public health and safety 
---------------~ ----~--------~---------------------------~~ 
even when this might have some effect on the bankruptcy process. 
See 11 u.s.c. § 362 (exemption from the automatic stay provision 
for regulatory actions); 28 u.s.c. § 959 (trustee must obey state 
law). Under section 362 (b) (4), the stay under section 362 (a) (1) 
does not apply to the commencement or continuation of an action 
or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce the governmental 
unit's police or regulatory power -- when that power is for the 
public's health or safety. In two cases mentioned with disap-
proval in the House report on the section, the stay prevented 
5. 
Maine from closing down a debtor's ind4strial plant that was pol-
luting a river in violation of state environmental regulations, 
and prevented Nevada from obtaining an injunction against an in-
dividual who was violating state consumer protection laws. H.R. 
Rep. 95-595, at 174-175. 
Courts have followed this interpretation. In re Blue 
Coal Corp., 5 B.R. 571 M.D.Pa. 1979), held that an attempt to 
substitute the bankruptcy trustee for the debtor in a state court 
contempt proceeding for failure to comply with a negotiated set-
tlement of an order to backfill and maintain equipment at a strip 
mine prior to bankruptcy was not a violation of the automatic 
stay. In re Zeitzer Food Corp., Bankr. L.Rep. (CCH) 11 66,051 
y{. D. N.y. 1976), applied the automatic stay to an attempt by a 
New York agency to revoke the food purveying license of the debt-
or. The court reasoned that the purpose of the license was to 
protect against fraud, rather than to maintain the purity of the 
foods distributed. In re Parkchester General Hospital, 4 B. R. 
292 (~D.N.Y. 1978), stayed for forty-five days administrative 
efforts to revoke the hospital license of the debtor based on 
concern for adequate physician supervision. 
It seems especially important that the enforcement of 
4-tl.dl-~~ ... .oc.A ~ L~ 
health and safety regulations should ~ the bankruptcy code· in · ~~ 
"'\ 
light of Congress' heavy involvement in the regulation of hazard-
ous wastes. State environmental regulations have in large part 
been undertaken under the auspices of various federal statutes 
and compliment or complete federal schemes. Thus, petr is incor-
rect to characterize the tension between the bankruptcy provi-
6. 
sions and local environmental regulat;ions and a clash between 
federal and state provisions. To the extent that bankruptcy 
courts are entitled to take into account federal environmental 
concerns in forbidding abandonment of waste sites, see In re T.P. 
Long Chemical, Inc., 45 B.R. 278, 284-286 (Br.N.D.Ohio 1985), it 
would not interfere with a federal purpose to take into account 
identical concerns based on state law. Finally, Congress has 
demonstrate a clear intent that private parties bear as much of 
the cost of toxic waste cleanup as possible. See, e.g., CERCLA, 
42 u.s.c. §§ 9601 et seq. 
c. Considerations of ' bublic policy t'support subjecting the 
trustee's abandonment power to applicable police regula-
tions to protect the public health and safety. 
There are sound reasons for imposing the costs of clean-
up upon Quanta's creditors rather than on the public at large. 
First, as discussed above, Congress wishes to impose liability on 
private parties to clean up the wastes for which they are in some 
way responsible. The creditors, unlike the genera~ public ~ve ~ 
assumed the risk that their economic fortunes would be adversely~ 
affected by Quanta's violations of environmental statutes. Sec-
ond, allowing abandonment here would allow the owners and credi-
tors of firms in toxic-waste industries to slough off their li-
abilities while retaining their assets. As soon as liability for 
cleanup attached, the firm could file for bankruptcy, abandon 
those properties for which cleanup was required, and distribute 
the still-valuable properties among the creditors. To hold oth-
erwise would convert the trustee's abandonment power into a vehi-
cle for transferring the cost of cleanup to the public at large. 
7. 
Finally, petrs' argument of absolute abandonment power 
would lead to absurd results. If the trustee were able to exer-
cise such power, he could abandon en route a truckload of toxic 
wastes on the side of the interstate. If the trustee acknowl- q 
edges that such an abandonment power is too broad -- as he must -
- the question then simply becomes one of the reasonableness of 
particular limits on the abandonment power, and not a simple 
question of statutory construction. 
D. The takings clause argument lacks merit. 
Petrs had an economic interest in Quanta's profitability 
before Quanta's insolvency, yet they would have had no taking 
clause claim based on the assertion that compliance with environ-
mental regulations would decrease Quanta's profitability and thus 
its ability to pay back their investment. If the estate is obli-
gated to obey the same laws, I cannot see why the fact that this 
compliance will similarly reduce their ability to recoup their 
investment is transformed into a violation of the takings clause. 
Second, as creditors of Quanta, petrs assumed the risk that com-
pliance with state law -- whether prior to or during bankruptcy - ~ 
- would diminish the return on their investment. 
E. The implications of affirming the Third Circuit's judg-
ment: Who bears the costs of maintaining the site, and 
for how long, and who is responsible for the ultimate 





the site, he ~ If the trustee is not entitled to abandon 
must continue to manage it. The costs of such management, in-
eluding the provision of guards and the maintenance of the fire 
system, become administrative expenses entitled to first priority 
under section 506. The difficult question is what happens after 




1 do not believe that the estate should be kept open as ~ 
long as the assets hold out while the trustee maintains the waste 
site. Once the trustee has marshalled all of the estate's assets 
and has determined the creditors' claims, the estate should be 
. ? 
Q ~dissolved and the sites revert to the debtor and ultimately to ,..,... ____.. 
~~ states for cleanup. The state would, upon dissolution of the 
~ estate, join the unsecured creditors for a share of the remaining 
assets, unless state law gave the state a statutorily created 
lein against the estate. 
A question also arises over the specific con-
tours of the restrictions on the trustee's abandonment power. 1 
believe that an injunction against any abandonment uin violation 
of generally applicable police power regulationsfl is too impre- r 
cise. 1 would recommend following the limitations established ---------- - --for the automatic stay. Under that approach, the state may en-
~
force against the debtor any action to protect the public health 
-----------and safety, but not one to protect the public fisc or to enforce 
ugeneral welfare u regulations. A trustee could not abandon a 
hazardous waste site, but could abandon a logging tract after 
------------cutting the timber but before replanting, covering skid trails, 
or other restorative measures. If this Court were to hold other-
wise -- one example would be to hold all forms of environmental 
regulation as excepted from the abandonment power -- the excep-
tion would go beyond the traditional police power exception in 
the pre-codification interpretations of the abandonment power, 
would be out of step with the narrow construction of the excep-
tion in sec~n 364(b) to the automatic stay, and would threaten 
9. 
to disrupt bankruptcy proceedings beyond the warrant of the pub-
lie's interest in "general welfare" regulations. 
III. Conclusion 
Legislative history, congressional involvement with haz-
ardous wastes, and considerations of public policy support a re-
striction on the trustee's abandonment power. The trustee should 
be foreclosed from abandoning property when it is in contraven-




July 26, 1985 
~-801 - MidAtlantic National Bank 
v. N.J. Dept. of Environmental 
Protection 
84-805 - O'Neill, Trustee and Bankruptcy 
of Quanta Resources Corp., Debtor 
Petitioner-- v. City of N.Y., et 
al. 
MEMORANDUM TO FILE 
This memo is dictated on the basis of a preliminary 
reading of the opinions of CA3 and the DC, and 
particularly the brief amicus of the SG. 
Quanta Resources Corp. (Quanta) operates three wasre 
oil recovery facilities located, respectively, in 
Edgewater, New Jersey: Long Island City, New York: and 
Syracuse, New York. Although perhaps not relevant to the 
issue before us, when Quanta acquired the Long Island 
2. 
facility (subject to two mortgages) it also became subject 
to a consent order by the New York Dept. of Environmental 
Conservation that required Quanta to bring the facility 
into compliance with state environmental laws. In 
summary, it appears that Quanta's operations of both its 
New Jersey and New York waste oil recovery facilities 
resulted in the violation of the environmental and 
nuisance laws of the two states. Concentrations of PCB --
an extremely toxic carcinogen -- were found to exist, and 
Quanta discontinued its Edgewater Operations and also 
engaged in negotiations concerning cleanup of its other 
properties. Quanta, however, filed a petition for 
reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code 
(the Code), and Thomas J. O'Neill was appointed trustee to 
liquidate the properties. Although not necessarily 
relevant, PCB contamination at the Long Island site 
apparently was not discovered until after Quanta went into 
bankruptcy. 




"After notice and an hearing, the trustee may 
abandon any property of the estate that is 
burdensome to the estate or that is of 
inconsequential value to the estate." 
3. 
Acting under Section 554 the trustee notified 
creditors of his intention to abandon (I believe) all of 
---~ 
the contaminating sites, and the Bankruptcy Court approved 
the abandonment despite objections from state and local 
authorities that this action would threaten public health 
and safety. The DC approved of the abandonment orders, 
y-'1 
but CA3 -- with Judge Gibbons dissenting -- reversed both 
of the DC's decisions. Perhaps I should say here that one 
of ~ons related to the New Jersey properties 
and the other to those in New York, but the same issue is 
presented. 
In perhaps over-simplified language, the SG states 
the question presented as follows: 
"Whether a bankruptcy trustee's power to abandon 
property that is a financial burden to the 
bankruptcy estate is subiect to generally 




The SG argues strongly that the affirmative answer 
given by CA3 is correct, and that the judgment of that 
court should be affirmed -- though in some respect upon 
different reasoning. 
In view of the importance of the case, I would like a 
bench memo from my clerk. Despite the unequivocal 
language of §554(a), I am inclined to agree with CA3 and 
the SG. But I want my clerk, on the basis of a more 
careful study, to give me his or her recommendation and 
reasoning. If, however, the clerk should agree 
essentially with the reasoning of the SG, the bench memo 
can be quite a brief one. 
I add a few comments based primarily on the SG's 
argument. Although the briefs of the parties present the 
case as a "choice between extremes" the trustee 
demanding an absolute right to abandon hazardous waste 
while the respondents initially argued that the trustee 
must assume total responsibility for the cleaning up of 




that th's degree of nabsolutism is neither necessary nor 
desirablen. The trustee's authority to abandon property 
powers construed reasonably to 
accommodate both the Bankruptcy Code and public health 
interest. The question may be viewed as one governed by 
established principles of preemption under which federal 
law (even in absolute terms) accommodates state law to the 
extent that it is possible to do so consistently with the 
purposes of Congress. Also, §959(b) of the Bankruptcy 
Code requires the trustee to nmanage and operaten property 
in his possession in accordance with state law. 
The SG describes the nissue before this Courtn as 
nwhether §554 of the Bankruptcy Code [that authorities 
abandonment] creates an to establish law by 
...---
~ preempting generally applicable state law safeguarding 
public health and safety. In answering this question in 
the negative, the SG -- relying on legislative history 
says that §554 is a codification of a judge-made rule in 
receivership proceedings that recognizes a receiver's 
power to abandon burdensome property • Courts prior to the 
',. 
6. 
enactment of §554 had recognized that the trustee's 
abandonment authority was subject, however, to general 
police powers of the states. The SG also finds the 
application of a tradi tiona! nuisance principles to the 
facts of this case to be supported by a state law. 
Finally, the SG responds briefly to petitioner's 
claim that the application of state law threatens an 
unconstitutional taking of creditors' property rights. __ ...........____---...___,.. 
CA3 did not decide this question, and it may not be before 
us. I rather doubt that the question is a substantial one 
where in fact abandonment of property hazardous to the 
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Dear Thurgood, Harry and Lewis: 
We four are in dissent in the 
above. Would you be willing, Lewis, to 
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Although my vote to affirm was quite tentative, and 
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1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Nos. 84-801 AND 84-805 
MIDLANTIC NATIONAL BANK, PETITIONER 
M-~1 u 
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION 
THOMAS J. O'NEILL, TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY OF 
QUANTA RESOURCES CORPORATION, DEBTOR, 
PETITIONER 
M-805 v. 
CITY OF NEW YORK ET AL. 
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
[November-, 1985] 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. 
These two petitions for certiorari, which arise out of the 
same bankruptcy proceeding, present the question whether a 
bankruptcy court may condition a trustee's abandonment of 
property upon compliance with state and local environmental 
laws. We decide that the trustee's authority to "abandon 
any property that is burdensome to the estate or that is of 
inconsequential value to the estate," 11 U. S. C. § 554(a), is 
not subject to any general requirement of compliance with 
state regulatory laws. 
In October 1981, Quanta Resources Corp. (Quanta) filed a 
voluntary petition in bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U. S. C. § 1101 et seq. The following 
month the action was converted to a liquidation proceeding 
under Chapter 7, and Thomas J. O'Neill, petitioner in 
No. M-805, was thereupon appointed trustee in bankruptcy. 
At the time it filed the bankruptcy petition, Quanta was in 
-----------
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the business of storing and processing waste oils, and it is the 
operation of its facilities in Long Island City, New York, and 
Edgewater, New Jersey that .,.e at the center of this / 
dispute. IS 
At the New York site, Quanta owned the real property 
(subject to two mortgages totaling some $454,000), the facil-
ity, and its inventory. That inventory included approxi-
mately 500,000 gallons of waste oil, some 70,000 of which 
were contaminated with polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). 
The trustee, upon his appointment, obtained an appraisal of 
this property and concluded that it was of no value to the es-
tate. Mortgages exceeded the "forced sale" value, and the 
estimated cost to dispose of the contaminated waste oil prop-
erly plainly rendered the property a net burden to the estate. 
Mter trying without success to sell the site for the benefit of 
Quanta's creditors, the trustee notified the creditors and the 
Bankruptcy Court that he intended to abandon the site pur-
suant to § 554 of the Bankruptcy Code. No one disputed the 
trustee's claim that the site was "burdensome" and of "incon-
sequential value to the estate" within the meaning of § 554. 
The City and the State of New York (collectively New 
York), respondents in No. 84-805, nevertheless objected, 
contending that abandonment would threaten the public 
health and safety, and that the act of abandonment itself 
would violate state and federal environmental law. New 
York rested its objection on both "public policy consider-
ations" reflected in applicable local laws and the require-
ments of 28 U. S. C. § 959(b), which provides that a trustee 
must "manage and operate" the property of the estate "ac-
cording to the valid laws of the State in which the property is 
situated." New York asked the Bankruptcy Court to order 
that the assets of the estate be used to bring the facility into 
compliance with applicable law. Mter briefing and argu-
ment, the Bankruptcy Court approved the abandonment, 
noting that "[t]he City and State are in a better position in 
every respect than either the Trustee or debtor's creditors to 
t 
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do what needs to be done to protect the public against the 
dangers posed by the PCB-contaminated facility." 
At the Edgewater, New Jersey site, Quanta leased the un-
derlying real property and owned outright the facility and its 
inventory. Quanta processed waste oil at Edgewater pursu-
ant to a temporary operating permit issued by the New J er-
sey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP), re-
spondent in No. 84-801. On June 3, 1981, Midlantic 
National Bank (Midlantic), petitioner in No. 84-801, pro-
vided Quanta with a $600,000 working capital loan secured by 
Quanta's inventory, accounts receivable and certain of its 
equipment. Later that month, NJDEP found approximately 
400,000 gallons of PCB-contaminated oil at the Edgewater 
site. The presence of PCBs violated Quanta's operating per-
mit, and on July 2, 1981, Quanta agreed to cease operations 
at Edgewater. NJDEP and Quanta undertook negotiations 
concerning cleanup of the property but the petition in bank-
ruptcy, filed on October 6, 1981, intervened. The next day, 
NJDEP issued an administrative order requiring Quanta to 
clean up the site. I 
In April 1983, shortly after the bankruptcy court had ap- I I) . C . U . e__ , 
proved abandonment of the New rork site, the~rustee gave 
notice of his intent to abandon personal property at the 
Edgewater site, consisting principally of the contaminated 
oil. The Bankruptcy Court approved the abandonment the 
following month, over NJDEP's objection that the estate had 
sufficient funds to protect the public from the dangers posed 
by the hazardous waste. 
The United States District Court for the District of New \ 
Jersey affinned the ~ankruptcy ~ourt's determination with \ V- . L . \A • l_ . 
respect to the New York site, and New York appealed to the 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. By the time the 
Bankruptcy Court approved abandonment of the New Jersey 
property, the identical issue was already presented in New 
York's appeal to the Court of Appeals, and the parties there-
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fore consented to NJDEP's taking a direct appeal to the 
Court of Appeals pursuant to 11 U. S. C. §405(c)(l)(B). 
Following the abandonment of the New York site, New 
York cleaned up that facility, with the exception of the con-
taminated subsoil, at an estimated cost of approximately 
$2,500,000. 
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the lower 
court decisions to permit abandonment. In re Quanta Re-
sources Corp. (Quanta I), 739 F. 2d 912 (New York case); In 
re Quanta Resources Corp. (Quanta II), 739 F. 2d 927 (New 
Jersey case). While finding the legislative history of § 554 
unhelpful, the Court presumed that Congress had intended to 
codify the judge-made abandonment practice developed 
under the previous Bankruptcy Act. Prior law, the Court 
believed, held that where important state law or general eq-
uitable principles protect some public interest, that interest 
should not be overridden by the judge-made abandonment 
power unless accommodation of state interests is inconsistent 
with explicit congressional intent. The Court found no such 
intent in § 554. Instead, citing the exception to the auto-
matic stay for the enforcement of police and regulatory 
power, 11 U. S. C. §362(b)(4), (5), the requirement in 28 
U. S. C. § 959(b) that trustees manage the property of the es-
tate in compliance with state law, and the "equitable princi-
ples" that govern bankruptcy, the Court decided that Con-
gress had not intended to preempt all state regulation, only 
that grounded in policies outweighed by the relevant federal 
interest. The Court thought that the policy advanced by 
state environmental laws-protection of the public health by 
regulating the disposal of toxic wastes-outweighed the fed-
eral interest in preserving the debtor's estate for distribution 
to creditors. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals concluded 
that the Bankruptcy Court had erred in permitting abandon-
ment, and remanded both cases for further proceedings. 
The dissenting judge argued that § 554 clearly permits 
abandonment without any exception analogous to that pro-
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vided to the automatic stay. The dissent further contended 
that the majority's interpretation of § 554 raised substantial 
questions under the takings clause by potentially destroying 
the interests of secured creditors, see United States v. Secu-
rity Industrial Bank, 458 U. S. 70 (1982), and that the ma-
jority had failed to address the important underlying issue of 
the priority of the States' claims for reimbursement. 
We granted certiorari and consolidated these cases to de-
termine whether the Court of Appeals properly limited the 
trustee's authority to abandon burdensome property, --
U. S. -- (1985), and now reverse. 
As posed by the Court of Appeals, the question presented 
by these cases is whether § 554 "permit[s] the abandonment 
of property of the bankrupt estate in contravention of state 
and local environmental protections laws." 739 F. 2d, at 
913. The dissenting judge noted-properly, we think-that 
in large part the underlying dispute in both cases centers on 
who is going to pay for cleaning up the dangerous situation 
generated by Quanta's prepetition viola}i9Jls of state and 
local law. In No. 84-805, New York haftllready cleaned up 
the site and expended $2.5 million in the process. In 
No. 84-801, after we granted certiorari, New Jersey appar-
ently began a partial cleanup in cooperation with the federal 
Environmental Protection Agency. The majority of the 
Court of Appeals declined to address what priority status 
should be given the States' present and future claims for re-
imbursement. While both state law and federal bankruptcy 
law are implicated in the ultimate resolution of this question 
of priority-a question that is not presented on the record be-
fore us-"abandonment" simply is not. The decision below 
freights a trustee's decision to abandon burdensome prop-
erty, and the Bankruptcy Court's approval of that decision, 
with complex considerations quite foreign to the concerns of 
§554. 
Abandonment is "the release from the debtor's estate of 
property previously included in that estate." 2 W. Norton, 
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Bankruptcy Law and Practice § 39.01 (1985), citing Brown v. 
O'Keefe, 300 U. S. 598, 602-603 (1937). Prior to enactment 
of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, there was no statutory pro-
vision specifically authorizing abandonment in liquidation 
cases. By analogy to the trustee's statutory power to reject 
executory contracts, courts had developed a rule permitting 
the trustee to abandon property that was worthless or not 
expected to sell for a price sufficiently in excess of encum-
brances to offset the costs of administration. 4 L. King, Col-
lier on Bankruptcy ~ 554.01 (15th ed. 1985) (hereinafter Col-
lier).' This judge-made rule served the overriding purpose 
of bankruptcy liquidation: the expeditious reduction of the as-
sets of the debtor's property to money, for equitable distribu-
tion to creditors, Kothe v. R. C. Taylor Trust, 280 U. S. 224, 
227 (1930). 4 Collier ~ 554.01. Forcing the trustee to ad-
minister burdensome property would contradict this pur-
pose, slowing the administration of the estate and draining 
its assets. 
The Bankruptcy Code expressly authorizes abandonment 
for the first time in the history of bankruptcy legislation. 
The relevant provision for present purposes provides in full: 
"(a) After notice and a hearing, the trustee may aban-
don any property of the estate that is burdensome to the 
estate or that is of inconsequential value to the estate." 2 
'Under the former Bankruptcy Act, title to the debtor's property 
vested in the trustee. Abandonment divested the trustee of title and re-
vested it in the debtor. 4 Collier ~ 554.02[2]. Under the Code, the 
trustee no longer takes title to the debtor's property, 11 U. S. C. § 541, 
and he is simply divested of control over the property by the abandonment. 
Although § 554 does not specify to whom the property is abandoned, the 
legislative history suggests that it is to the person having a possessory in-
terest in the property. S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1978); 
Ohio v. Kovacs, 459 U.S.-,- n. 12 (1985). 
2 Technical amendments in the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal 
Judgeship Act of 1984 added the words "and benefit" after "value" in 
§ 554(a). Pub. L. 98-353, Tit. III, § 468(a), 98 Stat. 380 (1984). 
84-801 & 84-805-0PINION 
MIDLANTIC NAT. BANK v. N.J. DEPT. OF E. P. 7 
This language, absolute in its tenns, suggests that a trustee's 
power to abandon is limited only by considerations of the 
property's value to the estate. It makes no mention of other 
factors to be balanced or weighed and permits no easy infer-
ence that Congress was concerned about state environmental 
regulations. 3 Indeed, when Congress was so concerned it 
expressed itself clearly, specifically exempting some environ-
mental injunctions from the automatic stay provisions of § 362 
of the Code, 11 U. S. C. § 362(b)(4), (5). See Ohio v. 
Kovacs, 469 U. S.- (1985). 
Nor does the scant legislative history of§ 554 support the 
Court of Appeals' interpretation. Now here does that legis-
lative history suggest that Congress intended to limit the 
trustee's authority to abandon burdensome property where 
abandonment might be opposed by those charged with the 
exercise of state police or regulatory powers. 
Respondents seek to turn the seemingly unqualified lan-
guage and the absence of helpful legislative history to their 
advantage. Adopting the reasoning of the Court of Appeals, 
they argue that in light of Congress' failure to elaborate, 
§ 554 must have been intended to codify prior "abandonment" 
a Last Term in Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U. S. - (1985), which involved 
the dischargeability of certain environmental injunctions in bankruptcy, we 
briefly addressed the abandonment of hazardous waste sites: 
"After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of the 
estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value 
to the estate. 11 U. S. C. § 554. Such abandonment is to the person hav-
ing the possessory interest in the property. S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 92 
(1978). . . . If the site at issue were [the debtor's] property, the trustee 
would shortly determine whether it was of value to the estate. If the 
property was worth more than the costs of bringing it into compliance with 
state law, the trustee would undoubtedly sell it for its net value, and the 
buyer would clean up the property, in which event whatever obligation 
[the debtor] might have had to clean up the property would have been sat-
isfied. If the property were worth less than the cost of cleanup, the 
trustee would likely abandon it to its prior owner, who would have to com-
ply with the state environmental law to the extent of his or its ability." 
/d., at- n. 12. 
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case law, and that under prior law the trustee's power to 
abandon was subject to "'the application of general regula-
tions of a police nature.'" Quanta I, 739 F. 2d, at 916, quot-
ing 4AJ. Moore, Collier on Bankruptcy ~70.42[2], at 502-504 
(14th ed. 1978). This line of argument is unconvincing. We 
have previously expressed our unwillingness to read into un-
qualified statutory language exceptions or limitations based 
upon legislative history unless that legislative history demon-
strates with extraordinary clarity that this was indeed the in-
tent of Congress. E. g., Garcia v. United States, 469 U. S. 
--,at--, slip op. at 5 (1984). We think that upon analy-
sis the "legislative history" relied upon by respondents here 
falls far short of this standard. 
The three cases upon which both respondents and the quo-
tation from Collier rely simply do not stand for the sweeping 
proposition ascribed to them by the text writer. In 
Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F. 2d 289 (CA4 1952), the 
Court of Appeals held that a trustee might not abandon 
worthless barges obstructing traffic in the Baltimore Harbor 
if the abandonment would have constituted a violation of fed-
erallaw. Characterizing the doctrine of abandonment as ju-
dicially created, the court said: 
"The judge-made rule must give way when it comes into 
conflict with a statute enacted in order to ensure the 
safety of navigation; for we are not dealing with a burden 
imposed upon the bankrupt or his property by contract, 
but a duty and a burden imposed upon an owner of ves-
sels by an Act of Congress in the public interest." 198 
F. 2d, at 290. 
In re Lewis Jones, Inc., 1 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 277 (ED 
Pa. 1974), was a bankruptcy court decision concluding that 
the principle of Ottenheimer did not apply because there was 
no conflicting statute. The court nonetheless held that since 
the right to abandon was based on judge-made law, the court 
was free to protect the public interest by requiring a trustee 
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seeking abandonment to first spend funds of the estate to seal 
manholes and vents in an underground pipe network. In In 
re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F. 2d 1 (CA7), cert. de-
nied, 317 U. S. 683 (1942), the District Court sitting in bank-
ruptcy had authorized the bankrupt to abandon a lease of a 
rail line, and a lessor appealed. The bankrupt did not appeal 
the District Court's imposition of conditions on the ~b~ndon- I 
ment. The Court of Appeals affirmed .the ~istrict 
Court's authorization of abandonment, and while there may 
be dicta in its opinion that would support respondent's posi-
tion, the holding of the case certainly does not. 
Ottenheimer depended on the need to reconcile a conflict 
between a judicial gloss on the Bankruptcy Act and the com-
mands of another federal statute. We implicitly confirmed 
the validity of such an approach two Terms ago in NLRB v. 
Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U. S. 513, 523-524 (1984). But that 
principle is far narrower than the broad doctrine for which 
Ottenheimer was cited in the quotation from Collier on Bank-
ruptcy-that a trustee's power to abandon is subject to "the 
application of general regulations of a police nature." 
Lewis Jones admittedly went further, on a different line of 
reasoning, but we do not believe that the isolated decision of 
a single bankruptcy court rises to the level of "established 
law" that we can fairly assume Congress intended to incorpo-
rate. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. 
Curran, 456 U. S. 353, 379-382 (1982). In addition, both 
Ottenheimer and Lewis Jones relied heavily on the fact that 
the pre-Code law of abandonment was judge-made, which in 
turn raises the somewhat Delphic inquiry as to whether these 
cases would have been decided the same way by those courts 
under the present Code. 
It may be argued, of course, that it is the quotation from 
Collier, albeit inaccurately characterizing the decided cases, 
that Congress wanted to incorporate into the Code. Con-
gress may if it wishes adopt the judgment of a commentator 
that the decided cases under an existing federal statute ought 
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to be subject to a particular exception, so long as Congress' 
intent appears in the usual statutory materials. But the 
statement in Collier relied on here did not purport to make an 
independent judgment as to the desirability of qualifying the 
trustee's authority to abandon; it purported only to describe 
existing case law. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it must be noted 
that the only reference to Collier was not in the legislative 
history of the present Code, but in that of an early precursor 
of § 554, § 4-611 of the proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973, 
H. R. Doc. No. 137, Part II, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 181, re-
printed in A. Resnick & E. Wypanski, 2 Bankruptcy Reform 
Act of 1978: A Legislative History, Doc. No. 22 (1979). And 
the proposition for which the section in Collier is cited is not 
the view that authority for abandonment is qualified by state 
police power, but instead the much less remarkable proposi-
tion that "[t]he concept of abandonment is well recognized in 
the case law. See 4A Collier§ 70.42[3]." A Senator or Con-
gressman seeking to familiarize himself with the statutory 
provision for abandonment in the Code, therefore, in order to 
divine that the statutory power to abandon was to be condi-
tioned on compliance with state police power regulations, 
would not merely have had to look at the legislative history of 
the precursor to the Code, but also would have had to read 
the several-page treatise section cited in that earlier legisla-
tive history. 
This reference to the since superseded version of Collier is 
simply too attenuated, for the various reasons we have 
stated, to support the inference that Congress, while writing 
§ 554 in unqualified terms, intended to incorporate so broad 
and uncertain an exception to the abandonment authority of 
the trustee. Congress knew how to draft an exemption cov-
ering the exercise of police powers when it wanted to. See 
11 U. S. C. § 362(b)(4), (5); supra, at-. It also knew how 
to draft a qualified abandonment provision. See id., 
§ 1170(a)(2) (abandonment of railroad lines permitted only if 
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"consistent with the public interest"). Its failure to so qual-
ify § 554 indicates that Congress intended the relevant in-
quiry at an abandonment hearing to be limited to whether the 
property is burdensome and of inconsequential value to the 
estate. 
Respondents also seek support from 28 U. S. C. § 959(b), 
which provides that "a trustee . . . shall manage and operate 
the property . . . according to the requirements of the valid 
laws of the state in which such property is situated." "Man-
agement," the argument runs, surely embraces the trustee's 
abandonment of property; where abandonment violates state 
law, as it does here,• the trustee is without authority to 
abandon. For their part, petitioners contend that § 959 is in-
applicable to a trustee's actions taken in the course of liquida-
tion, citing 7 J. Moore & J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice 
~66.04[4], at 1913 (2d ed. 1985) ("959(b) applies only to the 
receiver is his operation of property in his possession ... 
[not] to the distribution of the estate"). But whether or not 
temporary management or operation of a facility during liqui-
dation is governed by § 959(b }-a question we need not and 
do not decide-the trustee's filing of a petition to abandon 
does not constitute "manage[ment]" or "operat[ion]." Not 
only would a contrary holding strain the language of§ 959(b), 
cf. In re Adelphi Hospital Corp., 579 F. 2d 726, 729 n. 6 
(CA2 1978) (per curiam) (in pre-Code liquidation proceeding 
'New York and NJDEP contend that the "act" of abandonment itself 
violates state law. They argue that by revesting control over the prop-
erty to an assetless Quanta, unable to act with respect to the site, abandon-
ment constitutes "disposal" of the hazardous wastes in contravention of 
state law, seeN. Y. Envir. Conserv. Law§§ 71-2702, 71-2713 (McKinney 
1984); N. J. Stat. Ann. § 13:1E-3, -4 (West 1979). To the extent that 
these laws in fact · equate abandonment with unlawful "disposal," they are 
the equivalent of laws expressly barring abandonment of hazardous waste 
sites and plainly frustrate federal bankruptcy policy as expressed in § 554, 
see discussion in text at - - -. Assuming that respondents cor-
rectly characterize the effect of these laws, the laws would be preempted if 
applied here. See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U. S. 637, 644 (1971). 
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trustee "is in no sense a manager of an institution's opera-
tions"), it also would create an exception to the abandonment 
power without a shred of evidence that Congress intended to 
do so. As one commentator has noted, § 554(a) "is among 
the few provisions in the Bankruptcy Code that do not con-
tain explicit exceptions." Note, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 870, 883 
(1985). We decline to read 28 U. S. C. § 959(b) as creating 
an implicit exception. 5 
Finally, citing SEC v. United States Realty & Improve-
ment Co., 310 U. S. 434, 455 (1940), respondents argue that 
the Bankruptcy Court's equitable powers support the result 
reached below. We disagree. While the Bankruptcy Court 
is a court of equity, the Bankruptcy Code "does not authorize 
free-wheeling consideration of every conceivable equity." 
Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U. S., at 527. The Bankruptcy 
Court may not, in the exercise of its equitable powers, en-
force its view of sound public policy at the expense of the in-
terests the Code is designed to protect. In these cases, it is 
undisputed that the properties in question were burdensome 
and of inconsequential value to the estate. Forcing the 
trustee to expend estate assets to clean up the sites would 
plainly be contrary to the purposes of the Code. See supra, 
at--. 
We emphasize that our holding does not render a bank-
ruptcy court powerless to prevent a trustee from surrep-
titiously abandoning a toxic waste site, leaving the public un-
aware and unprotected. Requiring the trustee to notify the 
relevant authorities before abandoning, for example, is per-
5 In the Court of Appeals, New York sought reimbursement for its 
cleanup cost as an "administrative expense" of the estate under 11 U. S. C. 
§ 503(b). In particular, it argued that those costs were "actual, necessary 
costs of preserving the estate." ld., §503(b)(l)(A). The Court of Ap-
peals declined to address this claim, and New York now presses the more 
modest argument that § 503(b)(l)(A) authorizes the trustee to expend es-
tate assets to maintain or clean up the property in question. Whether or 
not it provides such authority, however, § 503(b)(l)(A) surely offers no in-
dependent ground for forcing the trustee to retain burdensome property. 
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fectly consistent with the Code. Such a requirement ad-
vances the state's interest in protecting the public health and 
safety by permitting it to step in and at least maintain the 
status quo, and at the same time allows for the orderly liqui-
dation and distribution of the estate's assets. Here, of 
course, the trustee provided such notice and the relevant au-
thorities were afforded an opportunity to take appropriate 
preventative and remedial measures. 
Our holding likewise does not exclude the possibility that 
there may be a far narrower condition on the abandonment 
power than that advanced by respondents here, such as 
where abandonment by the trustee might itself create a gen-
uine emergency that the trustee would be uniquely able to 
guard against. The United States in its brief as amicus cu-
riae suggests, for example, that there are limits upon the au-
thority of a trustee to abandon dynamite sitting on a furnace 
in the basement of a schoolhouse. Although we know of no 
cases in which trustees have sought to abandon dynamite 
under such circumstances, the existence of the narrow excep-
tion which we reserve would surely embrace that situation. 
Respondents' interest in these cases lies not just in pro-
tecting public health and safety but also in protecting the 
public fisc. In No. 84-805, before undertaking cleanup ef-
forts, New York unsuccessfully sought from the Bankruptcy 
Court a first lien on the Long Island City property to the ex-
tent of any expenditures it might make to bring the site into 
compliance with state and local law. New York did not ap-
peal the Court's denial of a first lien and proceeded to clean 
up the site (except for the contaminated subsoil). It now 
presses a claim for reimbursement, maintaining that the 
trustee should not have been allowed to abandon the site. 
NJDEP, in No. 84-801, apparently seeks to undo the aban-
donment and force the trustee to expend the estate's remain-
ing assets cleaning up the site, thereby reducing the cleanup 
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costs that must ultimately be born by the State. 6 
Barring abandonment and forcing a cleanup, however, 
would effectively place respondents' interest in protecting 
the public fisc ahead of the claims of other creditors. Con-
gress simply did not intend that § 554 abandonment hearings 
would be used to establish the priority of particular claims in 
bankruptcy. While states retain considerable latitude to en-
sure that priority status is allotted to their cleanup claims, 
see Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U. S. --,--,slip op. at 1 (1985) 
(O'CONNOR, J., concurring), they may not accomplish that re-
sult by imposing conditions on the abandonment power that 
Congress never contemplated. . 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals in each of these 
cases is 
Reversed. 
1 NJDEP does not contend that the estate, including any assets other-
wise subject to Midlantic's secured claim, contains sufficient assets to com-
plete the cleanup. 
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November 15, 1985 
No. 84-801 Midlantic National Bank v. N. J. 
Department of Environmental Protection 
No. 84-805 O'Neill v. City of New York 
Dear Bill, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
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O'Neill v. City of New York, et al 
Dear Bill, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely yours, 
JusticP Rehnquist 
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Dear Bill: 
Bill Brennan has assigned me the task of writinq a 
dissent jn accordance wtth my Conference vote. In due time 
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lfp/ss 11/21/85 MIDC SALLY-POW 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Cabell DATE: Nov. 21, 1985 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
84-801 and 84-805 Midlantic National Bank 
My reaction to your first draft that I reviewed 
last night is generally favorable. In addition to editing 
and a number of marginal questions, I have the following 
comments: 
1. Your first sentence is an example of your "sa-
tirical power" -a verbal "bomb shell". Unless there is 
clear record support for the contrast you draw, it should be 
substantially tempered or omitted. Even with record sup-
port, the language may be a little injudicious although it 
will certainly "grab" the reader's attention! 
2. A reader will understand our dissent better if 
the first paragraph states clearly what the Court holds. 
Then, if there is support for your present first sentence, 
we can put it in a footnote if it is toned down a bit. 
3. In the early part of the draft there are too 
few citations to the record, or to statutes or cases to sup-
port some of the statements. 
4. The cases cited to establish the "common law" 
rule are - for the most part - a bit old, and absent quota-
tions of relevant language in the decisions, are not partie-
ularly persuasive. I hope there is some quotable language, 
•' 
2. 
and also some express indication that these cases can be 
viewed as applying a common law rule. I do not believe the 
draft states explicitly what the "rule" is. I assume you 
have relied on the same cases cited by the SG for the common 
law rule. 
5. Part III is predicated on the view that the 
Court's opinion confers "unrestricted abandonment power upon 
a trustee". As I only hurriedly skimmed the Court's opinion 
when it was first circulated (and did not have it at home 
with me last night) , I do not know whether this is a fair 
statement of what the Court holds without any qualification. 
6. As I have had no bankruptcy experience, and no 
occasion since coming on the Court to become familiar with 
bankruptcy law, I am fortunate to have a clerk who took the 
bankruptcy course in law school. This does place a somewhat 
greater responsibility on you than normally would be the 
case. If there can be reasonable differences of opinion as 
to some of your statements as to bankruptcy law you might 
brief me on these or suggest what I should read. 
* * * 
Despite what is said above, I think your first 
draft basically is good and I commend you on the promptness 
with which you completed a first draft. It would have taken 
me a month? 
L.F.P., Jr. 
ss 
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5. Part III is predicated on the view that the 
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when it was first circulated (an~ did not l-lave it at home 
with me last night), I do not know whether this is a fair. 
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6. As I have had no bankruptcy expPrience, and no 
occasion since comtng on the Court to become familiar with 
bankruptcv 1aw, I am fortunate to have a cl~rk ~~71-to tool< the 
bankruptcy course in law school. This does place a somewhat 
greater responsibilitY on vou than norrnalJv woul~ be the 
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Dear Lewis, 
Midlantic National Bank 
v. New Jersey Dept. of 
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O'Neill v. New York 
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CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
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.. aglthtgt(tlt. ~. Qt. 2ll.Si?l' 
Re: No. 84-801) Midatlantic Bank v. New Jersey 
Department of Environmental Protection 
No. 84-805) O'Neill v. City of New York 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me in your dissent. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
985 
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JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
j;u.vumt Qtomt of tqt 'J!Utitt~ j;tahg 
1lJa:gJrin!lhtn. ~. Qt. 21lpJ!.;l 
December 2, 1985 
Re: Nos. 84-801 and 805-Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. 
New Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection and 
O'Neill v. City of New York 
Dear Lewis: 
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THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.Ju.pt'tntt <lfltltri Df tlft ~b .Jbttte 
._aeltinghtn. ~. C!J. 20p~~ 
December 4, 1985 
No. 84-801 - Midlantic Bank v. N.J. Department 
of Environmental Protection 





Copie~ to the Conference 
CCC 12/19/85 
84-801, Midlantic Corp. v. NJ Dep't Envtl. Protection 
Two issues have arisen in converting your dissent 
into a Court opinion. 
1. Limited Effect of the Holding. The Court's cor-
rect decision to condition abandonment on compliance with 
certain regulatory laws may often have little ultimate effect 
on bankrupt's handling of toxic waste dumps - the primary 
area of concern. Here, for example, a restriction on aban-
donment would have forced the trustee only to hold onto the 
property until the liquidation was completed. Upon conclu-
sion of the proceedings, the mortgage holders would have the 
option of repossessing the sites. They would decline. The 
property would revert to the corporate shell of the debtor, 
and then that shell would dissolve. The State would then 
have to clean up. 
I recommend that you consider acknowledging this in ~ .-
the opinion. ~nowledgment underscores the limited J~ ~ 
--------- ~ scope of the restriction the Court has read into the Bank-.?t-~ 
ruptcy Code: Abandonment is conditioned upon compliance w i th &-1. c.-
certain regulatory laws, but the Court is not altering th~ 
priorities of creditors' claims beyond the immediate effect M-6--1- t.uJ,. 
of a restricted abandonment. Second, lower courts that are~ 
unfamiliar with bankruptcy will not believe that a restric-
tion on abandonment inevitably leads to cleanup by the debt-
page 2. 
or. Finally, the acknowledgment signals that the Court has 
followed the implications of its holding through the bank-
ruptcy proceeding and is aware of what the holding does and 
doesn't mean. 




needs to be said about the nature of laws consti-_____ ......._ 
tute conditions on abandonment. My beli we can 
~-~­
state that any statute or regulation reason 
p~ pretermits the abandonment power. This state-
ment would nof encompass abandonment that creates ~ iRde~er-
~ dL-- /lc;~~ 
min.a te harm. Qt' speculative danger, and would preclude a ,__/,---. 
1 
state's limiting abandonment power with laws that carried a 
mere label of "Public Health and Safety" but bore little re-
lation to that welfare. 
I can continue to work on the Court opinion well 
into Friday before coming against these issues. There is ?-W!-
much more to say on both these subjects, but will rever~ 
elaboration unless and until you believe that you would bene-~~ 
fit from it. ~all-. 
December 19, 1985 Cabell Argued Case Supp. 
·.:· 
CHAMBERS OF 
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.JUSTICE w .. . .J . BRENNAN, .JR. 
December 30, 1985 
No. 84-801) Midlantic 
) National Bank 
) v. New Jersey 
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December 30, 1985 
Re: No. 84-801) Midatlantic Bank v. New Jersey 
Department of Environmental Protection 
No. 84-805) O'Neill v. City of New York 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
C HAM BERS OF 
~~~~mm~t~t~mub~mug 
Jll«tJrht:gtett. ~. ~· 2.0:~~$ 
v 
J U S TI C E HARRY A . BLACKM U N December 30, 1985 
Re: No. 84-801) Midatlantic Bank v. New Jersey 
Department of Environmental Protection 
No. 84-805) O'Neill v. City of New York 
Dear Lewis: 
By separate note, I am joining your opinion. 
Although of no great consequence, two matters concern 
me: (1) I do not understand the reference to "Post, at 5" in 
the center of page 7. (2) In the fourth line of page 4 is a 
reference to 11 u.s.c. §405(c) (1) (B). I believe there is no 
such section. There is one in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
1978. Bill Rehnquist had the correct reference, I think, at 
the top of page 4 of his proposed majority opinion as recir-
culated December 4. 
<D Po~t o:1 "B -9 '-...._ 
G) ~ 40~ (')U)(~) ~ ~ 
~CAM\~ A~ CJ\ \~ 1~ 
Justice Powell 
CHAMBERS 01"" 
..JUSTICE ..JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
Re: 
Dear Lewis: 
.ilupr.ruu Clf&tlttt &rf tift ~t.tb .tltatt• 
,rulfiqhm. ~. Qf. 2ll?"'' 
January 7, 1986 
There is some question in my mind ~bout the 
exact reach of the holding in your proposed opinion. 
The pre-1978 abandonment cases that you discuss, and 
in particular the Chicago Rapid Transit case and the 
Lewis Jones case, suggest that there can be no 
abandonment without imposing appropriate conditions. 
Although the Ottenheimer case seems to suggest that 
there can be no abandonment at all when it would 
violate an independent safety rule, the safety rule 
in that case simply required the debtor "to care for 
or dispose of [the property] in the manner prescribed 
by the statute." 198 F.2d, at 290. 
In this case, as you point out on page 3 and in 
footnote 3, no conditions were imposed. Thus, this 
abandonment was plainly improper. But what if the 1 
bankruptcy 'ud e had imposed co d't ons that re uired 
th ustee to ma1nta1n t e guard service and make 
enoug temporary repatrs to orestall ·any immtnent 
danger o a ertous ragedy? The last paragraph of 
your opinion seems to state that such an abandonment 
would also be impermissible. 
I found that I could not subscribe to Bill 
Rehnquist's proposed disposition because it seemed to 
authorize the trustee to abandon without any 
constraint whatsoever imposed by State law. You have 
convinced me that that position is untenable. I am 
inclined to believe that the opposite extreme would I 
be e ually unsatisfactory. Speci 1cally, I could not ~ 
su sc 1 e o a o 1ng that the State could veto any 
aban , no matter ow many sa ety precaut1ons 
I 
- 2 -
were taken and no matter how much money the estate 
had spent in an effort to rectify the problem. At 
some point it will become necessary to close the 
estate and at that time there may be no alternative 
to an abandonment that violates State law.l 
Thus, I wonder if it might be wise to nnrr 
holding by stating explicitly (1) that it was 
to authori~ent without imposing 
safety conditions and (2) that we are no 
that there are no circumstances that could ever 
justify an abandonment that may violate State law--
there may be cases in which an estate could not 
otherwise be closed. , . 
Respectfully, 
Justice Powell 
lThe underlying dispute, of course, is how to finance the 
cleanup costs that must be incurred as a consequence of the 
debtor's pre-bankruptcy conduct. That dispute will be affected 
by .both State and Federal rules of law that have not been brought 
to our attention in this proceedjng, and we obviously cannot say 
very much about it. (My very tentative assumption is that those 
costs can properly be assessed against the unencumbered assets of 
the estate, but probably not against secured creditors.) In any 
event, it seems to me that it may have been error for the 
Bankruptcy Court to approve the abandonment without first 
deciding, at least in a general way, how the cleanup costs were 
to be allocated. 
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January 7, 1986 
Re: 84-801 - Midlantic National Bank v. 
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Environmental Protection 
84-805 - O'Neill v. City of New York 
Dear Lewis: 
There is some question in my mind about the 
exact reach of the holding in your proposed opinion. 
The pre-1978 abandonment cases that you discuss, and 
in particular the Chicago Rapid Transit case and the 
Lewis Jones case, suggest that there can be no 
abandonment wi~t imposin~ appropriate conditions. 
Altfiougn the Otterifie1mer case seems to suggest that 
there can be no abandonment at all when it would 
violate an independent safety rule, the safety ~ule 
in that case simply required the debtor "to car• for 
or dispose of [the property] in the manner prescribed 
by the statute." 198 F.2d, at 290. 
In 1bj§-Case, as you point out on page 3 and in 
footnote 3, no conditions were~osed. Thus, this 
abandonment was plainly improper. But what if the 
bankruptcy judge had imposed conditions that required 
the trustee to maintain the guard service and make 
enough temporary repairs to forestall any imminent 
danger of a serious tragedy? The last paragraph of 
your opinion seems to state that such an abandonment 
would also be impermissible. 
I found that I could not subscribe to Bill 
Rehnquist's proposed disposition because it seemed to 
authorize the trustee to abandon without any 
constraint whatsoever imposed by State law. You have 
convinced me that that position is untenable. I am 
inclined to believe that the opposite extreme would 
be equally unsatisfactory. Specifically, I could not 
subscribe to a holding that the State could veto any 
abandonment, no matter how many safety precautions 
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were taken and no matter how mu h money the estate 
had spent in an effort to rect'fy the problem. At 
some point it will become nece sary to close the 
estate and at that time there ay be no alternative 
to an abandonment that violate State law.l 
Thus, I wonder if it mig be wise to narrow our 
holding by stating explicitly (1) that it was error 
to authorize the abandonment ithout imposing ~~ 
safety conditions and (2) th t we are not holding 
that there are no circumstances that could ever 
justify an abandonment that may violate State law--
there may be cases in which an estate could not 
otherwise be closed. 
Respectfully, 
Justice Powell 
lThe underlying dispute, of course, is how to finance the 
cleanup costs that must be incurred as a consequence of the 
debtor's pre-bankruptcy conduct. That dispute will be affected 
by both State and Federal rules of law that have not been brought 
to our attention in this proceeding, and we obviously cannot say 
very much about it. (My very tentative assumption is that those 
costs can properly be assessed against the unencumbered assets of 
the estate, but probably not against secured creditors.) In any 
event, it seems to me that it may have been error for the 
Bankruptcy Court to approve the abandonment without first 
deciding, at least in a general way, how the cleanup costs were 
to be allocated. 
I\.../ 
CCC 0lj07j86 
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Justice Steven's Letter of Jan. 7, 1985 
Justice Stevens has sent a letter that I interpret as an 
expression of concern over the exact bredth of the Court's hold-
ing. I believe that Justice Stevens is especially concerned that 
a state might be able to obtain a "super-priority" on the estate 
of a debtor by enacting multi tudenous laws labelled "For Public 
Health And Safety." Because this is an issue that you specifi-
cally considered, and because your thoughts are close to those I 
attribute to Justice Stevens, I believe only some minor changes 
are necessary. 
I have taken the liberty of talking with Justice Ste-
vens' clerk. Although I may not be clear on exactly what changes 
would satisfy Justice Stevens, the clerk was concerned about the 
discussions ot Ottenheimer and 
changes indicated on pages 6 
§ 959. Accordingly, I suggest the 
and 10 of the attached draft. To 
the extent it was appropriate for him to do so, Justice Stevens' 
clerk expressed a belief that these changes would help answer the 
concerns in the January 7th letter. 
Beyond those sections, Justice Stevens' main concern 
seems to be that we are holding a trustee may never abandon prop-
erty in contravention of State law. Your language limits the 
trumping of federal bankruptcy to "a state statute or regulation 
that is reasonably designed to protect the public health or safe-
ty from identified hazards." You also say in note 11 that not 
every state law trumps the abandonment power. 1 believe that 
' 
page 2. 
these qualifications, in conjunction with the changes on pages 6 
(!)J\.N 
and 10, i~ sufficient. If not, elaboration in footnote 11 would 
be appropriate. 
I do not believe that abandonment is permissible if the 
trustee takes steps "to forestall any imminent danger of a seri-
ous tragedy." Letter of Jan. 7 ,I 2. The notion of a trustee's 
abandoning the property while maintaining a guard service and 
fire-suppression system, as suggested by Justice Stevens, seems 
self-contradictory. Here the trustee abandoned the property to 
save on these expenses. In a more general sense, I perceive your 
opinion as holding that an abandonment may not threaten the pub-
lie's health or safety. If Justice Stevens actually means that 
abandonment may be conditioned only on "forestall[ing] any immi-
nent danger of serious tragedy," we may have to fight with Jus-
tice Rehnquist again for Justice Stevens' vote. 
The last two paragraphs of Justice Stevens' letter show 
a belief that the debtor's estate cannot be closed until the 
~-------------------~-----------------------------------property is abandoned or brought into compliance with the appli-
cable state laws. I researched this question, and found that the 
~
probable course of events would be for the debtor to retain the 
real property until all other affairs pertaining to the liquida-
tion were completed. At that point, the bankruptcy court would 
conclude the liquidation proceedings without regard to the re-
tained real property. Mortgage holders on the property (or their 
equivalent for personal property) would then have the opportunity 
to secure title to the property. If they refused, the property 
would revert to the corporate shell of the debtor. Because the 
page .J. 
shell would be without assets, the ul~imate responsibility and 
liability for cleanup would be imposed upon the State. The State 
would not have effective financial recourse for repayment. Crim-
inal proceedings would be possible against officers of the corpo-
ration, if appropriate under the facts and authorized by statute. 
1 do not know to what extent this line of thought has influenced 
Justice Stevens. 1 have spoken with his clerk about my views on 
the bankruptcy proceedings outlined above. 
Justice Stevens mentions in a footnote that the "under-
lying dispute" is how to finance the cleanup. You mentioned this 
in an earlier draft: "The ultimate issue in this litigation may 
be said to reduce to the priority of creditors' claims." See 
Chambers Draft 3 n. 2 (forebear of present n. 2). If Justice 
Stevens feels the need to say more than the present note 2, per-
haps we can resurrect some of the older language. 1 did not spe-
~---------------------------------· cifically propose this change to Justice Stevens' clerk, because 
1 am not sure Justice Stevens believes note 2 is insufficient. 
Justice Stevens will be back in town tomorrow. Subject 
to your approval, 1 will propose the changes on page 6 and 10, 
and hope for the best. 
January 7, 1986; 4:39 PM Cabell Op. Supp. 
CCC 0lj08j86 
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Justice Steven's Letter of Jan. 7, 1985 
Justice Stevens has sent a letter that I interpret as an 
expression of concern over the exact bredth of the Court's hold-
ing. I believe that Justice Stevens is especially concerned that 
a state might be able to obtain a "super-priority" on the estate 
of a debtor by enacting multitudenous laws labelled "For Public 
Health And Safety." Because this is an issue that you specifi-
cally considered, and because your thoughts are close to those I 
attribute to Justice Stevens, I believe only some minor changes 
are necessary. 
I have taken the liberty of talking with Justice Ste-
vens' clerk. Although I may not be clear on exactly what changes 
would satisfy Justice Stevens, the clerk was concerned about the 
discussions on Ottenheimer and § 959. Accordingly, I suggest the 
changes indicated on pages 6 and 10 of the attached draft. To 
the extent it was appropriate for him to do so, Justice Stevens' 
clerk expressed a belief that these changes would help answer the 
concerns in the January 7th letter. 
Beyond those sections, Justice Stevens' main concern 
seems to be that we are holding a trustee may never abandon prop-
erty in contravention of State law. Your language limits the 
trumping of federal bankruptcy to "a state statute or regulation 
that is reasonably designed to protect the public health or· safe-
ty from identified hazards." You also say in note 11 that not 
every state law trumps the abandonment power. I believe that 
page .t.. 
these qualifications, 
and 10, are sufficient. 
be appropriate. 
in conjunction with the changes on pages 6 
' 
If not, elaboration in footnote 11 would 
I do not believe that abandonment is permissible if the 
trustee takes steps "to forestall any imminent danger of a seri-
ous tragedy." Letter of Jan. 7 ,I 2. The notion of a trustee's 
abandoning the property while maintaining a guard service and 
fire-suppression system, as suggested by Justice Stevens, seems 
self-contradictory. Here the trustee abandoned the property to 
save on these expenses. In a more general sense, I perceive your 
opinion as holding that an abandonment may not threaten the pub-
lie's health or safety. If Justice Stevens actually means that 
abandonment may be conditioned only on "forestall[ing] any immi-
nent danger of serious tragedy," we may have to fight with Jus-
tice Rehnquist again for Justice Stevens' vote. 
The last two paragraphs of Justice Stevens' letter show 
a belief that the debtor's estate cannot be closed until the 
property is abandoned or brought into compliance with the appli-
cable state laws. I researched this question, and found that the 
probable course of events would be for the debtor to retain the 
real property until all other affairs pertaining to the liquida-
tion were completed. At that point, the bankruptcy court would 
conclude the liquidation proceedings without regard to the re-
tained real property. Mortgage holders on the property (or their 
equivalent for personal property) would then have the opportunity 
to secure title to the property. If they refused, the property 
would revert to the corporate shell of the debtor. Because the 
page .:S. 
shell would be without assets, the ultimate responsibility and 
liability for cleanup would be imposed upon the State. The State 
would not have effective financial recourse for repayment. Crim-
inal proceedings would be possible against officers of the corpo-
ration, if appropriate under the facts and authorized by statute. 
1 do not know to what extent this line of thought has influenced 
Justice Stevens. 1 have spoken with his clerk about my views on 
the bankruptcy proceedings outlined above. 
Justice Stevens mentions in a footnote that the "under-
lying dispute" is how to finance the cleanup. You mentioned this 
in an earlier draft: "The ultimate issue in this litigation may 
be said to reduce to the priority of creditors' claims." See 
Chambers Draft 3 n. 2 (forebear of present n. 2). 1f Justice 
Stevens feels the need to say more than the present note 2, per-
haps we can resurrect some of the older language. 1 did not spe-
cifically propose this change to Justice Stevens' clerk, because 
1 am not sure Justice Stevens believes note 2 is insufficient. 
Justice Stevens will be back in town tomorrow. Subject 
to your approval, 1 will propose the changes on page 6 and 10, 
and hope for the best. 
January 8, 1986; 8:48 AM Cabell Op. Supp . 
. ' 
. ~ · . . 
Altha.lgh these cases 
oo not define for us 
the exact ocntours of 
the trustee. s abandcn-
. :nent power, they do make 
clear that this power 
was subject ·to certain 
restricticns when Con-
gress enacted~ 554(a). 
84-801 & 84-806-0PINION 
6 lriiDLANTIC NAT. BANK v. N. J. DEPT. OF E. P. 
that the trustee of a debtor transit company could not cease 
its operation of a branch railway line when loeallaw required 
continued operation. While the court did not forbid the 
trustee to abandon property (i. e., to reject an unexpired 
lease), it conditioned his actions to ensure compliance with 
state law. Similarly, in In re Lewis Jones, Inc., 1 B. C. D. 
'1:17 (Bkrtey Ct. ED Pa. 1974), the bankruptcy court invoked 
its equitable power to "safeguard the public interest" by re-
quiring the debtor public utilities to seal underground steam 
lines before abandoning them. 
Thus, when Congress enacted § 554, there were well-rec-
ognized restrictions on a trustee's abandonment power. In 
codifying the judicially-developed rule of abandonment, Con-
gress also presumably included the established corollary that 
a trustee could not exercise his abandonment power in viola-
tion of certain state and federal laws. The nonnal rule of 
statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legisla-
tion to change the interpretation of a judieially created con-
cept, it makes that intent specific. Ed'TTUYrlds v. Compagnie 
Generale Transatlantique, 443 U. S. 256, 266-267 (1979). 
The Court has followed this rule with particular care in eon- . 
struing the scope of bankruptcy codifications. If Congress 
wishes to grant the trustee an extraordinary exemption from 
non-bankruptcy law, "the intention would be clearly ex-
pressed, not left to be collected or inferred from disputable 
considerations of convenience in administering the estate of 
the bankrupt." Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U.S. 441, 444 
(1904); see Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U. S. 79, 85 (1939) 
("If this old and familiar power of the states [over local rail-
road service] was withdrawn when Congress gave district 
courts bankruptcy powers over railroads, we ought to find 
language fitting for so drastic a change")./\ 
·Ill 
Neither the Court nor Congress has granted a trustee in 
bankruptcy powers that would lend support to a right to 
84-801 &: 84-806-0PINION 
10 MIDLANTIC NAT. BANK v. N.J. DEPT. OF E. P. 
empt all state laws. Section 959(b) commands the debtor in 
possession to "manage and operate the property in his pos-
session ... according to the requirements of the valid laws of 
the State." The petitioners have contended that §959(b) is 
relevant only when the trustee is actually operating the busi-
ness of the debtor, and not when he is liquidating it. 
We conclude that § 959(b) applies when the trustee is 
liquidating a debtor's business because that interpretation 
gives meaning to both the words "manage" and ''operate." 
Courts "are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word 
Congress used," Reiterv. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330,339 
(1979), and § 959(b), on its face, encompasses something more 
than "operation." As the Court of Appeals noted, there is no 
reason why the phrase '"rnanage[ment]' of the 'property,"' 
coqld not describe a trustee's custodial care and disposition of 
property in bankruptcy liquidation. In re Quanta Resources 
Corp., 739 F. 2d, at 919.8 This reading is consistent with 
the section's legislative history, which shows the provision 
was designed to place railroad receiverships within the reach 
Secticn 959 (b) does not, of state law.• The J)Feeef)t ef § 959(9) is elear; "[T]he g:eals ef 
of course, delimit the ~e feaeP&l . bftnlEPI:if)tey laws, iBehulmg rehabiBtatieR ef the 
precise conditions on an aeeteP, ae Ret &l:lthePise tPimBgf'eSSi9R ef stat.e }&V;.s settmg 
~~~~ (a)PeEI~ffieBtS fep. the epei'BtieB. ef tfie B\ismess, e¥eR if the 
Secticn 959 (b) Is limita- . eeBbfll:lea epe1'8'b6ft ef the Bl:lSHless wel:lla ee tfiwel"tea ey 
ticn, ~, supports ·applying state laws " Chid 
oor finding that Ccngress ----
did not intend for the quirements of the valid laws of the State in which such property is situ-
Bankruptcy OXie to pre--- ated, in the same manner that the owner or possessor thereof would be 
enpt all state laws. bound to do if in possession thereof." 
'See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U. S. 
-, - (1985) (stating, after surveying the trustee's various powers, 
that "the Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee wide-ranging management 
authority over the debtor"). 
'SeeS. Misc. Doc. No. 44, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1888); S. Misc. Doc. 
No.7, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1887); S. Misc. Doc. No. 19, 49th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1886); H. R. Misc. Doc. No. 45, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. (1886). 
We also 'Walld have a 
different case when a 
bankruptcy calrt autho-
rized abaOOament con-
ditiooed l.JtXIl the trus-
tee IS adequately pro-
tecting the p.lblic 1 s 
health and safety. 
84-801 cl 84-805-QPINION 
12 MIDLANTIC NAT. BANK 11. N.J. DEPT. OF E. P. 
to the public health or welfare or the environment because of 
an actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance." 
42 U. S. C. § 9606. In the face of Congress' undisputed con-
cern over the risks of the improper storage and disposal of 
hazardous and toxic substances, we are unwilling to presume 
that by enactment of§ 554(a), Congress implicitly overturned 
long-standing restrictions on the common-law abandonment 
power. 
v 
In the light of the restricted pre-1978 abandonment power 
of the bankruptcy trustee and in the context of the limited 
scope of other Bankruptcy Code provisions, we conclude that 
Congress did not intend for § 554(a) to preempt certain state 
and local laws. We hold that a trustee may not abandon 
property in contravention of a state statute or regulation that 
is reasonably designed to protect the public health or safety 
from identified hazards. 11 Accordingly, we affirm the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 
It is so ordered. 
u This exception to the abandonment power vested in the trustee by 
§ 554 is a narrow one. It does not encompass a speculative or indetermi-
nate future violation of such laws that may stem from abandonment. The 
abandonment power is not to be fettered by laws or regulations not reason-
ably calculated to protect the public health or safety from imminent and 
identifiable harm. A 
Januarv 9, 1986 
84-801 and 84-805 Midlantic Rank, et seq. 
Dear John: 
Your letter of January 7 is hel:oful. 
I agree that abandonm~nt could be authorized where 
appropr late steps \\'ere takE'n \-lith the approval of the bank-
ruptcy court to protect the health and safety of the public. 
I enclose xerox copies of pages 6, 10 and 12 of my 
draft of December 30 on which I have indicated changes. I 
believ~ tl-tese meet your concerns. I wtll, of course, con-
sider any language changes you may suggest. 
Sincerely, 





JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
~upuuu (!J11url1tf Urt ~nittb .:itattll 
'~lhte<4htgfun. ~. <!J. 21l~J!.;l 
January 14, 1986 
Re: 84-801 - Midlantic National Bank v. 
New Jersey Department of 
Environmental Protection 
84-805 - O'Neill v. City of New York 
Dear Lewis: 
As always, I am grateful for your willingness to 
try to accommodate my concerns. I think your 
proposed change on~page 6 is~ne but I am still 
somewhat~oubled both by th~eliance on§ 959(b) 
and by t~breadth of the concluding paragraph in the 
opinion. 
With respect to§ 959(b), I wonder if instead of 
squarely holding that the section applies to 
abandonment--a holqing which I really think is quite 
doubtful--would it not be sufficient merely to ! ely 
o it as additional evidence that Congress d i d not 
inten the Ban ruptcy o e to preempt all state laws. 
It seems to me that this point could be made by 
(1 eliminating the paragraph that now appears on page 10 
and s i mply add l ng a t the end of the preceding 
paragraph the substance of the sentence that you have 
proposed as an additional insert. In other words, _ n 
11 
~ 7 
perhaps the run-over paragraph hat en with the ~ · 
sentence reading something like th1s· "Even though 
§ 959(b) does not directly apply to an abandonment 
under § 554(a) of the Bankruptcy Code--and therefore 
does not delimit the precise conditions on an 
abandonment--the section nevertheless supports o~r . 
conclusion that Congress did not intend~e ·--- tz'Y" 
Bankruptcy Code to preempt all state laws that 
otherwise constrain the exercise of a trustee's 
powers." (Perhaps in the first line of page 10, 
l 
instead of merely noting that§ 959(b) commands "the 
debtor in possession" to comply with state law, it 01( 
might be appropriate to insert the word "trustee" 




Would you also consider a rev1s1on of the final 
paragraph in the opinion to read this way: 
"In the light of the restricted pre-1978 
abandonment power of the Bankruptcy trustee and in 
the context of the limited scope of other Bankruptcy 
Code provisions, we conclude that the trustee's 
general duty to comply with state law, including 
State environmental laws, is applicable in the 
abandonment context. Congress did not intend 
§ 554(a} as a total preemption of all conflicting 
state and local laws. The Bankruptcy Court does not 
have the power to authorize a~bandonment without 
d- lmaking anj effort tOT formulat~~~onditions that will 
adequately protect t he public s health and safety. 
Accordingly, without reaching the question whether 
state laws imposing conditions on abandonment that 
may be so onerous as to interfere with the Bankruptcy 
adjudication itself, we hold that a trustee may not 
abandon property in contravention of a state statute 
or regulation that is reasonably designed to protect 
the public health or safety from identified 
hazards.11J Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals for the Thi r d Circuit." 
Jd./"This exception to the abandonment power 
vested in the trustee by § 554 is a narrow one. It 
does not encompass a speculative or indeterminate {T/l 
future violation of such laws that may stem from 
abandonment. The abandonment power is not to be 
fettered by laws or regulations not reasonably 
calculated to protect the public health or safety 




.iuvrtmt Q}lllld d tqt 1tnittb jtatt.s-
Jla.sfringi:Lttt. ~. <!}. 2Ll~~~ 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
January 15, 1986 
No. 84-801 Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey 
Departrrent of Environrrental Protection 
No. 84-805 O'Neill v. City of New York 
Dear Bill, 
Please join rre in your dissent. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
84-801 Midlantic 
Rider A, p. 12 
January 15, 1986 
In the light of the Bankruptcy trustee's re~tricted 
pre-1978 abandonment power and the limited scope of other 
Bankruptcy Code provisions, we conclude that Conqress did 
not intend for §554(a) to preempt all state anrl local laws. 
The Banl<ruptcy Court does not have the power to authorize an 
abandonment without formulating conditions that wlll ade-
quately protect the public's health and ~afety. Accor~inq­
ly, without reaching the question whether certain state laws 
imposing conditions on abandonment may be ao onerous as to 
interfere with the bankruptcy adjudication itself, we hold 
that a trustee may not abandon proPerty in contravention of 
a state statute or regulation that is reasonably designed to 
protect the public health or safety from identified 
hazards.l Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 
84-801 Midlantic 
Rider A, P• 10 
January 15, 1986 
Even though §959(b) does not directly apply to an abandon-
ment under §554(a) of the Bankruptcy Code -and therefore 
does not delimit the precise cone'Ht i.ons on an aban~onment -
the section nevertheless supports our conclusion that Con-
gress did not in tend for the Bank ruptcv Code to pre~mpt 1'!11 
state laws that otherw-i.se constrain the exercise of a trust-
ee's powers. 
January 15, 1986 
84-801 Midlantic Bank 
Dear John: 
I will be glad to make the changes suggested in 
your letter of ,January 14. 
I enclose two riders: one that would replace the 
full paragraph on page 101 and a second that would replace 
the final paragraph on page 12. I have made only an occa-
sional language change in what you suggest. 
I am assuming that these changes will be satisfac-
tory to Bill Brennan and Barry who have joinerl me, as I view 
your language as a clearer statement of what the opinion 






j;upr ~m~ Qj:ll'nd ttf Ur~ 'Jitnilt~ ' j;taf~g 
Jragfrittgtttn. ~. Q):. 2!lbi'!,1 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
January 17, 1986 
Re: 84-801 - Midlantic National Bank v. 
New Jersey Department of 
Environmental Protection 
84-805 - O'Neill v. City of New York 
Dear Lewis: 




Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
,jtqtrttttt <qtturl ttf tJrt ~tb ,jtalt$' 
~lfinghtn. ~. <q. 2ll~J!.~ 
.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE v 
January 17, 1986 
84-801 - Midlantic National Bank v. New 
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection 
84-805 - O'Neill v. City of New York 
Dear Bill, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
J;u.prtmt atou.d of tqt 11Utittb .§tatts 
'lla:sfrington.18. or. 2llgi~~ / 
January 21,1986 
Re: Nos. 84-801 and 84-805-Midlantic v. New Jersey 
and O'Neill v. New York 
Dear Lewis: 





cc: The Conference 
84-801 Midlantic Bank v. New Jersey Dept. (Cabell) 
WHR for the Court 10/19/85 
1st draft 11/15/85 
2nd draft 11/21/85 
3rd draft 12/4/85 




1st draft 11/26/85 
Joined by WJB 11/26/85 
HAB llj29j85 
TM 12/2/85 
LFP will dissent 11/19/85 
LFP for the Court 
1st draft 12j27j85 
2nd draft 12/30/85 
3rd draft 1/17/86 
4th draft l/23/86 





1st draft l/15/86 
2nd draft 2/11/86 
3rd draft lj23j86 
Joined by SOC 1/15/86 
BRW 1/17/86 
January 27, 1986 
MIDA SALLY-POW 
lfp/ss ~6 MIDA SALLY-POW 
84-801 Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey 
Department of Environmental Protection 
J7 This case comes to us QR writ-o£ e~~i9~a~i from the Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit. It presents the question/~ 
whether a Trustee in Bankruptcy may use the ~~t power ¥' 




and New Jerse~hat had 
Resources;'operated facilities in New York , 
. A I-AA..I-~ ~~ /;ti'Xt <:: . 
illegally accepted; 1tew::ic wast:._ _ _? i ~. -
After New Jersey requested that the sites be cleaned up, Quanta 
filed for bankruptcy. 
The Trustee - acting under S554 of the Bankruptcy Code ---
sought to abandon both the New Jersey and New York sites. They ___.., 
~ 
were no longer of value to the estate. 
" 
-rne tsanKruptcy Court approved the abandonments, ( and New 
York and New Jersey filed separate appeals. The Court of Appeals 
reversed both judgments. ~ 111/e ·~ ~ -;,.~  
For the reasons stated in ~ opinio~, we find that in ~ ~) 
:1 s s' /f. "' 
enacting S554 in 1978, Congress did not intend to change -- __, 
limitations~on the judicially developed doctrine of abandonment -
limitations that protect legitimate state and federal interests. 
Such limitations on the abandonment powe;/also are consistent 
with limitations upon other aspects of the Trustee's operations. 
Moreover, Congress has repeatedly emphasize~in other 
statutes~ts goal of protecting the environment against toxic 
pollution. 
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals. 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST has filed a dissenting op1n1on, in which 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































lfp/ss 11/23/85 Rider A, p. 1 (Midlantic) (?1./~~0/-St>a-
M!Dl SALLY-POW 
authority to abandon property conferred upon the trustee 
~ 5 rQtt-Et:) 
~ must be read in the context of the Bankruptcy Code ~f 1 91~ 
11.4- aL-uJ 
. in its entirety. t{)(ection 5~) {must be considered 
in light of the pre-1978 abandonment power of 
a bankruptcy trustee, a power viewed as subject to common 
law restrictions on its exercise. When thus viewed in 
context, and in light of long prevailing understanding and 
practice prior to 
~·t9f3 
of §554 (a) ottt -o£ 
·~uld not be tolerated. 
CCC llj24j85 
The Court today construes 11 u.s.c. §554(a) 1 of 
the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 to permit a trustee in 
bankruptcy to abandon property that is burdensome or 
of inconsequential value to the estate without regard 
to "any general requirement of compliance with state 
regulatory laws." Ante, at The Court recognizes 
only a narrow restriction on this abandonment power, 
such as "where abandonment by the trustee might itself 
create a genuine emergency that the trustee would be 
miquely able to guard against." Ante, at I 
believe, however, that the meaning of §554 must be 
determined in the light of the restricted pre-1978 
abandonment power of the bankruptcy trustee and in the 
context of the limited scope of other Bankruptcy Code 
provisions. Upon such review, it is clear that Con-
f • 
11/24/85; 12:04 PM DRAFT page 2. 
gress did not intend the interpretation of §554(a) 




In the face of Congress' undisputed concern over the 
risks of the improper storage and disposal of hazard-
ous and toxic substnces, I am unwilling to presume 
that by its enactment of §554(a), Congress implicitly 
overturned long-standing restrictions on the common-
law abandonment power. 
IV 
Today's holding allows the trustees of these 
bankrupt estates to abandon hazardous materials and to 
aggravate already-existing dangers by halting security 
measures that prevent public entry, valdalism, and 
fire.l Joint Appendix before the Court of Appeals 12, 
~H«- c~f-s ~J ~.J ~ .-u..di-J~ ~~ ~ 
26.~ The trustees are ~t required to take even rela-
tively minor steps to reduce imminent danger, such as 
security fencing, drainage and diking repairs, sealing 
deteriorating tanks, and removal of explosive agents 
not on a school stove. 2 Because I believe that Con-
llj25j85; 11:21 AM DRAFT page 2. 
~~ 
gress did not grant trustess ~ unlmited license to 
abandon property of the bankrupt estate, I dissent . 
...... 
CCC llj25j85 
lJoint Appendix before the Court of Appeals 
11-12 (affidavit of Richard Docyk, Deputy Chief In-
spector for NY City Fire Department); id., at 26 
(transcript of proceedings before de Vito, J.). The 
trustees in this case have abandoned 470,000 gallons 
of highly toxic and carcinogenic waste oil in unguard-
ed, deterioraring containers where they "present risks 
of explosion, fire, contamination of water supplies, 
destruction of natural resources, and injury, genetic 
"' damge, or death through personal contact. Brief for 
A 
United States as Amicus Curiae 4, 23. See Joint Ap-
pendix, supra, at 17 (70,000 gallons at New York 
site); Appendix before the Court of Appeals A7 
(400,000 gallons at New Jersey site); id., at A46 (de-
teriorating containers); Join Appendix, supra, at 11 
(deteriorating tanks); id., at 26 (guard service); 
id., at 12 (risk of fire); id. at 11 (contamination of 
11/25/85; 11:21 AM DRAFT page 2. 
adjacent areas); id. at 26 (health effects of exposure 
to PCBs and their derivatives). 
2Both abandonment orders, now affirmed by the 
Court, were without qualification. The EPA urged the 
pre-abandonment steps outlined in the text as part of 
its Region II Action Memorandum (Jan. 25, 1985) 
(lodged with the Court). 
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1see, ~, Hillsdale Foundry Co v. Michigan, a 
--------------~ 
B. R. 195 (W. D.Mich. 197 4) (action by Michigan Attorney 
General to enforce state's anti-pollution laws held 
subject to automatic stay) • The House Repor~erred \.~eu.'o\i~ d\'!.c:.....,,~ ) :t~ref, 
I 
also to an wnreported cas~ from Texa~where a stay 
) 
prevented the state of Maine from closing ~debtor's 
1 ~hat was polluting a river in violation of the 
state's environmntal protection laws. H.R. Rep. No. 595, 
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 174-175. 
2congress eliminated the small generator 
a~~~ 
exception and subjected maHy m&re facilities to the 
""\ 
2. 
regulations. Pub.L.No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221, 3248-3272 
(codified at 42 u.s.c. §300l(d)). Another provision 
r--~ broadens the Act's coverage by automatically 
u ~
assigning a hazardous rating to s g{stances that the EPA 
"'( 
does not classify by a set deadline. Id., 98 Stat. at 
3227-31 (codified at 42 u.s.c. §§3004(d), (e), (f) (3), 
Amended enforcement provi~a 
---------·--·---
ow more (g)(6)). 
id., 98 Stat. at 3271-72 (codified at 2 - ---------- ·--- orders or 
suits to compel "corrective action" after a leak has 
98 Stat. at 3257-3258 (codi£ied at 42 
15. 
security fencing, drainage and diking repairs, sealing 
deteriorating tanks, and removal of explosive agents 
(presumably not on a school stove). Because 1 believe 
~~ ~~ I 
that Congress did not ~ow the trustee -~~eat a license 
1"\ 
~ A. 








' ' . . 
It is so ordered. 
lfp/ss 12/26/85 Rider A, p. 1 (Midlantic) 
M1Dl SALLY-POW 
§544(a) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978(?) 1 authorizes a 
trustee in bankruptcy to abandon property that is 
burdensome or of inconsequential value to the estate in 
contravention of state laws or regulations that are 
reasonably designed to protect the public health or 
safety? 
Note to Cabell: 
1 suggest reframing the first sentence as 
indicated above, and then omit the remainder of what is 
now in the first paragraph of the opinion. As you may 
have noted from my prior decisions in past year, 1 prefer 
2. 
simply to state the question accurately in a sentence or 
two at the beginning of an opinion, and wait until after 
the facts and holdings of the courts below have been 
stated before expressing the conclusion of the Court. 
And, Cabell, your statement of the facts in Part 
1 - particularly pages two and three require rewriting 
somewhat more coherently. As presently drafted, I think 
the reader may be in the dark as to exactly what had 
happened. 1 have not reread Parts II and Ill, as I assume 
that they are in substance what has been approved by four 
Justices of the Court. If there are changes of substance, 
please identify them for me. 
I have suggested some changes in Part IV. If you 
have questions, do not hesitate to ask me. 
lfp/ss 12/26/85 Rider A, p. 1 (Midlantic) 
M!Dl SALLY-POW 
§544(a) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978(?) 1 authorizes a 
trustee in bankruptcy to abandon property that is 
burdensome or of inconsequential value to the estate in 
contravention of 
~ 
statek laws or regulations that are 
reasonably designed to protect the public health or 
safety® 
Note to Cabell: 
1 suggest reframing the first sentence as 
indicated above, and then omit the remainder of what is 
now in the first paragraph of the opinion. As you may 
have noted from my prior decisions in past year, I prefer 
2. 
simply to state the question accurately in a sentence or 
two at the beginning of an opinion, and wait until after 
the facts and holdings of the courts below have been 
stated before expressing the conclusion of the Court. 
And, Cabell, your statement of the facts in Part 
I - particularly pages two and three require rewriting 
somewhat more coherently. As presently drafted, I think 
the reader may be in the dark as to exactly what had 
happened. I have not reread Parts II and III, as I assume 
that they are in substance what has been approved by four 
Justices of the Court. If there are changes of substance, 
please identify them for me. 
I have suggested some changes in Part IV. If you 
have questions, do not hesitate to ask me. 
PERNIK CARTER-POW January 14, 1986: 6:38 PM 
Even though §959(b) does not directly apply to an abandon-
ment under §554(a) of the Bankruptcy Code- and therefore 
does not delimit the precise conditions on an abandonment -
the section nevertheless supports our conclusion that Con-
gress did not intend for the Bankruptcy Code to preempt all 
state laws that otherwise constrain the exercise of a trust-








see also: RUNBUM 
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January 14, 1986; 6:38 PM 
Even though §959(b) does not directly apply to an abandon-
ment under §554(a) of the Bankruptcy Code- and therefore 
does not delimit the precise conditions on an abandonment -
the section nevertheless supports our conclusion that Con-
gress did not intend for the Bankruptcy Code to preempt all 
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3 copies 
see also: PERNIK 
4$080lg 
r')1t..~<tla·l t .. , .~~ lt.=t - r!Y ;_;;r;"l ll>t. 
vft{¥l~ ~ /J /1 / Z, 
January 14, 1986~ 6:37 PM 
In the light of the Bankruptcy trustee's restrict-
ed pre-1978 abandonment power and the limited scope of other 
Bankruptcy Code provisions, we conclude that Congress did 
not intend for §554(a) to preempt all state and local laws. 
The Bankruptcy Court does not have the power to authorize an 
abandonment without formulating conditions that will ade-
quately protect the public's health and safety. According-
ly, without reaching the question whether certain state laws 
imposing conditions on abandonment may be so onerous as to 
interfere with the bankruptcy adjudication itself, we hold 
that a trustee may not abandon property in contravention of 
a state statute or regulation that is reasonably designed to 
protect the public health or safety from identified 
hazards.YuAccordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 
84-801 Midlantic 
Rider A, p. 12 
January 15, 1986 
In the light of the Bankruptcy trustee's restricted 
pre-1978 abandonment power and the limited scope of other 
Bankruptcy Code provisions, we conclude that Congress did 
not intend for §554(a) to preempt all state and local laws. 
The Bankruptcy Court does not have the power to authorize an 
abandonment without formulating conditions that will ade-
quately protect the public's health and safety. According-
ly, without reaching the question whether certain state laws 
imposing conditions on abandonment may be so onerous as to 
interfere with the bankruptcy adjudication itself, we hold 
that a trustee may not abandon property in contravention of 
a state statute or regulation that is reasonably designed to 
protect the public health or safety from identified 
hazards.ll Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 
84-801 Midlantic 
Rider A, p. 10 
January 15, 1986 
Even though §959(b) does not directly apply to an abandon-
ment under §554(a) of the Bankruptcy Code -and therefore 
does not delimit the precise conditions on an abandonment -
the section nevertheless supports our conclusion that Con-
gress did not intend for the Bankruptcy Code to preempt all 
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January 16, 1986: 11:12 AM 
Even though §959 (b) does not directly apply to an abandonment 
under §554 (a) of the Bankruptcy Code - and therefore does not 
delimit the precise conditions on an abandonment - the section 
nevertheless supports our conclusion that Congress did not intend 
for the Bankruptcy Code to preempt all state laws that otherwise 
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~ CARTER-POW January 16, 1986; 11:12 AM 
In the light of the Bankruptcy trustee's restricted pre-
1978 abandonment power and the limited scope of other Bankruptcy 
Code provisions, we conclude that Congress did not intend for 
§554(a) to preempt all state and local laws. The Bankruptcy 
Court does not have the power to authorize an abandonment without 
formulating conditions that will adequately protect the public's 
health and safety. Accordingly, without reaching the question 
whether certain state laws imposing conditions on abandonment may 
be so onerous as to interfere with the bankruptcy adjudication 
itself, we hold that a trustee may not abandon property in con-
travention of a state statute or regulation that is reasonably 
designed to protect the public health or safety from identified 
hazards.l1/Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of 








see also: RUNBUM 
PERNIK 
4$080lg 
January 16, 1986; 11:00 AM 
Technical amendments in the Bankruptcy Amendments and 
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 added the words "and benefit" after 
"value" in §554(a). Pub.L. 98-353, Tit. III, §468(a), 98 Stat. 
380 (1984). 
J).~ ? p~,NT&O --... -
\Of1.0 
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of a 
school," he may abandon 470,000 gallons of highly toxic 
and carcinogic waste oil in unguarded, deteriorating 
containers where they present risks of explosion, fire, 
contamination of water supplies, destruction of natural 
resources, and injury, genetic damage, or death through 
'5~ GcNtuAo ~, ~ 4, 2!.. 
personal contact. A more modest reading of the trustee's 
I' 
~ 
c/ . ~~~~ 
~~ / lff:"_r_ ~r ri (!'/ 
-a.-~' ~~~~~-o ~r._,~_.J..r " u. .~.c. £11'- ..,.-~ ,,. 
t; ~ ~~· 
~ ~~ abandonment power under §SSt~voids this unsupported  
~}-~ , distinction, follows the common-law restrictions on the ,~ 
p_. ~ ~ \t~J ~ 
j ~~·~ 'tJ"P~"' abandonment power, and accords with the test1r 1cteQJ scope 
~-~~ 
~r~ ~ [..--------. ---) :"\ 
{_~ ~ of other provisions ~ithin t:fi~ \Bankruptcy Code_; and with 
~~ the repeatedly expressed congressional interest in 




power before the 1978 -
4-
revisions ~ the Bankruptcy Code was ~iearly limited by a 
" 
public interest excepti~n A~tainly no case approached 
~ 
the sweep of the abandonment power that the major±ty ~ 
bestows upon a trustee today. 
? 
l ' • 
We should presume that 
'\ 
Congress incorporated these common-law restrictions on the ' . ---;::::::; J 
power. In Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 
I 
198 F.2d 289 (CA4 1952), the Court of Appeals concluded 
~ 
c~~ ~~ ~.c:::..~...,.~L.....; ... p 
~ht ~5&.~(9~4-f-~ ) 
~~-~--~t~~~­
JI-~t.-2... <:A..-1~ 1~~~~~~ vt. 
3. 
that a bankruptcy trustee, in liquidating the estate of a 
barge company, could not abandon several barges when the 
abandonment would have obstructed a navigable passage in 
violation of federal law. re Chicago 
Rapid Transit Co., 129 F.2d 1 (CA 7), cert. denied, 317 
u.s. 683 (1942), the Court of Appeals held that a debtor 
transit company could not abandon its lease of a branch 
railway line when local law required continued operation. 
\.SVmJ.~.) 
(Fina~l; in ln re Lewis Jones, Inc., 1 B.R. 277 (Bankr. 
E.o.Pa. 1974), the bankruptcy court invoked its equitable 
L6'1 ~. l 
power to "safeguard the public interest" @no ~ 
debtor public utilities to seal underground steam lines 
~ 
before abandoning them. ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~ 
~~ 
Thus, when Congress enacted §554 ~i~ did A~t ~ 
ln codifying the judicially-
4. 
.b;::LJ:j~ 





the established cor~ry that a trustee @an~o!) exercise 
his abandonment power in violation of certain state and 
federal laws. The normal rule of statutory construction 
is that if Congress intends for legislation to change the 
interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes 
~at intent specific. Edmonds v. Compagnie General 
Transatlantique, 443 u.s. 256, 266-267 (1979). (More~ 
@'e Court· has followed this rule with particular care in 
t5!/!!!J!P 
construing the scope of bankruptcy codifications. If 
. ~ ~ 
Congress wishes to grant the trustee anW extraordinary 
exemption from non-bankruptcy law, "the intention would be 
clearly expressed, not left to be collected or inferred 
from disputable considerations of convenience in 
administering the estate of the bankrupt." Stewarts v. 
t 
5. 
Hammer, 194 u.s. 441, 444 (1904); see Palmer v. 
Massachusetts, 308 u.s. 79, 85 (1939) ("If this old and 
familiar power of the states [over local railorad service] 
was withdrawn when Congress gave district courts 
bankruptcy powers over railroads, we ought to find 
language fitting for so drastic a change."). 
11 
Neither Congress nor this Court has ever granted 
a trustee bankruptcY. equal to 
the abandonment power that the majority confers today. In 
fact, Congress has repeatedly expressed its legislative 
determination that the trustee is not to have carte 
blanche to ignore non-bankruptcy law.A Where the 
Bankruptcy Code has conferred special powers upon the 
trustee and where there was no common law limitation on 
,., .:. ' .._ 
6. 
that power, Congress has expressly provided that the 
efforts of the trustee to marshall and distribute the 
assets of the estate must yield to governmental interest 
~te ~ ~~~~ 
in public health and safety. 1 .cannot belie~e thet A 
vL4 ~ · 
Congress, having placed ~limitation~upon pankruptcYr0 
1 r-------~---
Jl... L -h-\Mo. -ke~ I J L4'!.J~."'.JJ 
(t:,..""'t"U"'"'s""'t'll':'~":o:"e ":::"s--::-lo;:::n)"C"r er aspects of @ e 'il:) operations 'A me-ant 
~~ . 
to overrule a well-establlshed judicial restriction on the 
1\ 
abandonment power. As we held last Term in the context of 
the National Labor Relations Act, "[T]he debtor-in-
possession is not relieved of all obligations under the 
Act simply by filing a petition for bankruptcy." NLRB v. 
Bildisco & Bildisco, u.s. __ , 
. 
~
The automatic stay ~of the Bankruptcy Code, 
K 
§362(a), has been described as "one of the fundamental 




Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 50? (1978); H.R. Rep. 
No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 340 
importance of §362(a) in preserving the 
debtor, Congress has enacted several 
health and safety: 
"Thus, where a governmental unit is suing a 
debtor to prevent or stop violation of fraud, 
environmental protection, consumer protection, 
safety, or similar police or regulatory laws, or 
attempting to fix damages for violation of such 
a law the action or proceeding is not stayed 
under the automatic stay." H.R. Rep. No. 595, 




Petitioners have suggested that the 
existence of ~express exception ~lg~~omatic stay;--
undermines the inference of a similar exception ~l the 
abandonment power: Had Congress sought to 
restr ictf h-; scope of §554, it would have enacted :rimilar / 
limiting provisions. This argument, however, fails to 
acknowledge the 
§§554 and 362. 
differences between the predecessors of 
As ~I have noted, the exceptions ~t \ he 
judicially-created abandonment power were firmly 
established. But in enacting §362 in 1978, Congress 
significantly expanded the scope of the automatic stay, 
see 1 NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE §20.03, at 5-6 
(1981), a process that had begun only five years earlier 
with the[f i~adoption of the Bankrutpcy Rules in 1973 ~ 
~nd that had substantially broadened the import of the:J-0 
9. 
automatic stay by 1978, see id. §20.02, at 4-5. 
face of the greatly increased reach of 
1973 and 1978, some courts had stretched the expanded 
automatic stay to foreclose State's efforts to enforce 
their antipollution laws,l and Congress wanted to overrule 
th~e interpretations in its 1978 revision. See H.R. Rep. 
595, supra, at 174-175. 
Section 959(b) provides additional evidence that 
Congress did not intend for the Bankruptcy Code's purpose 
~ of rehabilitating the debtor or distributing the assets of 
the estate to abrogate all state laws. ~n §9591tr;~e .;r ffiands~btor in possession to •manage and operate 
the property in his possession •.• according to the 
requirement of the valid laws of the State." The 
10. 
petitioners have contended that §959(b) is relevant only 
when the trustee is actually operating the business of the 
~ 
debtor, and not when he is liquidating it. The majo5i ty 
declines to reach that precise issue, and instead states 
\t't- J 
simply e trustee's filing of a petition to abandon does 
not constitute 'manage[ment] • or 'operat[ion]. '" With all 
respect, .lr= bel i e~ch a formulation begs the question. 
0~~ 
I GQlieve ~t ~959(b) applies when the trustee 
/{ 
is liquidating the business of a debtor because that 
interpretation gives both the words "manage" and 
"operate." Courts "are obliged to give effect, if 
possible, to every word Congress used," Reiter v. Sonotone 
Corp., 442 u.s. 330, 339 (1979), and §959 (b), on its face, 
encompasses something more than "operation." As the Court 
of Appeals noted, there is no reason why the phrase 
f 
11. 
"'manage[ment] • of the 'property,'" could not, in the 
abstract, describe a trustee's custodial care and 
disposition of property in bankruptcy liquidation. A See 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub, __ _ 
u.s. ___ , at ___ (stating, after surveying the trustee's 
various powers, that "the Bankruptcy Code gives the 
trusteee wide-ranging managment authority over the 
"L ~ 
, debtor"). ~ reading is also consistent with the 
1'\ 
section's legislative history, ~shows the provision 
L_9E.EI\d J 
was l to place railroad receiverships within the reach of 
state law. Sees. Misc. Doc. 44, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1888); s. Misc. Doc. 7, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1887); s. 
Misc. Doc. 19, 49th Cong., 2d Sess. (1886); H.R. Misc. 
Doc. 45, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. (1886). The precept of 
§959(b) is clear: "[T]he goals of the federal bankruptcy 
.. ' 
12. 
laws, including rehabilitation of the debtor, do not 
authorize transgression of state laws setting requirements 
for the operation of the business, even if the continued 
operation of the business would be thwarted by applying 
state laws." 739 F.2d at 919. 
Ill 
Finally, I am reluctant to ~ a legislative 
1\ 
intent to confer unrestricted abandonment power upon a 
~~A 





·~~ goal of protecting the env~Lrmental 
1\ 
v :: 
toxic pollution. Chemical Manfctures Association 
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, u.s. __ , at 
~ 
Congress has enacted a Resource Conservation and 
1\ 
Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 u.s.c. §§6901-6987, to regulate 
the treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous was~~lby 
13. 
monitoring wastes from their creation until after their 
~Clli~~~~ I 
permanent disposal. That Act "J"" mPdwe2 the United 
States to seek judicial or administrative restraint of 
~ 
activities involving hazardous wastes that "may presnt an 
A 
imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the 
environment." 42 u.s.c. §6973; see also s. Rep. 98-284, 
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1983). Congress - snJ: sr 31! 1 • rll; ..A 
broadened the scope of the statute and tightened the 
regulatory restraints in 1984. 2 In the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(the "Superfund" Act) ' /\Congress established a fund to 
finance cleanup of some sites and require~ 
reimburse either the fund or the 
parties for the cleanup. The 




secure such relief as may be necessary to avert ~ 
"imminent and substantial endangerment to the public 
health or welfare or the environment because of an actual 
or threatened release of a hazardous substance." 42 
u.s.c. §9606. In the face of Congress' undisputed concern 
over the c~l risks of the improper storage and 
disposal of hazardous and toxic substances, I am unwilling 
to presume that Congress implicitly overruled long-
standing restrictions on the common-law abandonment power. 
IV 
Today's holding allows this trustee to abandon 
hazardous materials an;~~gravate already-existing dangers 
7 . 
by stopping security measures that prevented public entry, 
vandalism, and fire. The trustee is not required to take 
even minor steps to ~mminent danger, such as 
. ' 
; R~: PD:-'TER OF 
• • .. f ::: 
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
The majority today rules that although a trustee 
may not "abandon dynamite on a stove in the basement of a 
school," he may abandon 470,000 gallons of highly toxic 
and carcinogic waste oil in unguarded, deteriorating 
containers where they present risks of explosion, fire, 
contamination of water supplies, destruction of natural 
resources, and injury, genetic damage, or death through 
personal contact. A more modest reading of the trustee's 
2. 
abandonment power under S554 avoids this unsupported 
distinction, follows the common-law restrictions on the 
abandonment power, and accords with the restricted scope 
of other provisions within the Bankruptcy Code and with 
the repeatedly expressed congressional interest in 
environmental protection. Accordingly, 1 dissent. 
1 
The trustee's abandonment power before the 1978 
revisions to the Bankruptcy Code was clearly limited by a 
public interest exception. Certainly no case approached 
the sweep of the abandonment power that the majority 
bestows upon a trustee today. We should presume that 
Congress incorporated these common-law restrictions on the 
trustee's abandonment power. In Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 
/ / 






that a bankruptcy trustee, in liquidating the estate of a 
barge company, could not abandon several barges when the 
abandonment would have obstructed a navigable passage in 
violation of federal law. Similarly, in In re Chicago 
I 
Rapid Transit Co., 129 F.2d 1 (CA ' 7), cert. denied, 317 
/. I u.s. 683 (1942), the Court of Appeals held that a debtor 
transit company could not abandon its lease of a branch 
railway line when local law required continued operation. 
Finally, in In re Lewis Jones, Inc., 1 0 277 ([Bank Q 
,r 
~De Pa. 1974), the bankruptcy court invoked its equitable 
power to "safeguard the public interest" and require 
debtor public utilities to seal underground steam lines 
before abandoning them. 
Thus, when Congress enacted §554, it did not 
write upon a tabula rasa. In codifying the judicially-
su STYU I 
MAI!Al 
l <i.'? j 
..v . 
(~et. ) l 
4. 
developed rule of abandonment, it also presumably included 
the established corfll~ry that a trustee cannot exercise 
his abandonment power in violation of certain state and 
federal laws. The normal rule of statutory construction 
is that if Congress intends for legislation to change the 
interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes 
that intent specific. 
\ 
Edmonds v. Compagnie General£ 
T\ 
I .I I 
Transatlantique, 443 u.s. 256, 266-267 (1979). Moreover, 
the Court has followed this rule with particular care in 
construing the scope of bankruptcy codifications. If 
Congress wishes to grant the trustee any extraordinary 
/ 
exemption from non-bankruptcy law, "the intention would be 
clearly expre.9sed, not left to be collected or inferred 
from disputable considerations of conveni~nce in 
/ 








Hammer, 194 u.s. 441, 444 (1904); see Palmer ~. 
r r I 
Massachusetts, 308 u.s. 79, 85 (1939) ("If this old and 
familiar power of the states [over local rai~d service] ~ 
was withdrawn when Congress gave district courts 
bankruptcy powers over railroads, we ought to find 
I 
language fitting for so drastic a changee "). 
II 
Neither Congress nor this Court has ever granted 
a trustee in bankruptcy power in any other area equal to 
the abandonment power that the majority confers today. In 
fact, Congress has repeatedly expressed its legislative 
determination that the trustee is not to have carte 
blanche to ignore non-bankruptcy law. Where the 
Bankruptcy Code has conferred special powers upon the 
trustee and where there was no common law limitation on 
6. 
that power, Congress has expressly provided that the 
efforts of the trustee to marshal/ and distribute the 
assets of the estate must yield to governmental interest 
in public health and safety. 1 cannot believe that 
Congress, having placed these limitations upon bankruptcy 
trustees in many other aspects of their operations, meant 
to overrule a well-established judicial restriction on the 
abandonment power. As we held last 8 in the context of 
I 
the National Labor Relations Act, "[T]he debtor-in-
possession is not relieved of all obligations under the 
/ , 
AActA simply by filing a petition for bankruptcy." NLRB v. 
Bildisco & Bildisco, -A- u.s. -IT:-' -It-" 
The automatic stay of the Bankruptcy Code, 
( 
§362(a}, has been described as "one of the fundamental 
/ 
debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws." s. 
Itt STYl( 
-~l 
' '3' j& --
;_/ 






Rep. No. ~989, ~ 5th Conq., 2d Sess. 50?) (1978); H.R. Rep. 
' \ 
No.~595, 5th-cong., 1st Ses~ 340 (1977). Despite the 
importance of §362(a) in preserving the estate of the 
debtor, Congress has enacted several classes of exceptions 
to the stay that allow the government to comment or 
I 
continue legal proceedings. Section 362(b) (5) permits the 
enforcement of judgments or to enforce "non-monetary" 
judgments. The legislative history makes clear that one 
of the purposes of this exception was to protect public 
health and safety: 
\ 
"Thus, where a governmental unit is suing a 
debtor to prevent or stop violation of fraud, 
environmental protection, consumer protection, 
safety, or similar police or regulatory laws, or 
attempting to fix damages for violation of such 
a lawAthe action ?r proc~eding is not stayed 
under the automat1c stay." H.R. Rep. No. A595, 
supra, at ' 343 ~1!77) ; s. Rep. No. A989, supra, at 
52 ~ :.: 
· .. 
8. 
Petitioners have suggested that the 
existence of this express exception for automatic stays 
undermines the inference of a similar exception for the 
abandonment power: Had Congress sought to similarly 
restrict the scope of §554, it would have enacted similar 
limiting provisions. This argument, however, fails to 
acknowledge the differences between the predecessors of 
§§5S4 and 362. As we have noted, the exceptions for the 
judicially-created abandonment power were firmly 
ntUYU established. But in enacting §362 in 1978, Congress 
MAII AL 
i 3.~ 
~ significantly expanded the scope of the automatic stay, 
~· ®MJ#/®/@/ see 1" N Ff·/ 
/ 
(1981}, a process that had begun only five years earlier 
with the first adoption of the Bankr~y Rules in 1973 
and that had substantially broadened the import of the 
9. 
) I automatic stay by 1978, see id. A S20 : 02, at 4 ~ 5. In the 
Yf-o. q5f;: I 
TA zg u. 'S.c.~ j 
face of the greatly increased reach of S362, Congress had 
to expressly establish limits to this new power. Between 
1973 and 1978, some courts had stretched the expanded 
automatic stay to foreclose State's efforts to enforce 
their antipollution laws,l and Congress wanted to overrule 
these interpretations in its 1978 revision. See H.R. Rep. 
I 
1\ 595, supra, at 174-175. 
~ctio!D 959(b) provides additional evidence that 
Congress did not intend for the Bankruptcy Code's purpose 
of rehabilitating the debtor or distributing the assets of 
/ 
the estate to abrogate all state laws. ln §959(b), the 
/ 
Code commands debtor in possession to "manage and operate 
the property in his possession according to the 
/ 
requiremen~ of the valid laws of the State." The 
10. 
petitioners have contended that S959(b) is relevant only 
when the trustee is actually operating the business of the 
debtor, and not when he is liquidating it. The majority 
declines to reach that precise issue, and instead states 
simply "the trustee's filing of a petition to abandon does 
not constitute 'manage[ment]' or 'operat[ion] .'" With all 
respect, 1 believe such a formulation begs the question. 
1 believe that S959(b) applies when the trustee 
is liquidating the business of a debtor because that 
interpretation gives effect to both the words "manage" and 
/ 
"operate." Courts "are obliged to give effect, if 
/ ' possible, to every word Congress used," Reiter v. Sonotone 
r / 
Corp., 442 u.s. 330, 339 (1979), and §959 (b), on its face, 
encompasses something more than "operation." As the Court 




"'manage[ment) • of the 'property,'" could not, in the 
abstract, describe a trustee's custodial care and 
disposition of property in bankruptcy liquidation. See 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm( ssioi9 v. Weintraub, ~ 
u.s. ~ (stating, after surveying the trustee's 
~ --~~. 
I 
various powers, that "the Bankruptcy Code gives the 
trusteee wide-ranging managJfent authority over the 
I 
debtor"). The reading is also consistent with the 
section's legislative history, which shows the provision 
was to place railroad receiverships within the reach of 
state law. SeeS. Misc. Ooc. A44, 50th Cong. ; 1st Sess. 
/ / I 
(1888); S. Misc. Doc. A7' 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1887); s. 
/ , 
Misc. Doc. /\19, 49th Cong., 2d Sess. (1886); H.R. Misc. 
, 
Doc. 1\ 45, 49th Cong. , 1st Sess. ( 1886} • The precept of 
/ 
§959(b) is clear: "[T)he goals of the federal bankruptcy 
k. / 
12. 
laws, including rehabilitation of the debtor, do not 
authorize transgression of state laws setting requirements 
for the operation of the business, even if the continued 
operation of the business would be thwarted by applying 
state laws. ~. 739 F. 2d @ 919~ 
Ill 
Finally, 1 am reluctant to divine a legislative 
intent to confer unrestricted abandonment power upon a 
trustee in bankruptcy when Congress has repeatedly shown 
its §:foremost goal of protecting the env fflnment@ 
against toxic pollu,tion.l\ Chemical Man@ tures Ass§f iation) 
v. Natural Resources Defense Council,!\ + u.s. __ , @ __ Lf?D/~ 1 
I 
(1985). Congress has enacted a Resource Conservation and 
Recovery' Act (RCRA), 42 u.s.c. §§6901...:6987, to regulate · 
the treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste by 
{. 
13. 
monitoring wastes from their creation until after their 
permanent disposal. That Act also empowers the United 
States to seek judicial or administrative restraint of 
I 
activities involving hazardous wastes that "may pre~nt an 
imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the 
I' 
environment." 42 u.s.c. S6973: see I also s. Rep. ~ 98-284, 
P·/ c? ath Cong., 1st Sess~ sa {19S3). Congress substantially 
broadened the scope of the statute and tightened the 
regulatory restraints in 1984. 2 In the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
{the "Superfund" Act), Congress established a fund to 
finance cleanup of some sites and require certain 
responsible parties to reimburse either the fund or the 
parties responsible for financing the cleanup. The 
d I CJ!:, I'!'/ ~u~fund A Act also empowers the j ede r a 1 lover nmen t to 
~ 1'1' SU STYLl 
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14. 
secure such relief as may be necessary to avert an 
I 
"imminent and substantial endangerment to the public 
health or welfare or the environment because of an actual 
I 
or threatened release of a hazardous substance." 42 
\ 
u.s.c. §9606. In the face of Congress' undisputed concern 
over the critical risks of the improper storage and 
disposal of hazardous and toxic substances, I am unwilling 
to presume that Congress implicitly overruled long-
standing restrictions on the common-law abandonment power. 
IV 
Today's holding allows this trustee to abandon 
hazardous materials and aggravate already-existing dangers 
by stopping security measures that prevented public entry, 
vandalism, and fire. The trustee is not required to take 
even minor steps to lessen imminent danger, such as 
15. 
security fencing, drainage and diking repairs, sealing 
deteriorating tanks, and removal of explosive agents 
(presumably not on a school stove). Because 1 believe 
that Congress did not allow the trustee so great a license 
in §554's abandonment power, 1 dissent. 
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lsee, ~, Hillsdale Foundry Co~~_ v. Michigan~a #Ad· j 
/ ~) 
~gDe>Mich. 1974) (action by Michigan Attorney 
r 
D> f~ ; 
~e/ 
tf>· / (!911 ) 0 j 
General to enforce ~tate's anti-pollution laws held 
subject to automatic stay) • The House Report referred 
also to an unreported case from Texas where a stay 
prevented the ftate of Maine from closing down a debtor's 
~ant that was polluting a river in violation of the 
state's environmRtal protection laws. H.R. Rep. No. ~595, 
~5th Cong., 1st Ses~ 174-175£) 
2congress eliminated the small generator 





Pub.L.  98-6161 98 Stat. 32211 3248-3272 
(codified at 42 u.s.c.l\ s@<d~). Another provision 
automatically broadens the Act's coverage by automatically 
assigning a hazardous rating to ~tances that the EPA 
does not classify by a set deadline. ® 98 Stat. @ 
3~:JA.)~Ci~'l:) 3227-;tl (codified at 42 u.s.c." ss@(d) I (e) I (f) (3) I 
(~. JCfrt~)/ (g) (6~). Amended enforcement provisions allow more 
!1),/1/),/3).:/ citizen suits, @ 98 Stat. @ 3271-;(_2 (codified at 42 
A)to913 (~. ,qg) I U. s.c '1\ s~@l , and authorize administrative orders or 
, 
suits to compel "corrective action" after a leak has 
M.,Jf~J;/ occurred. ~ 98 Stat. @ 3257_:3258 (codified at 42 
A/ ~g19~ / (~,,qgs)/ u. s.c "A s~o@<h!,l· 
3 
\ 
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JUSTICE POWELL, disse mg:-- t ~ rl I 4 1 g ) 
The Court today, les that a trustee in bankruptcy may 
abandon property that is burdensome or of inconsequential 
value to the estate without regard to "any general require- Q 
ment of compliance with state regulatory laws. " Supra, at 
-zr-· ~s only a "narrow[] condition on the abandonment J CddA -~ 
pwer ... such as where abandonment by the trustee might ~~  
if'self create a genuine emergency that the trustee would be /2(....o  
uniquely able to guard against." Supra, at --. Under ~ ~ . 
the Court's holding, although a trustee may not "abandon dy-
namite on a stove in the basement of a school," ibid.,,Jlle may~ U.. 
' abandon 470,000 gallons of highly toxic and carcinogic waste ' . ----r; 
oil in unguarded, deteriorating containers where they 
tJ present risks of explosion, fire, contamination of water sup-
~ plies, destruction 6f natural resourees, and~mjm y:; genetic - ~  
~ damage, ar death- thraugh J3orsonal oontset, see Brief for ~ 
~~ruted States; Ami= Curiae, 4,~ e:: ~ v 
()~~ ~~ _) 
~~ 
-
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reading of the trustee's abandonment power under 
U. S. C. § 554(a) 1 avoids this unsupported dit;;tinction, fol-
lows the common-law restrictions on the abandonment 
power, and accords with the limited scope of other Bank-
ruptcy ~ode ~rovision.s, ~EH.,._·~-eiil8-'fle.J;>efl~;U¥-e::rcm:-essecn--. 
The trustee's abandonment po er before the 197 
sions of the Bankruptcy Code)Wk£H~~JUitiiU~~-{:1~f)ii'"'W-MJ 
~. ;T~s w~ made clear by tee 
vant cases. In Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198''F. 289 (CA4 
1952), the Court of Appeals concluded that a bankruptcy 
trustee, in liquidating the estate of a barge company, could 
not abandon several barges when the abandonment would 
have obstructed a navigable passage in violation of federal 
law. Tfie Court stated: 
"The judge-made [abandonment] rule must give way 
when it comes into conflict with a statute enacted in 
order to ensure the safety of navigation; for we are not 
dealing with a burden imposed upon the bankrupt or his 
property by contract, but a duty and a burden imposed 
upon an owner of vessels by an Act of Congress in the 
public interest." I d., at 290. 
In In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F. 2d 1 (CA 7), 
cert. denied, 317 U. S. 683 (1942), the Court of Appeals held 
a debtor transit company could not cease its operation of 
a branch railway line when local law required continued oper-
ation. While the court did not forbid the trustee's abandon-
ment of property (i. e., his rejection of an unexpired lease), it 
conditioned the trustee's actions to ensure compliance with 
' Section 554(a) reads: 
"After notice and a hearing, the trustee may~andon any property of the 
estate that is burdensome to estate or that is o nconsequential value to the 
estate." 
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state law. Similarly, in In re Lewis Jones, Inc., 1 B. R. D. 
277 (Bkrtcy Ct. ED Pa. 1974), the bankruptcy court invoked 
its equitable power to "safeguard the public interest" by re-
quiring the debtor public utilities to seal underground steam 
lines before abandoning them. 
Thus, when Congress enacted § 554, there were well-rec-
ognized restrictions on a trustee's abandonment power. In 
codifying the judicially-developed rule of abandonment, Con-
gress also presumably included the established corollary that 
a trustee could not exercise his abandonment power in viola-
tion of certain state and federal laws. The normal rule of 
statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legisla-
tion to change the interpretation of a judicially created con-
cept, it makes that intent specific. Edmonds v. Compagnie 
Generale Transatlantique, 443 U. S. 256, 266-267 (1979). 
The Court has followed this rule with particular care in con-
struing the scope of bankruptcy codifications. If Congress 
wishes to grant the trustee an extraordinary exemption from 
non-bankruptcy law, "the intention would be clearly ex-
pressed, not left to be collected or inferred from disputable 
considerations of convenience in administering the estate of 
the bankrupt." Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U. S. 441, 444 
(1904); see Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U. S. 79, 85 (1939) 
("If this old and familiar power of the states [over local rail-
road service] was withdrawn when Congress gave district 
courts bankruptcy powers over railroads, we ought to find 
language fitting for so drastic a change"). 
II 
Neither Congress nor this Court has ever granted a 
trustee in bankruptcy ~ther power equal to the abandon- -D 
ment power that the majority confers today. In fact, as I 
show below, Congress has repeatedly expressed its legisla-
tive determination that the trustee is not to have carte 
blanche to ignore non-bankruptcy law. Where the Bank-
ruptcy Code has conferred special powers upon the trustee 
? 
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and where there was no common law li1n~on on that 
power, Congress has expressly provided~t~the efforts of 
the trustee to marshafa~e assets of the estate 
must yield to governmental interest in public health and 
----aafetn One cannot assume that Congress, having placed 
these limitations upon other aspects of trustees' operations, 
intended to abandon a well-established judicial restriction on 
the abandonment power. As we held last year in the context 
of the National Labor Relations Act, "[T]he debtor-in-posses-
sion is not relieved of all obligations under the [Act] simply 
by filing a petition for bankruptcy." NLRB v. Bildisco & 
Bildisco, 465 U. S. 513, 534. 
The automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code, 
§ 362(a), 2 has been described as "one of the fundamental 
2 Section 362(a) provides: 
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed 
under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under sec-
tion 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U. S. C. 
78eee(a)(3)), operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of-
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or em-
ployment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding 
against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the com-
mencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the 
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title; 
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the es-
tate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under 
this title; 
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property 
from the estate; 
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the 
estate; 
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor 
any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the 
commencement of the case under this title; 
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that 
arose before the commencement of the case under this title; 
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the com-
mencement of the case under this title against any claim against the debtor; 
and 
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debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws." 
S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 54 (1978); H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, 
p. 340 (1977). Despite the importance of§ 362(a) in preserv-
ing the debtor's estate of the debtor, Congress has enacted 
several categories of exceptions to the stay that allow the 
government to commence or continue legal proceedings. 
For example, Section 362(b)(5) permits the government to 
enforce "non-monetary" judgments against a debtor's estate. 
It is clear from the legislative history that one of the pur-
poses of this exception was to protect public health and 
safety: 
"Thus, where a governmental unit is suing a debtor to 
prevent or stop violation of fraud, environmental protec-
tion, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or 
regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for viola-
tion of such a law the action or proceeding is not stayed 
under the automatic stay." 1\ H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, 
supra, at 343; S. Rep. No. 95-989, supra, at 52. 
Petitioners have suggested that the existence of an express 
exception to the automatic stay undermines the inference of a 
similar exception to the abandonment power: Had Congress 
sought to restrict similarly the scope of § 554, it would have 
enacted similar limiting provisions. This argument, how-
ever, fails to acknowledge the differences between the prede-
cessors of§§ 554 and 362. As I have noted, the exceptions to 
the judicially-created abandonment power were firmly estab-
lished. But in enacting § 362 in 1978, Congress significantly 
expanded the scope of the automatic stay, see 1 NORTON 
BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE §20.03, p. 5-6 
(1981), a process that had begun only five years earlier with 
the adoption of the Bankruptcy Rules in 1973, see id., 
§ 20.02, at 4-5. In the face of the greatly increased reach of 
§ 362, it was necessary for Congress to establish express lim-
(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United 
States Tax Court concerning the debtor. 
? 
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its to this new power. Between 1973 and 1978, some courts 
had stretched the expanded automatic stay to foreclose 
State's efforts to enforce their antipollution laws, 3 and Con-
gress wanted to overrule these interpretations in its 1978 re-
VISion. See H. R. Rep. 95-595, supra, at 174-175. 
Title 28 U. S. C. 959(b) 4 provides additional evidence that 
Congress did not intend for the Bankruptcy Code'~ 
tQJlaPagate all state laws. In § 959(b), the Code commands 
debtor in possession to "manage and operate the property in 
his possession . . . according to the requirements of the valid 
laws of the State." The petitioners have contended that 
§ 959(b) is relevant only when the trustee is actually operat-
ing the business of the debtor, and not when he is liquidating 
it. The Court declines to reach that precise issue, and in-
stead states simply that "the trustee's filing of a petition to 
abandon does not constitute 'manage[ment]' or 'operat[ion]."' 
With all respect, such a formulation begs the question. 
Section § 959(b) applies when the trustee is liquidating the 
business of a debtor because that interpretation gives mean-
ing to both the words "manage" and "operate." Courts "are 
obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word Congress 
used," Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 339 (1979), 
3 See, e. g., Hillsdale Foundry Co. v. Michigan ex rel. Kelly, 1 BCD 195 
(Bkrtcy Ct. WD Mich. 1974) (action by Michigan Attorney General to en-
force State's anti-pollution laws held subject to automatic stay). The 
House Report referred also to an unreported case from Texas where a stay 
prevented the State of Maine from closing down a debtor's plant that was 
polluting a river in violation of the state's environmental protection laws. 
H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 174-175. 
• Section 959(b) provides: 
"Except as provided in section 1166 of title 11, a trustee, receiver or man-
ager appointed in any cause pending in any court of the United States, in-
cluding a debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the property in 
his possession as such trustee, receiver or manager according to the re-
quirements of the valid laws of the State in which such property is situ-
ated, in the same manner that the owner or possessor thereof would be 
bound to do if in possession thereof." 
~- lr 
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and § 959(b), on its face, encompasses something more than 
"operation." As the Court of Appeals noted, there is no rea-
son why the phrase '"manage[ment]' of the 'property,"' could 
not, in the abstract, describe a trustee's custodial care and 
disposition of property in bankruptcy liquidation. In re 
Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F. 2d, at 919; see Commodity 
Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471U. S. --,--
(1985) (stating, after surveying the trustee's various powers, 
that "the Bankruptcy Code gives the trusteee wide-ranging 
management authority over the debtor"). This reading is 
also consistent with the section's legislative history, ~ ~..f 
shows the provision was designed to place railroad receiver-
ships within the reach of state law. See S. Misc. Doc. 
No. 44, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1888); S. Misc. Doc. No. 7, 
50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1887); S. Misc. Doc. No. 19, 49th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1886); H. R. Misc. Doc. No. 45, 49th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1886). The precept of § 959(b) is clear: "[T]he 
goals of the federal bankruptcy laws, including rehabilitation 
of the debtor, do not authorize transgression of state laws 
setting requirements for the operation of the business, even 
if the continued operation of the business would be thwarted 
by applying state laws." In re Quanta Resources Group, 
739 F. 2d 912, 919 (CA3 1984). 
III 
Finally, I am reluctant to find a legislative intent to confer 
unrestricted abandonment power upon a trustee in bank-
ruptcy when Congress ha.s repeatedly emphasized its "goal of 
protecting the environmental against toxic pollution." 
Chemical Manfufactures Assn., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, 470 U.S.--,-- (1985). Congress has 
also enacted a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA), 42 U. S. C. §§ 6901-6987, to regulate the treat-
ment, storage, and disposal of hazardous wastes by monitor-
ing wastes from their creation until after their permanent 
disposal. That Act authorizes the United States to seek ju-
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dicial or administrative restraint of activities involving haz-
ardous wastes that "may present an imminent and substan-
tial endangerment to health or the environment." 42 
U. S. C. § 6973; see also S. Rep. No. 98-284, p. 58 (1983). 
Congress broadened the scope of the statute and tightened 
the regulatory restraints in 1984.5 In the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 
Pub.L. 98-80, § 2(c)(2)(B), Congress established a fund to fi-
nance cleanup of some sites and require certain responsible 
parties to reimburse either the fund or the parties who paid 
for the cleanup. The Act also empowers the Federal Gov-
ernment to secure such relief as may be necessary to avert 
"imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health 
or welfare or the environment because of an actual or thre -
ened release of a hazardous substance." 42 U. S. C. § 06. 
In the face of Congress' undisputed concern over the r · ks of 
the improper storage and disposal of hazardous and t ic sub-
stances, I am unwilling to presume that ongres 1mphcit y 
long-standing restrictions on the ommon-law 
abandonment power. 
Hl.V 5 
Today's holding allows WB trusteej ie aba~don hazardous 
materials and to aggravat e already-existing dangers by~­
~.ping security measures that preventj!!:t public ent~~tl~~l~ 
ism, and fire. . The truste[ ~not -reqllired to take eve~mmor 
steps to red e imminenCe~ such as security fencing, 
5 Congr ehminated the small generator exception and subjected many 
more f tlities to the regulations. Pub. L. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221, 
3248- 72 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6921(d) (Supp. 1985)). Another 
prov:·sion automatically broadens the Act's coverage by automatically as-
si · ng a hazardous rating to substances that the EPA does not classify by 
a , et deadline. 98 Stat. 3227-3231 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. §§ 6924(d), 
( 0, (f)(3), (g)(6) (Supp. 1985)). Amended enforcement provisions allow 
ore citizen suits, 98 Stat. 3271-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6973 
Supp. 1985)), and authorize · istl'ativ or suits to compel "cor-
ective action" af eak has occurred. 98 Stat. 57-3258 (codified at 
U.~ . § 6928(h~ (Supp. 1985)). 
f aL.; ~ 
~~~;~.J 
_j/ t,.Y ~ J.rY I 
(V" ~ v t< 
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drainage and diking repairs, sealing deterior~~ting 
removal of explosive agents not on a school sto e. 
believe that Congress did not grant.t¥ truste a 
liceruret: •=w=~ bf ~  
~ 
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
The Court today rules that a trustee in bankruptcy may 
abandon property that is burdensome or of inconsequential 
value to the estate without regard to "any general require-
ment of compliance with state regulatory laws. (Supra~~ at 
--. This is only a "narr~ condition on the abandonment 
r . . . such as where abandonment by the trustee might 
itself create a genuine emergency that the trustee would be 
uniquely able to guard against." ~ at --. Under ) I P,rJ;., ) 
the Court's holding, although a trustee may not "abandon dy-
namite on a stove in the basement of a school," ibi<() he may \ J 
abandon 470,000 gallons of highly toxic and carcinogic waste 
oil in unguarded, deteriorating containers where they 
present risks of explosion, fire, contamination of water sup-
plies, destruction of natural resources, and injury, genetic 
damage, or death through personal contact, see Brief for 
United States as Amicus Curiae0 4, 23. A more modest 
SH STYL£ ) / MIL- MANUAL 
§ B. ~b'.f(a) 
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reading of the trustee's abandonment power under 11 
U. S. C. § 554(a) 1 avoids this unsupported distinction, fol-
lows the common-law restrictions on the abandonment 
power, and accords with the limited scope of other Bank-
ruptcy Code provisions and with the repeatedly expressed 
congressional interest in environmental protection. Accord-
ingly, I dissent. 
I 
The trustee's abandonment power before the 1978 revi-
sions of the Bankruptcy Code was clearly limited by a public 
interest exception. This was made clear by the only rele-
vant cases. In Ottenheimer ~.Whitaker, 198 F. 2d 2~9 (CA4 
1952), the Court of Appeals concluded that a bankruptcy 
trustee, in liquidating the estate of a barge company, could 
not abandon several barges when the abandonment would 
have obstructed a navigable passage in violation of federal 
law. The Court stated: , 
"The judge-ma~e [abandonment] rule must give way 
when it comes into conflict with a statute enacted in 
order to ensure the safety of navigation; for we are not 
dealing with a burden imposed upon the bankrupt or his 
property by contract, but a duty and a burden imposed 
upon an owner ,of vessels by an Act of Congress in the 
public interest." I d., at 290. 
In In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F. 2d 1 (CA 7), 
cert. denied, 317 U. S. 683 (1942), the Court of Appeals held 
that a debtor transit company could not cease its operation of 
a branch railway line when local law required continued oper-
ation. While the court did not forbid the trustee's abandon-
ment of property (i. e., his rejection of an unexpired lease), it 
conditioned the trustee's actions to ensure compliance with 
' Section 554(a) reads: 
I 
" "After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of the J I 
estate t):lat is burdensopte to,fstate or that is ofinconsequential value to the .zJu.. :;F 
estate." "- · 
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state law. Similarly, in In re Lewis Jones, Inc., 1 ~· R. D] 
277 (Bkrtcy Ct. ED Pa. 1974), the bankruptcy court invoked 
its equitable power to "safeguard the public interest" by re-
quiring the debtor public utilities to seal underground steam 
lines before abandoning them. 
Thus, when Congress enacted § 554, there were well-rec-
ognized restrictions on a trustee's abandonment power. In 
codifying the judicially-developed rule of abandonment, Con-
gress also presumably included the established corollary that 
a trustee could not exercise his abandonment power in viola-
tion of certain state and federal laws. The normal rule of 
statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legisla-
tion to change the interpretation of a judicially created con-
cept, it makes that intent specific. Edmonds v. Compagnie 
Generale Transatlantique, 443 U. S. 25p, 266-267 (1979). 
The Court has followed this rule with particular care in con-
struing the scope of bankruptcy codifications. If Congress 
wishes to grant the trustee an extraordinary exemption from 
non-bankruptcy law, "the intention would be clearly ex-
pressed, not left to be ·collected or inferred from disputable 
considerations of convenience in administering the estate of 
the bankrupt." Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U. S. 441, 444 
(1904); see Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U. S. 79, 85 (1939) 
("If this old and familiar power of the states [over local rail-
road service] was withdrawn when Congress gave district 
courts bankruptcy powers over railroads, we ought to find 
language fitting for so drastic a change"). 
II 
Neither Congress nor this Court has ever granted a 
trustee in bankruptcy any other power equal to the abandon-
ment power that the majority confers today. In fact, as I 
show below, Congress has repeatedly expressed its legisla-
tive determination that the trustee is not to have carte 
blanche to ignore non-bankruptcy law. Where the Bank-
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and where there was no common law limitation on that 
power, Congress has expressly provided that the efforts of 
the trustee to marshal and distribute the assets of the estate 
must yield to governmental interest in public health and 
safety. One cannot assume that Congress, having placed 
these limitations upon other aspects of trustees' operations, 
intended to abandon a well-established judicial restriction on 
the abandonment power. As we held last year in the context 
of the National Labor Relations Act, "[T]he debtor-in-posses-
sion is not relieved of all obligations under the [Act] simply 
by filing a petition for bankruptcy." NLRB v. Bildisco & 
Bildisco, 465 U. S. 513, 534. 
The automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code, 
§ 362(a), 2 has been described as "one of the fundamentat 
2 Section 362(a) provides: \ 
~a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed 
under section 301, 302, or 303 of this tiile, or an application filed under sec- j 
tion fj(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U. S. C. I 
78eee(a)(3)), operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of-
,~~,.(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or em-
ployment of proc:ess, of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding 
against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the com-
mencement of the case under this title, or to recov.er a claim against the 
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title; 
A (2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the es-
tate, of a judgment obtained before the commenc~ment of the case under 
this title; 
A(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property 
from the estate; 
I\ (4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any li~n against property of the 
estate; 
N 5) any act to create, perf~ct, or enforce against property of the debtor 
any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the 
commencement of the case under this title; 
t\(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that 
arose before the commencement of the case under this title; 
t\ (7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the com-
mencement of the case under this title.against any claim against the debtor; 1 
Md . 
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debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws." 
S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 54 (1978); H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, 
p. 340 (1977). Despite the importance of§ 362(a) in preserv-
ing the ~estate of the debtor, Congress has enacted 
several categories of exceptions to the stay that allow the 
,government to commence or continue legal proceedings. 
For example, Section 362(b)(5) permits the iovernment to 
enforce "non-monetary" judgments against a debtor's estate. 
It is clear from the legislative history that one of the pur-
poses of this exception was to protect public health and 
safety: 
"Thus, where a governmental unit is suing a debtor to 
prevent or stop violation of fraud, environmental protec-
tion, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or 
regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for viola-
tion of such a law~he action or proceeding is not stayed 
under the automatic stay." H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, 
supra, at 343.; S. Rep. No. 95-989, supra, at 52. 
Petitioners have suggested that the existence of an express 
exception to the automatic stay undermines the inference of a 
similar exception to the abandonment power: Had Congress 
sought to restrict similarly the scope of § 554, it would have 
q-/ 
enacted similar limiting provisions. This argument, how- SEE STYlt 
ever, fails to acknowledge the differences between the prede- MANU~ 
cessors of§§ 554 and 362. As I have noted, the exceptions to §::3. ~ _ 
the judicially-created abandonment power were firmly estab- fJ' 
lished. But in enacting § 362 in 1978, Congress significantly //1:)/ ) 
ex_panded the scope of the automatic sta see 1,.NQRTONJA ~· \6 j 
~NKRUPTCY) Lf\W ANI» p ACTICE § 20.03, PD 5-6 ::;fJO I 
(1981), a process that had begun only five years earlier with 
the adoption of the Bankruptcy Rules in 1973, see id., 
§ 20.02, at 4-5. In the face of the greatly increased reach of 
§ 362, it was necessary for Congress to establish express lim-
; . (8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United 
States Tax Court concerning the debtor. 1\, 
@/ 
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its to this new power. Between 1973 and 1978, some courts 
had stretched the expanded automatic stay to foreclose 
State's efforts to enforce their antipollution laws, 3 and Con-
gress wanted to overrule these interpretations in its 1978 re-
VISIOn. See H. R. Rep. 95-595, supra, at 174-175. 
Title 28 U. S. C. 959(b) 4 provides additional evidence that 
Congress did not intend for the Bankruptcy Code's purpose 
to abrogate all state laws. In § 959(b), the Code commands 
debtor in possession to "manage and operate the property in 
his possession . . . according to the requirements of the valid 
laws of the State." The petitioners have contended that 
§ 959(b) is relevant only when the trustee is actually operat-
ing the business of the debtor, and not when he is liquidating 
it. The Court declines to reach that precise issue, and in-
stead states simply that "the trustee's filing of a petition to 
abandon does not constitute 'manage[ment]' or6bperat[ion].'" 
With all respect, such a formulation begs the question. 
Section § 959(b) applies when the trustee is liquidating the 
business of a debtor because that interpretation gives mean-
ing to both the words "manage" and "operate." Courts "are 
obliged to give effect, if possible, to every w_9rd Congr.7ss 
used," Reiter { Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 339 (1979), 
3 See, e. g., Hillsdale Foundry Co. v. Michigan ex rel. Kelly, 1 BCD 195 
(Bkrtcy Ct. WD Mich. 1974) (action by Michigan Attorney General to en-
force State's anti-pollution laws held subject to automatic stay). The 
House Report referred also to an unreported case from Texas where a stay 
prevented the State of Maine from closing down a debtor's plant that was 
polluting a river in violation of the state's environmental protection laws. 
H. R. Rep. No; 95-595, p. 174-175. 
• Section 959(b) provides: 
I 
" "Except as provided in section 1166 of title 11, a truste.e, receiver or man-
ager appointed in any cause pending in any court of the United States, in-
cluding a debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the property in 
his possession as such truste~, receiver or manager according to the re-
quirements of the valid laws of the State in which such property is situ-
ated, in the same manner. that the owner or posse~sor thereof would be 
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and § 959(b), on its face, encompasses something more than 
"operation." As the Court of Appeals noted, there is no rea-
son why the phrase "'manage[ment]' of the 'property,'" could 
not, in the abstract, describe a trustee's custodial care and 
disposition of property in bankruptcy liquidation. In re 
Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F. 2d, at 919; see Commodity 
Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471,tJ. S. --,--
(1985) (stating, after surveying the trustee's various powers, 
that "the Bankruptcy Code gives the trusteee wide-ranging 
management authority over the debtor"). This reading is 
also consistent with the section's legislative history, which 
shows the provision was designed to place railroad receiver-
ships within the reach of state law. See S. Misc. Doc. 
No. 44, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1888); S. Misc. Doc. No. 7, 
50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1887); S. Misc. Doc. No. 19, 49th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1886); H. R. Misc. Doc. No. 45, 49th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1886). The precept of § 959(b) is clear: "[T]he 
goals of the federal bankruptcy laws, including rehabilitation 
of the debtor, do not authorize transgression of state laws 
setting requirements for the operation of the business, even 
if the continued operation of the business would be thwarted 
by applying state laws." In re Quanta Resources Group, 
739 F. 2d 912, 919 (CA3 1984). 
III 
Finally, I am reluctant to find a legislative intent to confer 
unrestricted abandonment power upon a trustee in bank-
ruptcy when Congress has repeatedly emphasized its "goal of 
protecting the environment.@D against toxic pollution." 
Chemical Mari_ufacturet!.... Assn., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council,"470 U. :s. --, -- (1985). Congress has 
also enacted a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA), 42 U. S. C. §§ 6901-6987, to regulate the treat-
ment, storage, and disposal of hazardous wastes by monitor-
ing wastes from their creation until after their permanent 
disposal. That Act authorizes the United States to seek ju-
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dicial or administrative restraint of activities involving haz-
ardous wastes that "may present an imminent and substan-
tial endangerment to health or the environment." 42 
U. S. C. § 6973; see also S. Rep. No. 98-284, p. 58 (1983). 
Congress broadened the scope of the statute and tightened 
the regulatory restraints in 1984.5 In the Comprehensive / 
Environmental RespOJ!Se, Compensation, and Liability Act, 11 ,M... ~d.L ~ 7 
Pub.L. 98-80, § 2(c)(2)(B), Congress established a fund to fi-
nanek cleanup of some sites and require certain responsible 
parties to reimburse either the fund or the parties who paid 
for the cleanup. The Act also empowers the Federal Gov-
ernment to secure such relief as may be necessary to avert 
"imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health 
or welfare or the environment because of an actual or threat-
ened release of a hazardous substance." 42 U. S. C. § 9606. 
In the face of Congress' undisputed concern over the risks of 
the improper storage and disposal of hazardous and toxic sub-
stances, I am unwilling to presume that Congress implicitly 
overruled long-standing restrictions on the common-law 
abandonment power. 
IV 
Today's holding allows this trustee to abandon hazardous 
materials and to aggravate already-existing dangers by stop-
ping security measures that prevented public entry, vandal-
ism, and fire. The trustee is not required to take even minor 
steps to reduce imminent danger, such as security fencing, 
5 Congress eliminated the ·small generator exception and subjected many 
more facilities to the regulations. Pub. )... 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221, 
3248-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6921(d) (Supp. 1985)). Another 
provision automatically broadens the Act's coverage by automatically as-
signing a hazardous rating to substances that the EPA does not classify,by 
a set deadline. 98 Stat. 3227-3231 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. §§ 6924(d), 
(e), (f)(3), (g)(6) (Supp. 1985)). Amended enforcement provisions allow 
more citizen suits, 98 Stat. 3271-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6973 
(Supp. 1985)), and authorize administrative orders or suits to compel "cor-
rective action" after I} leak has occurred. 98 Stat. 3257-3258 (codified at 
42 U. S. C. A. § 6928(h) (Supp. 1985)). 
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drainage and diking repairs, sealing deteriorating tanks, and 
removal of explosive agents not on a school stove. Because I 
believe that Congress did not grant the trustee an unlimited 
license in the abandonment power, I dissent. 
lfp/ss 11/23/85 M1DCC SALLY-POW 
MEMORANDUM 
'ID: Cabell DATE: November 23, 1985 
.FROM: Lewis .F. Powell, Jr . 
84-801 and 84-805 Midlantic National Bank 
The purpose of this memo is to make comments as 
they occur to me when reading your Chambers Draft of our 
dissent. 
1. What we say is likely to evoke a strong 
response from Justice Rehnquist. Therefore it must be 
accurate in every respect. 1 suggest that in the text~~ 
~~~}3/ 
t we ~ tate more of the facts. 1 would take them 
1\ 
l1u:z_, 
from~court opinions rather than the SG's brief where 
~~· 
~e. My understanding is that the trustee in the New 
York case 
~ 
creditors that he wotlbd abandon the 
•. . . 
2. 
Long Island site that includes 70,000 gallons of waste oil 
contaminated by PCB. 1 believe - but have not checked -
~~ ~ 
that)Y simila~ r st has been ~e by the trustee with 
respect to the Edgewater site in New Jersey where the SG's 
brief states that 400,000 of waste oil are ~ 
contaminated. 1 would put this in the text with reference 
to the opinions of the two courts. Then, in a footnote 1 
think you could very well use your favorite quote from p. 
23 of the SG's brief. 1 would commence the footnote along 
the following lines: 
"According to the b ( : f for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae, the r~rresponsible abandonment of 
inherently hazardous wastes [requested by the 
trustees] poses particularly alarming health and 
safety concerns. Hazardous wastes, by their 
very nature, present risks ..• •. (Here, 
Cabell, finish the sentence as you now have it 
and putting it in quotes. Since it is taken 
from the SG's brief 1 would then add, if you 
properly can, that petitiO~fj~Q .these two 
cases do n~~n~ert ~fiazardous 
conditions d result from the Court's 
opinion toJ ay unless the states, at public 
expense, immediately assume~ responsibility. 
~: / JI Then, Cabell, in fairness 1 think we should say 
' 
' 
that New York - because of the reckless 
abandonment of the Long Island facility -
already has had to spend some $2 million(?), for 
which there may or not be reimbursement. 
In other words, Cabell, I think at the very 
beginning of our dissent we should expand what you have 
said and also be careful to present the "horror story" 
accurately in every respect. -r·--~ ~~ 
3. 
AJ Jf ~.yrtA- ¢.. ~-~ ~ 






To: The Chief Justice ~ (/ 
Justice Brennan ~ 1-. 






From: Justice Powell 
Circulated: _________ _ 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
NOS. 84-801 AND 84-805 
MIDLANTIC NATIONAL BANK, PETITIONER 
84-801 v. 
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION 
THOMAS J. O'NEILL, TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY OF 
QUANTA RESOURCES CORPORATION:, DEBTOR, 
PETITIONER 
84-805 v. 
CITY OF NEW YORK ET AL. 
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
~ December-, 1985] 
C__/ . JUSTICE POWELL, issenting. 
These two petitions or certiorari, arising out of the same 
bankruptcy proceeding, present the question whether 
trustee in bankruptcy may abandon property that is burden-
e or of inconsequential value to the estate without regard 
to any general requirement of compliance to state regulatory 
laws. In the Jight of the restrict" pre-1978 abandonment 
power of the bankruptcy trustee, the limited scope of other 
bankruptcy provisions, and congressional interest in protect-
ing the environment from toxic wastes, we conclude that the 
trustee's authority under 11 U. S. C. § 554(a) 1 is not an un-
limited license to abandon property of the bankrupt estate 
__.:;) 
1 Section"554(a) reads: 
/ "After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of 
the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential 
value to the estate." 
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but instead is subject to compliance with certain state and 
local regulatory laws. 
I 
On October 6, 1981, Quanta Resources Corp. (Quanta) filed 
a voluntary petition in bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U. S. C. § 1101 et seq. The following 
month, the action was converted to a liquidation proceeding 
under Chapter 7, and Thomas J. O'Neill, petitioiJfin No. 
84-805, was thereupon appointed trutee in bankruptcy. 
At its facility in Long Island City, New York, Quanta had 
an ownership interest in the real property (subject to two 
mortgages totalling$ 454,464), th~ facility, and its inventory. 
Mortgages exceeded the value of the property, and the esti-
mated cost to dispose of the contaminated waste oil plainly 
rendered the property a net burden to the estate. · After try-
ing without success to sell the site for the benefit of Quanta's 
.creditors, the trustee notified the creditors and the Bank-
ruptcy Court that he intended to abandon the site pursuant 
to § 554(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. No ·one disputed that 
trustee's allegation that the site was "burdensome" and of 
"inconsequential value to the estate" within the meaning of 
§554. 
The City and the State of New York (collectively New 
York), respondents in No. 84-805, nevertheless objected, 
contending that abandonment would threaten the public 
health and safety, and that the act of abandonment itself 
would violate state and federal environmental law. New 
York rested its objection on both "public policy" consider-
ations reflected in applicable local laws, and the requirement 
of 28 U. S. C. § 959(b), requiring a trustee to "manage and 
operate" the property of the estate "according to the valid 
laws of the State in which the property is situated." New 
York asked the bankruptcy court to order that the assets of-
the estate be used to bring the facility into compliance with 
-£-r 
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I 
..{ 
applicable law 2 After briefng and argument, the Bank-
ruptcy Court approved the abandonment, noting that "[t]he 
City and State are in a better position in every respect than 
either the trustee or debtor's creditors to do what needs to be 
done to protect the public against the dangers posed by the 
PSB-contaminated facility." The District Court affirmed 
and New York appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit. 
· Upon abandonment, the trustree remov.ed the 24-hour 
guard service and shut down the fire-supression system. 
New York clea~ up the facility, with the exception of con~ 
11 
taminated subsoil, at a cost of about $2.5 million. ,.---- c._:_.) 
At the Edgewater, New Jersey, site, Quanta leased the 
underlying real prooperty and owned outright the facility and 
its inventory. Quanta procesed waste oil at Edgewater pur-
suant to a temporary operating permit issued by the New 
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP), 
respondent in No. 84-801. In June 1981, NJDEJ;> discov-
ered that Quanta had violated a specific prohibition in its op-
erating permit in having more than 400,000 gallons of PCB-
contaminated oil at the Edgewater site, and ordered Quanta 
to sease operations at Edgewater. NJDEP and Quanta 
began negotiations concerning cleanup of the property, but 
on October 6, 1981, Quanta filed a petition in bankruptcy be-
fore the negotiations had concluded. The next day, NJDEP ___. 
~ 5kt~ 2 Th~ue in this litigation may b~ the priority of 
creditors' claims. New York seu~l:i · a 
_ __,..,;..il.y"' an admini,trntivo oxpen~; ~ 
lf N e..w York's claim t: · . · , · s n t -------.. $ kf 
before us. 
u.~ 
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issued an admnistrative order requiring Quanta to clean up 
the site. 
On April 23, 1983, shortly after the District Court had ap-
proved abandonment of the New York site, the trustee gave 
notice of his intent to abandon personal property at the 
Edgewater site, consisting principally of the contaminated 
oil. The Bankruptcy Court approved the abandonment on 
May 20, 1983, over NEJDEP's objection that the estate had 
sufficient funds to protect the public from the dangers posed 
by the hazardous waste. 
Because the New Jersey case and the New York case pre-
sented identical issues, the parties in the New Jersey litiga-
tion consented to NJDEP's taking a direct appeal to the 
Court of Appeals pursuant to 11 U. S. C. §405(c)(l)(B). 
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit reversed the lower court decisions to permit abandon-
ment. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F. 2d 912 (1984) 
(Quanta I); In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F. 2d 927 
(Quanta II). Although the court found little guidance in 
§ 554's legislative history, the ~ity concluded that Con- ,;/ 
gress had intended to codify the judge-made abandonment 
practice developed under the previous Bankruptcy Act. 
Under that law, where iBijlart:mt, state law or general equita- --6 
ble principles protect some public interest, that interest k_t:;;_. 
should not be overridden by the j.ndgemuie abandonment :5 -_-~ 
power. The court also found evidence in other provisions of ~ 
the bankruptcy code that Congress did not intend to preempt } -
all state regulation, only that ground on policies outweighed 
by the relevant federal interest. Accordingly, the/ Court of / 
Appeals held that the Bankruptcy Court erred in permitting 
abandonment, and remanded both cases for further 
proceedings. 3 
•Judge Gibbons dissented, arguing that §554 clearly permits abandon-
ment without any exception analogous to that provided to the automatic 
stay. The dissent further contended that the majority's interpretation of 
§ 554 raise substantial questions under the takings clause by potentially de-
, . 
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We granted certiorari and consolidated these cases to de-
termine whether the Court of Appeals properly limited the 
trustee's authority to abandon burdensome property, 469 
U.S.--, and affirm. 
II 
The trustee's abandonment power before the 1978 revi-
sions of the Bankruptcy Code had been limited by a judi-
cially-developed doctrine intended to protect legitimate state 
or federal interests. This was made clear by a limited num-
ber of relevant cases. In Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F. 
2d 289 (CA4 1952), the Court of Appeals concluded that a 
bankruptcy trustee, in liquidating the estate of a barge com-
pany, could not abandon several barges when the abandon-
ment would have obstructed a navigable passage in violation 
of federal law. The Court stated: 
"The judge-made [abandonment] rule must give way 
when it comes into conflict with a statute enacted in 
order to ensure the safety of navigation; for we are not 
dealing with a burden imposed upon the bankrupt or his 
property by contract, but a duty and a burden imposed 
upon an owner of vessels by an Act of Congress in the 
public interest." I d., at 290. 
In In re Chicago Rapid Transit 9o., 129 F. 2d 1 (CA 7), 
cert. denied, 317 U. S. 683 (1942), the Court of Appeals held 
that the trustee of a debtor transit company could not cease 
its operation of a branch railway line when local law required 
continued operation. While the court did not forbid the 
trustee's abandonment of property (i. e., his rejection of an 
unexpired lease), it conditioned the trustee's actions to en-
sure compliance with state law.· Similarly, in In re Lewis 
Jones, Inc., 1 B. C. D. 277 (Bkrtcy Ct. ED Pa. 1974), the 
stroying the interest of secured creditors, see United States v. Security 
Industrial Bank, 458 U. S. 70 (1982), and that the majority had failed to 
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bankruptcy court invoked its equitable power to "safeguard 
the public interest" by requiring the debtor public utilities to 
seal underground steam lines before abandoning them. 
Thus, when Congress enacted § 554, there were well-rec-
ognized restrictions on a trustee's abandonment power. In 
codifying the judicially-developed rule of abandonment, Con-
gress also presumably included the established corollary that 
a trustee could not exercise his abandonment power in viola-
tion of certain state and federal laws. The normal rule of 
statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legisla-
tion to change the interpretation of a judicially created con-
cept, it makes that intent specific. Edmonds v. Compagnie 
Generale Transatlantique, 443 U. S. 256, 266-267 (1979). 
The Court has followed this rule with particular care in con-
struing the scope of bankruptcy codifications. If Congress 
wishes to grant the trustee an extraordinary exemption from 
non-bankruptcy law, "the intention would be clearly ex-
pressed, not left to be collected or inferred from disputable 
considerations of convenience in administering the estate of 
the bankrupt." Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U. S. 441, 444 
(1904); see Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U. S. 79, 85 (1939) 
("If this old and familiar power of the states [over local rail-
road service] was withdrawn when Congress gave district 
courts bankruptcy powers over railroads, we ought to find 
language fitting for so drastic a change"). · 
II 
Neither the Court nor Congress has granted a trustee in 
bankruptcy powers that would lend support to a right to 
abandon property in contravention of state or local laws de-
signed to protect public health or safety. As we held last 
Terms ago when the State of Ohio sought compensation for 
cleaning the toxic waste site of a bankrupt corporation: 
"Finally, we do not question that anyone in possession of 
the site-whether it is Kovas or another in the event the 
receivership is liquidated and the trustee abandons the 
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property, or a vendee from the receiver or the bank-
ruptcy trustee-must comly with the environmental laws 
of the State of Ohio. Plainly, that person or firm may 
not maintain a nuisance, pollute the waters of the State, 
or refuse to remove the source of such conditions." 
Ohio v. Kovas, 469 U.S.--,-- (1985) 
Congress has repeatedly expressed its legislative deter-
mination that the trustee is not to have carte blanche to ig-
nore non-bankruptcy law. Where the Bankruptcy Code has 
conferred special powers upon the trustee and where there 
was no common law limitation on that power, Congress has 
expressly provided that the efforts of the trustee to marshal 
and distribute the assets of the estate must yield to govern-
mental interest in public health and safety. Post, at 5. One 
cannot assume that Congress, having placed these limitations 
upon other aspects of trustees' operations, intended to aban-
don a well-established judicial restriction on the abandon-
ment power. As we held last year in the context of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, "[T]he debtor-in-possession is not 
relieved of all obligations under the [Act] simply by filing a 
petition for bankruptcy." NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 
u. s. 513, 534. 
The automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code, 
§ 362(a), 4 has been described as "one of the fundamental 
• Section 362(a) provides: 
"(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed 
under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under sec-
tion 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U. S. C. 
78eee(a)(3)), operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of-
"(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or em-
ployment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding 
against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the com-
mencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the 
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title; 
"(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the es-
tate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under 
this title; 
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debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws." 
S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 54 (1978); H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, 
p. 340 (1977). Despite the importance of§ 362(a) in preserv-
ing the debtor's estate of the debtor, Congress has enacted 
several categories of exceptions to the stay that allow the 
Government to commence or continue legal proceedings. 
For example, Section 362(b)(5) permits the Government to 
enforce "non-monetary" judgments against a debtor's estate. 
It is clear from the legislative history that one of the pur-
poses of this exception was to protect public health and 
safety: 
"Thus, where a governmental unit is suing a debtor to 
prevent or stop violation of fraud, environmental protec-
tion, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or 
regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for viola-
tion of such a law, the action or proceeding is not stayed 
under the automatic stay." H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, 
supra, at 343 (emphasis added); S. Rep. No. 95-989, 
supra, at 52 (emphasis added). 
Petitioners have suggested that the existence of an express 
exception to the automatic stay undermines the inference of a 
similar exception to the abandonment power: had Congress 
sought to restrict similarly the scope of § 554, it would have 
"(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property 
from the estate; 
"(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the 
estate; 
"(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor 
any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the 
commencement of the case under this title; 
"(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that 
arose before the commencement of the case under this title; 
"(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the com-
mencement of the case under this title against any claim against the debtor; 
and 
"(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the 
United States Tax Court concerning the debtor." 
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enacted similar limiting provisions. This argument, how-
ever, fails to acknowledge the differences between the prede-
cessors of§§ 554 and 362. As we have noted, the exceptions 
to the judicially-created abandonment power were firmly es-
tablished. But in enacting § 362 in 1978, Congress signifi-
cantly broadened the scope of the automatic stay, see 1 W. 
Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice § 20.03, p. 5-6 (1981), 
an expansion that had begun only five years earlier with the 
adoption of the Bankruptcy Rules in 1973, see id., § 20. 02, at 
4-5. Between 1973 and 1978, some courts had stretched the 
expanded automatic stay to foreclose State's efforts to en-
force their antipollution laws, 5 and Congress wanted to over-
rule these interpretations in its 1978 revision. See H. R. 
Rep. 95-595, supra, at 174-175. In the face of the greatly 
increased scope of § 362, it was necessary for Congress to 
limit this new power expressly. Title 28 U. S. C. 959(b) 6 
provides additional evidence that Congress did not intend for 
the Bankruptcy Code to preempt all state laws. In§ 959(b), 
the Code commands debtor in possession to "manage and op-
erate the property in his. possession . . . according to the re-
quirements of the valid laws of the State." The petitioners 
have contended that § 959(b) is relevant only when the 
trustee is actually operating the business of the debtor, and 
5 See, e. g. , Hillsdale Foundry Co. v. Michigan ex rel. Kelly, 1 BCD 195 
(Bkrtcy Ct. WD Mich. 1974) (action by Michigan Attorney General to en-
force State's anti-pollution laws held subject to automatic stay). The 
House Report referred also to an unreported case from Texas where a stay 
prevented the State of Maine from closing down a debtor's plant that was 
polluting a river in violation of the state's environmental protection laws. 
H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 174-175. 
6 Section 959(b) provides: 
"Except as provided in section 1166 of title 11, a trustee, receiver or 
manager appointed in any cause pending in any court of the United States, 
including a debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the property in 
his possession as such trustee, receiver or manager according to the re-
quirements of the valid laws of the State in which such property is situ-
ated, in the same manner that the owner or possessor thereof would be 
bound to do if in possession thereof." 
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not when he is liquidating it. The Court declines to reach 
that precise issue, and instead states simply that "the trust-
ee's filing of a petition to abandon does not constitute 'man-
age[ment]' or 'operat[ion].'" With all respect, such a for-
mulation begs the question. 
Section § 959(b) applies when the trustee is liquidating the 
business of a debtor because that interpretation gives mean-
ing to both the words "manage" and "operate." Courts "are 
obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word Congress 
used," Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 339 (1979), 
and § 959(b), on its face, encompasses something more than 
"operation." As the Court of Appeals noted, there is no rea-
son why the phrase "'manage[ment]' of the 'property,'" could 
not describe a trustee's custodial care and disposition of prop-
erty in bankruptcy liquidation. In re Quanta Resources 
Corp., 739 F. 2d, at 919. 7 This reading is also consistent 
with the section's legislative history, which shows the provi-
sion was designed to place railroad receiverships within the 
reach of state law. 8 The precept of § 959(b) is clear: "[T]he 
goals of the federal bankruptcy laws, including rehabilitation 
of the debtor, do not authorize transgression of state laws 
setting requirements for the operation of the business, even 
if the continued operation of the business would be thwarted 
by applying state laws." Ibid. 
III 
Although the reasons elaborated upon above are sufficient 
for concluding that Congress did not intend for the abandon-
ment power to abrogate certain state and local laws, we find 
additional support for restricting that power in repeated con-
7 See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.' S. 
- , - (1985) (stating, after surveying the trustee's various powers, 
that "the Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee wide-ranging management 
authority over the debtor"). 
8 See S. Misc. Doc. No. 44, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1888); S. Misc. Doc. 
No. 7, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1887); S. Misc. Doc. No. 19, 49th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1886); H. R. Misc. Doc. No. 45, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. (1886). 
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gressional emphasis on its "goal of protecting the environ-
ment against toxic pollution." Chemical Manufacturers 
Assn., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 
U. S. --, -- (1985). Congress has enacted a Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U. S. C. 
§§ 6901-6987, to regulate the treatment, storage, and dis-
posal of hazardous wastes by monitoring wastes from their 
creation until after their permanent disposal. That Act au-
thorizes the United States to seek judicial or administrative 
restraint of activities involving hazardous wastes that "may 
present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health 
or the environment." 42 U. S. C. § 6973; see also S. Rep. 
No. 98-284, p. 58 (1983). Congress broadened the scope of 
the statute and tightened the regulatory restraints in 1984.9 
In the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act, as amended by Pub. L. 98-80, 
§ 2(c)(2)(B), Congress established a fund to finance cleanup of 
some sites and require certain responsible parties to reim-
burse either the fund or the parties who paid for the cleanup. 
The Act also empowers the Federal Government to secure 
such relief as may be necessary to avert "imminent and sub-
stantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or the 
environment because of an actual or threatened release of a 
hazardous substance." 42 U. S. C. § 9606. In the face of 
Congress' undisputed concern over the risks of the improper 
storage and disposal of hazardous and toxic substances, I am 
9 Congress eliminated the small generator exception and subjected many 
more facilities to the regulations. Pub. L. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221, 
3248-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6921(d) (Supp. 1985)). Another 
provision automatically broadens the Act's coverage by automatically as-
signing a hazardous rating to substances that the EPA does not classify by 
a set deadline. 98 Stat. 3227-3231 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. §§ 6924(d), 
(e), (f)(3), (g)(6) (Supp. 1985)). Amended enforcement provisions allow 
more citizen suits, 98 Stat. 3271-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6973 
(Supp. 1985)), and authorize administrative orders or suits to compel "cor-
rective action" after a leak has occurred. 98 Stat. 3257-3258 (codified at 
42 U. S. C. A. § 6928(h) (Supp. 1985)). 
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unwilling to presume that by its enactment of§ 554(a), Con-
gress implicitly overturned long-standing restrictions on the 
common-law abandonment power. 
IV ~~ 
In the light of the restricted yr~78 abandonment power 
of the bankruptcy trustee and in the context of the limited 
scope of other Bankruptcy Code provisions, we conclude that 
Congress did not intencYfor § 554(a) to preempt certain state 
and local laws. A..Jfustee may not abandon property in 
contravention of ~.~tute or regulation that is reasonably 
~ ,-~calealat~ to protect the public health or safety from identi-
fied hazards. e trustee may not a an on hazardo ma-
terials and to aggravate already-existing dange y halting 
security measures that prevent public ent , andalism, and 
fire. 10 Under the Court's ruling, it i ot at all clear that the 
trustees are not required to ta ven relatively minor steps 
to reduce imminent dan , such as security fencing, drain-
age and diking re · s, sealing deteriorating tanks, and re- r--..._-
moval of exp ve agents not on a school stove. Because I 
believe tb Congress did not grant trustees an apparently 
unliJnited license to abandon property of the bankrupt estate, 
I dissent. ..L 
~ f\.Qri..T p~ 
10 Joint Appendix before the Court of Appeals 11-12 (affidavit of Richard 
Docyk, Deputy Chief Inspector for NY City Fire Department); id., at 26 
(transcript of proceedings before de Vito, J.). The trustees in this case 
have abandoned 470,000 gallons of highly toxic and carcinogenic waste oil 
in unguarded, deterioraring containers where they "present risks of explo-
sion, fire, contamination of water supplies, destruction of natural re-
sources, and injury, genetic damge, or death through personal contact." 
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 4, 23; see Joint Appendix, supra, 
at 17 (70,000 gallons at New York site); Appendix before the Court of Ap-
peals A7 (400,000 gallons at New Jersey site); id., at A46 (deteriorating 
containers); Joint Appendix, supra, at 11 (deteriorating tanks); id., at 26 
(guard service); id., at 12 (risk of fire); id. at 11 (contamination of adjacent 
areas); id. at 26 (health effects of exposure to PCBs and their derivatives). 
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
The Court today construes 11 U. S. C. § 554(a) 1 of the 
Bankruptcy Code of 1978 to permit a trustee in bankruptcy to 
abandon property that is burdensome or of inconsequential 
value to the estate without regard to "any general require-
ment of compliance with state regulatory laws." Ante, at 
--. The Court recognizes only a narrow restriction on this 
abandonment power, such as "where abandonment by the 
trustee might itself create a genuine emergency that the 
trustee would be uniquely able to guard against." Ante, at 
--. I believe, however, that the meaning of§ 554 must be 
determined in the light of the restricted pre-1978 abandon-
1 Section 554(a) reads: 
"After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of 
the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential 
value to the estate." 
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ment power of the bankruptcy trustee and in the context of 
the limited scope of other Bankruptcy Code provisions. 
Upon such review, it is clear that Congress did not intend the 
interpretation of§ 554(a) adopted by the Court today. 
I 
The trustee's abandonment power before the 1978 revi-
sions of the Bankruptcy Code had been limited by a judi-
cially-developed doctrine intended to protect legitimate state 
or federal interests. This was made clear by a limited num-
ber of relevant cases. In Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F. 
2d 289 (CA4 1952), the Court of Appeals concluded that a 
bankruptcy trustee, in liquidating the estate of a barge com-
pany, could not abandon several barges when the abandon-
ment would have obstructed a navigable passage in violation 
of federal law. The Court stated: 
"The judge-made [abandonment] rule must give way 
when it comes into conflict with a statute enacted in 
order to ensure the safety of navigation; for we are not 
dealing with a burden imposed upon the bankrupt or his 
property by contract, but a duty and a burden imposed 
upon an owner of vessels by an Act of Congress in the 
public interest." I d., at 290. 
In In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F. 2d 1 (CA 7), 
cert. denied, 317 U. S. 683 (1942), the Court of Appeals held 
that the trustee of a debtor transit company could not cease 
its operation of a branch railway line when local law required 
continued operation. While the court did not forbid the 
trustee's abandonment of property (i. e., his rejection of an 
unexpired lease), it conditioned the trustee's actions to en-
sure compliance with state law. Similarly, in In re Lewis 
Jones, Inc., 1 B. C. D. 277 (Bkrtcy Ct. ED Pa. 1974), the 
bankruptcy court invoked its equitable power to "safeguard 
the public interest" by requiring the debtor public utilities to 
seal underground steam lines before abandoning them. 
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Thus, when Congress enacted § 554, there were well-rec-
ognized restrictions on a trustee's abandonment power. In 
codifying the judicially-developed rule of abandonment, Con-
gress also presumably included the established corollary that 
a trustee could not exercise his abandonment power in viola-
tion of certain state and federal laws. The normal rule of 
statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legisla-
tion to change the interpretation of a judicially created con-
cept, it makes that intent specific. Edmonds v. Compagnie 
Generale Transatlantique, 443 U. S. 256, 266-267 (1979). 
The Court has followed this rule with particular care in con-
struing the scope of bankruptcy codifications. If Congress 
wishes to grant the trustee an extraordinary exemption from 
non-bankruptcy law, "the intention would be clearly ex-
pressed, not left to be collected or inferred from disputable 
considerations of convenience in administering the estate of 
the bankrupt." Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U. S. 441, 444 
(1904); see Palmer v. Massachusetts , 308 U. S. 79, 85 (1939) 
("If this old and familiar power of the states [over local rail-
road service] was withdrawn when Congress gave district 
courts bankruptcy powers over railroads, we ought to find 
language fitting for so drastic a change"). 
II 
Neither Congress nor this Court has ever granted a 
trustee in bankruptcy power equal to the abandonment 
power that the majority confers today. In fact, as I show 
below, Congress has repeatedly expressed its legislative 
determination that the trustee is not to have carte blanche to 
ignore non-bankruptcy law. Where the Bankruptcy Code 
has conferred special powers upon the trustee and where 
there was no common law limitation on that power, Congress 
has expressly provided that the efforts of the trustee to mar-
shal and distribute the assets of the estate must yield to gov-
ernmental interest in public health and safety. Post, at 5. 
One cannot assume that Congress, having placed these limi-
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tations upon other aspects of trustees' operations, intended 
to abandon a well-established judicial restriction on the aban-
donment power. As we held last year in the context of the 
National Labor Relations Act, "[T]he debtor-in-possession is 
not relieved of all obligations under the [Act] simply by filing 
a petition for bankruptcy." NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 
465 u. s. 513, 534. 
The automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code, 
§ 362(a), 2 has been described as "one of the fundamental 
debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws." 
S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 54 (1978); H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, 
p. 340 (1977). Despite the importance of§ 362(a) in preserv-
'Section 362(a) provides: 
"(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed 
under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under sec-
tion 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U. S. C. 
78eee(a)(3)), operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of-
"(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or em-
ployment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding 
against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the com-
mencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the 
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title; 
"(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the es-
tate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under 
this title; 
"(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property 
from the estate; 
"(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the 
estate; 
"(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor 
any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the 
commencement of the case under this title; 
"(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that 
arose before the commencement of the case under this title; 
"(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the com-
mencement of the case under this title against any claim against the debtor; 
and · 
"(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the 
United States Tax Court concerning the debtor." 
84-801 & 84-805--DISSENT 
MIDLANTIC NAT. BANK v. N. J. DEPT. OF E. P. 5 
ing the debtor's estate of the debtor, Congress has enacted 
several categories of exceptions to the stay that allow the 
Government to commence or continue legal proceedings. 
For example, Section 362(b)(5) permits the Government to 
enforce "non-monetary" judgments against a debtor's estate. 
It is clear from the legislative history that one of the pur-
poses of this exception was to protect public health and 
safety: 
"Thus, where a governmental unit is suing a debtor to 
prevent or stop violation of fraud, environmental protec-
tion, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or 
regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for viola-
tion of such a law, the action or proceeding is not stayed 
under the automatic stay." H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, 
supra, at 343 (emphasis added); S. Rep. No. 95-989, 
supra, at 52 (emphasis added). 
Petitioners have suggested that the existence of an express 
exception to the automatic stay undermines the inference of a 
similar exception to the abandonment power: had Congress 
sought to restrict similarly the scope of § 554, it would have 
enacted similar limiting provisions. This argument, how-
ever, fails to acknowledge the differences between the prede-
cessors of§§ 554 and 362. As I have noted, the exceptions to 
the judicially-created abandonment power were firmly estab-
lished. But in enacting § 362 in 1978, Congress significantly 
broadened the scope of the automatic stay, see 1 W. Norton 
Bankruptcy Law and Practice § 20.03, p. 5-6 (1981), an ex-
pansion that had begun only five years earlier with the adop-
tion of the Bankruptcy Rules in 1973, see id., § 20. 02, at 4-5. 
Between 1973 and 1978, some courts had stretched the ex-
panded automatic stay to foreclose State's efforts to enforce 
their antipollution laws,3 and Congress wanted to overrule 
' See, e. g., Hillsdale Foundry Co. v. Michigan ex rel. Kelly , 1 BCD 195 
(Bkrtcy Ct. WD Mich. 1974) (action by Michigan Attorney General to en-
force State's anti-pollution laws held subject to automatic stay). The 
House Report referred also to an unreported case from Texas where a stay 
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these interpretations in its 1978 revision. See H. R. Rep. 
95-595, supra, at 174-175. In the face of the greatly in-
creased scope of § 362, it was necessary for Congress to limit 
this new power expresslyG.\)Title 28 U. S. C. 959(b) 4 pro-
vides additional evidence that Congress did not intend for the 
Bankruptcy Code to preempt all state laws. In§ 959(b), the 
Code commands debtor in possession to "manage and operate 
the property in his possession . . . according to the require-
ments of the valid laws of the State." The petitioners have 
contended that § 959(b) is relevant only when the trustee is 
actually operating the business of the debtor, and not when 
he is liquidating it. The Court declines to reach that precise 
issue, and instead states simply that "the trustee's filing of a 
petition to abandon does not constitute 'manage[ment]' or 'op-
erat[ion]."' With all respect, such a formulation begs the 
question. 
Section § 959(b) applies when the trustee is liquidating the 
business of a debtor because that interpretation gives mean-
ing to both the words "manage" and "operate." Courts "are 
obliged to give effect, if possible, ·to every word Congress 
used," Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 339 (1979), 
and § 959(b), on its face, encompasses something more than 
"operation." As the Court of Appeals noted, there is no rea-
son why the phrase "'manage[ment]' of the 'property,'" could 
not describe a trustee's custodial care and disposition of prop-
erty in bankruptcy liquidation. In re Quanta Resources 
prevented the State of Maine from closing down a debtor's plant that was 
polluting a river in violation of the state's environmental protection laws. 
H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 174-175. 
• Section 959(b) provides: 
"Except as provided in section 1166 of title 11, a trustee, receiver or 
manager appointed in any cause pending in any court of the United States, 
including a debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the property in 
his possession as such trustee, receiver or manager according to the re-
quirements of the valid laws of the State in which such property is situ-
ated, in the same manner that the owner or possessor thereof would be 
bound to do if in possession thereof." 
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Corp., 739 F. 2d, at 919; see Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U. S. --, -- (1985) (stating, 
after surveying the trustee's various powers, that "the Bank-
ruptcy Code gives the trusteee wide-ranging management 
authority over the debtor"). This reading is also consistent 
with the section's legislative history, which shows the provi-
sion was designed to place railroad receiverships within the 
reach of state law. See S. Misc. Doc. No. 44, 50th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1888); S. Misc. Doc. No. 7, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1887); S. Misc. Doc. No. 19, 49th Cong., 2d Sess. (1886); 
H. R. Misc. Doc. No. 45, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. (1886). The 
precept of§ 959(b) is clear: "[T]he goals of the federal bank-
ruptcy laws, including rehabilitation of the debtor, do not au-
thorize transgression of state laws setting requirements for 
the operation of the business, even if the continued operation 
of the business would be thwarted by applying state laws." 
In re Quanta Resources Group, 739 F. 2d 912, 919 (CA3 
1984). 
III 
Finally, I cannot find a legislative intent to confer unre-
stricted abandonment power upon a trustee in bankruptcy 
when Congress has repeatedly emphasized its "goal of pro-
tecting the environment against toxic pollution." Chemical 
Manufacturers Assn., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 470 U. S. --, -- (1985). Congress has 
also enacted a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA), 42 U. S. C. §§ 6901-6987, to regulate the treat-
ment, storage, and disposal of hazardous wastes by monitor-
ing wastes from their creation until after their permanent 
disposal. That Act authorizes the United States to seek ju-
dicial or administrative restraint of activities involving haz-
ardous wastes that "may present an imminent and substan-
tial endangerment to health or the environment." 42 
U. S. C. § 6973; see also S. Rep. No. 98-284, p. 58 (1983). 
Congress broadened the scope of the statute and tightened 
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the regulatory restraints in 1984.5 In the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 
as amended by Pub. L. 98-80, § 2(c)(2)(B), Congress estab-
lished a fund to finance cleanup of some sites and require cer-
tain responsible parties to reimburse either the fund or the 
parties who paid for the cleanup. The Act also empowers 
the Federal Government to secure such relief as may be nec-
essary to avert "imminent and substantial endangerment to 
the public health or welfare or the environment because of an 
actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance." 42 
U. S. C. § 9606. In the face of Congress' undisputed concern 
over the risks of the improper storage and disposal of hazard-
ous and toxic substances, I am unwilling to presume that by 
its enactment of § 554(a), Congress implicitly overturned 
long-standing restrictions on the common-law abandonment 
power. 
IV 
Today's holding allows the trustees of these bankrupt es-
tates to abandon hazardous materials and to aggravate al-
ready-existing dangers by halting security measures that 
prevent public entry, vandalism, and fire. 6 Under the 
• Congress eliminated the small generator exception and subjected many 
more facilities to the regulations. Pub. L. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221, 
3248-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6921(d) (Supp. 1985)). Another 
provision automatically broadens the Act's coverage by automatically as-
signing a hazardous rating to substances that the EPA does not classify by 
a set deadline. 98 Stat. 3227-3231 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. §§ 6924(d), 
(e), (f)(3), (g)(6) (Supp. 1985)). Amended enforcement provisions allow 
more citizen suits, 98 Stat. 3271-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6973 
(Supp. 1985)), and authorize administrative orders or suits to compel "cor-
rective action" after a leak has occurred. 98 Stat. 3257-3258 (codified at 
42 U. S. C. A. § 6928(h) (Supp. 1985)). 
• Joint Appendix before the Court of Appeals 11-12 (affidavit of Richard 
Docyk, Deputy Chief Inspector for NY City Fire Department); id., at 26 
(transcript of proceedings before de Vito, J.). The trustees in this case 
have abandoned 470,000 gallons of highly toxic and carcinogenic waste oil 
in unguarded, deterioraring containers where they "present risks of explo-
sion, fire, contamination of water supplies, destruction of natural re-
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Court's ruling, it is not at all clear that the trustees are not 
required to take even relatively minor steps to reduce immi-
nent danger, such as security fencing, drainage and diking 
repairs, sealing deteriorating tanks, and removal of explosive 
agents not on a school stove. 7 Because I believe that Con-
gress did not grant trustees an apparently unlimited license 
to abandon property of the bankrupt estate, I dissent. 
sources, and injury, genetic damge, or death through personal contact." 
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 4, 23; see Joint Appendix, supra, 
at 17 (70,000 gallons at New York site); Appendix before the Court of Ap-
peals A7 (400,000 gallons at New Jersey site); id., at A46 (deteriorating 
containers); Joint Appendix, supra, at 11 (deteriorating tanks); id., at 26 
(guard service); id. , at 12 (risk of fire); id. at 11 (contamination of adjacent 
areas); id. at 26 (health effects of exposure to PCBs and their derivatives). 
7 Both abandonment orders, now affirmed by the Court, were without 
qualification. The EPA urged the pre-abandonment steps outlined in the 
text as part of its Region II Action Memorandum (Jan. 25, 1985) (lodged 
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JUSTICE POWELl(, ctissenbng.X \ 
These~petitions for certiorari, arising out of the same 
bankruptcy proceeding, resent the question whether 
[December -, 1985] 
. J d~\\\1~ '\he_ ~~ at- ""e. ~. J 
rustee in an ptcy may abandon property that is burden-
some or of inconsequential value to the estate without regar 
to any general requirement of compliance to state regulator 
laws. In the light of the restrict pre-1978 abandonmen 
power of the bankruptcy trustee, the limited scope of othe 
bankruptcy provisions, and congressional interest in protect 
ing the environment from toxic wastes, we conclude that the 
trustee's authority under 11 U. S. C. § 554(a) 1 is· not an un 
limit rt 
\ 1\\"\e. \8 O.CS.t.§F==:;--
'-------J 1~554(a) reads: 
"After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of 
the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential 
value to the estate." 
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I 
,JOn October 6, 1981, Quanta Resources Corp. (Quanta) filed 
a voluntary petition in bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U. S. C. § 1101 et seq. The following 
month, the action was converted to a liquidation proceeding r- \'.\A · 
under Chapter 7, and Thomas J. O'Neill, petition in No. FJ.... 
84-805, was thereupon appointed trutee in bankruptcy. 
At its facility in Long Island City, New York, Quanta had 
an ownership interest in the real property (subject to two 
mortgages totalling$ 454,464), the facility, and its inventory. 
Mortgages exceeded the value of the property, and the esti-
mated cost to dispose of the contaminated waste oil plainly 
rendered the property a net burden to the estate. After try-
ing without success to sell the site for the benefit of Quanta's 
creditors, the trustee notified the creditors and the Bank-
ruptcy Court that he intended to abandon the site pursuant 
to § 554(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. No one disputed that 
trustee's allegation that the site was "burdensome" and of 
"inconsequential value to the estate" within the meaning of 
§554J 
The City and the State of New York (collectively New 
York), respondents in No. 84-805, nevertheless objected, 
contending that abandonment would threaten the public 
health and safety, and (!;hat the act of abandonment ltseiOJL.-
would violate state and federal e vironmental law. N w 
York rested its objection on o "public policy" consider-
ations reflected in a li ble local laws, and~the requirement 
of 28 U. S. C. § 959(b), e mrin a trustee "manage and 
operate" the property of the estate "according to . the valid 
laws of the St~in which the property is situated." New 
York asked th Q nkruptcy !.! urt to order that the assets of 
the estate be u - to bring~e facility into compliance with 
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MOVE 
~--~----~~-~~--lil applicable la 2 After brieflg and argument, the Bank- t..::J 
ruptcy Court a proved the abandonment, noting that "(t]he 
3 
City and State re in a better position in every respect than 
either the trust e or debtor's creditors to do what needs to be 
C done to protec the public against the dangers posed by the 
~-contamin ed facility." The District Court affirmed 
and New York ppealed to the Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit. 
0 Upon abandonment, the trus~e removed t e 24-hour 
ard service and shut down the fire-su ess1 n sys em. 
New York cleaned up the facility, with the excep ion of c,on-
taminated subsoil, at a cost of about $2.5 million. 
t t e Edgewater, New Jersey, site, uanta ease t e 
underlying real prooperty and owned outright the facility and 
its inventory. Quanta procesed waste oil at Edgewater pur 
suant to a temporary operating permit issued by the N e 
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP), 
respondent in No. 84-801. In June 1981, NJDEP discov-
ered that Quanta had violated a specific prohibition in its op-
erating permit in having more· than 400,000 gallons of PCB-
contaminated oil at the Edgewater site, and ordered Quanta 
to sease operations at Edgewater. NJDEP and Quanta 
began negotiations concerning cleanup of the property, but 
on October 6, 1981, Quanta filed a petition in bankruptcy be-
fore the negotiations had concluded. The next day, NJDEP 
e Issue m t IS litigation may be sru to re uce t e to t e priOrity of 
reditors' claims. New York sought to have the cost of clean up receive 
riority as an administrative expense. The question of the priority o 
ew York's claim for expenditures to render the site safer, however, is not 
efore us. Nor do we pass on the question of whether the bankruptcy 
court could have or should have ordered that the assets of the estate be 
used to bring the facility into compliance with applicable law. We hold 
only that a trustee in bankruptcy may not abandon property in contraven-
tion of certain local laws designed to protect the public health or safety. 
Such a restriction, in some cases, may mean that the trustee merely retains 
title to the property until the liquidation is completed, when the propertY) 
would revert to the mortgage holders or the debtor's r hell. 
0 
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issued an admnistrative order requiring Quanta to clean up 
the site. 
On April 23, 1983, shortly after the District Court had ap-
proved abandonment of the New York site, the trustee gave 
notice of his in ten(' to abandon personal property at the 
Edgewater site, consisting principally of the contaminated 
oil. The Bankruptcy rt a rov nm 
May 20, ~over N DEP's objection that the estate had 
sufficient funds to protect the public from the dangers posed 
by the hazardous waste.,( 
Because the New Jersey case and the New York case pre-
sented identical issues, the parties in the New Jersey litiga-
tion consented to NJDEP's taking a direct appeal to the 
Court of Appeals pursuant to 11 U. S. C. §405(c)(l)(B). 
A divided P.anel of the ou A eal · 
TE1\T' 0~ FTNT 
I~ IN ~\LE S 
''G.U~NT2.'' 
the lower court deci · n to ermit abandon-1---; 
n re uanta Resources Corp., 739 F. 2d 912 (1984) 
'-~; In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F. 2d 927 
: ~ Although the court found little guidance in 
~legislative histoi;[; the majority)concluded that Con- \ ~ §55~) ·r\- ) 
gress had intended to codify the judge-made abandonment 
practice developed under the previous Bankruptcy Act. 
Under that law, whereGmportanDstate law or general eqmta- P 
\ed.. ~~r 
\ wc:-u. .IV'OT JJ 
hie principles protec( some) public interest that mterest)\-~;\'ho~ ~Mbs~ \ 
~hould not be) overridden by the judge-made a'bandonment t 
pow~er. The court also found evidence in other provisions of 
the Q nkruptcy~ode that Congress 1 no m en o preemp ~ )~ 
~ 
all s ate regulati"dn,1only that groun on olicies outwei hed 
by the relevant federal interest. Accordingly, th~ Court of 
Appeals held that the Bankruptcy Court erred in p<-erm- I .... tt~I-ng--~ooc---
abandonment, and remanded both cases for further 
proceedings. 3 
3 Judge Gibbons dissented, arguing that §554 8 permits abandon-
ment without any exception analogous to that provided to the automatic 
stay The dissent further contended that the majority's interpretation of 
§ 554 rais~substantial questions under the takings clause by potentially de-
0 
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.. --,and affirm. 
II r\ ®~e.~} 
;-.. lfhe trustee's abandonment ower Qiefare\ the 1978 revi-
sions of the Bankruptcy Cod had been limited by a judi-
cially-developed doctrine inten ed to protect legitimate state \\-he. ~ ~ 
or federal interests. This was made clear by it limited)~ -..:.. _;_;;.--...J 
0 ae:r ef relevant cases. In Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F. 
2d 289 (CA4 1952), the Court of Appeals concluded that a 
bankruptcy trustee, in liquidating the estate of a barge com-
pany, could not abandon several barges when the abandon-
ment would have obstructed a navigable passage in violation ~ 
of federal law. The ,.Court stated: b 
"The judge-made [abandonment] rule must give way 
when it comes into conflict with a statute enacted in 
order to ensure the safety of navigation; for we are not 
dealing with a burden imposed upon the bankrupt or his 
property by contract, but a duty and a burden imposed 
upon an owner of vessels by an Act of Congress in the 
public interest." I d. , at 290. 
In In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F. 2d 1 (CA 7), 
cert. denied, 317 U. S. 683 (1942), the Court of Appeals held 
that the trust~e of a debtor transit company could not cease 
its operation of a branch railway line when local law required 
continued operation. i the court did not forbid the 
trusteE@ abando ent o property (i. e., 1s re ec 1 an 
unexpired lease), it conditioned \the trusteej)actions to en-
sure compliance with state law. Similarly 1illln re Leuns 
Jones, Inc ., 1 B. C. D. 277 (Bkrtcy Ct. ED Pa. 1974), the 
stroying the interest of secured creditors, see United States v. Security ~ 
Industrial Bank, 458 U. S. 70 (1982), and that the majority had failed to 
address the important underlying issue of the priority of the states' claims 
for reimbursement. 
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bankruptcy court invoked its equitable power to "safeguard 
the public interest" by requiring the debtor public utilities to 
seal underground steam lines before abandoning them. 
Thus, when Congress enacted § 554, there were well-rec-
ognized restrictions on a trustee's abandonment power. In 
codifying the judicially-developed rule of abandonment, Con-
gress also presumably included the established corollary that 
a trustee could not exercise his abandonment power in viola-
tion of certain state and federal laws. The normal rule of 
statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legisla-
tion to change the interpretation of a judicially created con-
cept, it makes that intent specific. Edmonds v. Compagnie 
Generale Transatlantique, 443 U. S. 256, 266-267 (1979). 
The Court has followed this rule with particular care in con-
struing the scope of bankruptcy codifications. If Congress 
wishes to grant the trustee an extraordinary exemption from 
non-bankruptcy law, "the intention would be clearly ex-
·pressed, not left to be collected or inferred from disputable 
considerations of convenience in administering the estate of 
the bankrupt." Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U. S. 441, 444 
(1904); see Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U. S. 79, 85 (1939) 
("If this old and familiar power of the states [over local rail-
road service] was withdrawn when Congress gave district 
courts bankruptcy powers over railroads, we ought to find 
language fitting for so drastic a change"). 
II 
Neither the Court nor Congress has granted a trustee in 
bankruptcy powers that would lend support to a right to 
abandon property in contravention of state or local laws de-
signed_ to protect public health or safety. As we held last 
Te~ when the State of Ohio sought compensation for 
cleaning the toxic waste site of a bankrupt corporation: 
"Finally, we do not que~s~ti~o~n~tJ]h~an;~le..lll..;P!liiaeS&Qll..Ql._-\ [ th d b~1 
the site-whether it is ovas or another in the event the e.. e. 
receivership is liquidated and the trustee abandons the 
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property, or a vendee fro_m the receiver or the bq,nk-
ruptcy trustee-must co~y with the environmental laws 
of the State of Ohio. Plainly, that person or firm may 
not maintain a nuisance, pollute the waters of the State, 
or refuse to remove the source of such conditions." 
Ohio v. Kovas, 469 U.S. -,- (1985) {.. 
Congress has repeatedly expressed its legislative deter-
min~tion that the trustee is not to have carte blanche to ig-
nore non-bankruptcy law. Where the Bankruptcy Code has 
conferred special powers upon the trustee and where there 
was no common law limitation on that power, Congress has 
expressly provided that the efforts of the trustee to marshal 
and distribute the assets of the estate must yield to govern-
mental interest in public health and safety. Post, at 5. One 
cannot assume that Congress, having placed these limitwionJ \ , . , ) 
upon other aspects of trustees' operations, intended to ban- o\sc...~ 
~ a well-established judicial restriction on the abandon-
ment power. As we held last year in the context of the N a-
tional Labor Relations Act, "[T]he debtor-in-possession is not 
relieved of all obligations under the [Act] simply by filing a 
petition for bankruptcy." NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 
u. s. 513, 534. 
The automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code, 
§ 362(a), 4 has been described as "one of the fundamental 
• Section 362(a) provides: 
"(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed 
under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under sec-
tion 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act 'of 1970 (15 U. S. C. 
78eee(a)(3)), operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of-
"(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or em-
ployment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding 
against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the com-
mencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the 
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title; 
"(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the es-
tate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under 
this title; 
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debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws." 
S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 54 (1978); H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, 
p. 340 (1977). Despite the importance of§ 362(a) in preserv-
ing the debtor's estatE( of the debtol} Congress has enacted 
several categories of exceptions to the stay that allow the 
Government to commence or continue le al roceedin s. 
For example, Section 62(b)(5) permits the Government to 
enforce "non-monetary" judgments against a debtor's estate. 
It is clear from the legislative history that one of the ur-
poses of this exception as to protect pu 1c health and 
safety: 
"Thus, where a governmental unit is suing a debtor to 
prevent or stop violation of fraud, environmental protec-
tion, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or 
regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for viola-
tion of such a law, the action or proceeding is not stayed 
under the automatic stay." H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, 
supra, at 343 (emphasis added); S. Rep. No. 95-989, 
supra, at 52 (emphasis added). 
Petitioners have suggested that the existence of an express 
exception to the automatic stay undermines the inference of a 
similar exception to the abandonment power: h~d Congress 
sought to restrict similarly the scope of § 554, it would have 
"(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property 
from the estate; 
"(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the 
estate; 
"(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor 
any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the 
commencement of the case under this title; 
"(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that 
arose before the commencement of the case under this title; 
"(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the com-
mencement of the case under this title against any claim against the debtor; 
and 
"(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the 




84-801 & 84-805-DISSENT 
MIDLANTIC NAT. BANK v. N.J. DEPT. OF E. P. 9 
enacted similar limiting provisions. This argument, how-
ever, fails to acknowledge the differences between the prede-
cessors of§§ 554 and 362. As we have noted, the exceptions 
to the judicially-created abandonment power were firmly es-
tablished. But in enacting § 362 in 1978, Congress signifi-
cantly broadened the scope of the automatic stay, see 1 W. 
Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice § 20.03, ~5-6 (1981), 
an expansion that had begun only five years ear1ier with the 
adoption of the Bankruptcy Rules in 1973, see id., §20.02, at 
4- 5. Between 1973 and 1978, some courts had stretched the 
expanded automatic stay to foreclose Stat~ efforts to en-
force their antipollution laws, 5 and Congress wanted to over-
rule these interpretations in its 1978 revision. See H. R. 
Rep. 95-595, supra, at 174-175. In the face of the greatly 
increased scope of § 362, it was necessa for Con ess to 
limit this new power expressly. Title 28 U. S. C. 959(b) 6 
provides additional evidence that Congress did not intend for \ ;\, 
the Bankruptcy Code to preempt all state laws. W959(b~ l ~e.:-:0: l 
the Cede commands debtor in possession to "manage and op-'----'1::>-..: 
erate the property in his possession . . . according to the re-
quirements of the valid laws of the State." The petitioners 
have contended that § 959(b) is relevant only when the 
trustee is actually operating the business of the debtor, and 
5 See, e. g. , Hillsdale Foundry Co. v. Michigan ex rel. Kelly, 1 BCD 195 
(Bkrtcy Ct. WD Mich. 1974) (action by Michigan Attorney General to en-
force State's anti-pollution laws held subject to automatic stay). The 
House Report referred lso to an unreported case from Texas where a stay 
prevented the tate of Maine from closing down a debtor's plant that was 
polluting a river in violation of the state's environmental protection laws. 
H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 174-175. 
6 Section 959(b) provides: 
"Except as provided in section 1166 of title 11, a trustee, receiver or 
manager appointed in any cause pending in any court of the United States, 
including a debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the property in 
his possession as such trustee, receiver or manager according to the re-
quirements of the valid laws of the State in which such property is situ-
ated, in the same manner that the owner or possessor thereof would be 
bound to do if in possession thereof." 
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not when he is li uidatin it. The Court declines to reach 
that precise issue, and instead states simply that "the trust- L---
ee's filing of a petition to abandon does not constitute 'man-
age[ment]' or 'operat[ion].' ',-' --...1 ..... • ................... L-J.J=~o~~;u.u........._,~,.....J 
mulation be s the uestion. 
§ 959(b) applies when the trustee is liquidating the 0 
usmess because that interpretation gives mean-
ing to both the words "manage" and "operate." Courts "are 
obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word Congress 
used," Reiter v. Sonotone Corp ., 442 U. S. 330, 339 (1979), 
and § 959(b), on its face, encompasses something more than 
"operation." As the Court of Appeals noted, there is no rea-
son why the phrase " 'manage[ment]' of the 'property,"' could 
not describe a trustee's custodial care and disposition of prop-
erty in bankruptcy liquidation. In re Quanta Resources 
Corp., 739 F . 2d, at 919. 7 This reading is @ consistent 
with the section's legislative history, which shows the provi-
sion was designed to place railroad receiverships within the 
reach of state law. 8 The precept of § 959(b) is clear: "[T]he 
goals of the federal bankruptcy laws, including rehabilitation 
of the debtor, do not authorize transgression of state laws 
setting requirements for the operation of the business, even 
if the continued operation of the business would be thwarted 
by applying state laws." Ibid. 
III ____y --\ ~~ j 
Although the reasons elaborated W!» above @'e sufficient) \ 
f'or poncludmg) that Congress did not intend for the abandon-
ment power to abrogate certain state and local laws, we find 
additional support for restricting that power in repeated con-
7See Commodity Futures Tradini' Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U. S. ~ 
-, - (1985) (stating, after surveying the trustee's various powers, 
that "the Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee wide-ranging management 
authority over the debtor"). 
8 See S. Misc. Doc. No. 44, 50th Cong. , 1st Sess. (1888); S. Misc. Doc. 
No. 7, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1887); S. Misc. Doc. No. 19, 49th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1886); H. R. Misc. Doc. No. 45, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. (1886). 
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gressional emphasis on its "goal of protecting the environ-
ment against toxic pollution." Chemical Manufacturers 
Assn., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 
U. S. --, -- (1985). Congress has ena~ted ·a Resource .R 
Conservation and Recovery Act( (RCRAl, 42 U. S. C. 
§§ 6901-6987, to regulate the treatment, storage, and dis-
posal of hazardous wastes by monitoring wastes from their 
creation until after their permanent disposal. That Act au-
thorizes the United States to seek judicial or administrative 
restraint of activities involving hazardous wastes that "may 
present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health 
or the environment." 42 U. S. C. § 6973; see also S. Rep. 
No. 98-284, p. 58 (1983). Congress broadened the scope of 
the statute and tightened the regulatory restraints in 1984.9 
In the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act, as amended by Pub. L. 98-80, 
§ 2(c)(2)(B), Congress established a n ance cleanu of 
some sites and requir certain responsible parties to reim-
burse either the fund or the parties who paid for the cleanup. 
The Act also empowers the Federal Government to secure 
such relief as may be necessary to avert "imminent and sub-
stantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or the 
environment because of an actual or threatened release of a 
hazardous substance." 42 U. S. C. § 9606. In the face of 
Congress' undisputed concern over the risks of the imp~ , . . . _ , 
storage and disposal of hazardous and toxic substances,
9 Congress eliminated the small generator exception and subjected many 
more facilities to the regulations. Pub. L. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221, 
3248-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6921(d) (Supp. 1985)). Another 
provision automatically broadens the Act's coverage by automatically as-
signing a hazardous rating to substances that the EPA does not classify by 
a set deadline. 98 Stat. 3227-3231 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. §§.6924(d), 
(e), (f)(3), (g)(6) (Supp. 1985)). Amended enforcement provisions allow 
more citizen suits, 98 Stat. 3271-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6973 
(Supp. 1985)), and authorize administrative orders or suits to compel "cor-
rective action" after a leak has occurred. 98 Stat. 3257-3258 (codified at 
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unwilling to presume that by~enactment of§ 554(a), Con- 'L 
gress implicitly overturned long-standing restrictions on the 
common-law abandonment power. 
This exception to the 
abandonment power 
vested in the trustee 
by §554 is a narrow 
one. It does not 
encompass a specula-
tive or indeterminate 
future violation of 
such laws that may 
stem from abandon-
ment. The abandon-
ment power is not to 
be fettered by laws 
or regulations not 
reasonably calculated 
to protect the public 




before the Court of Appeals 11-12 (affidavit of Richard 
.ef Inspector for NY City Fire Department); id., at 26 
!edings before de Vito, J.). The trustees in this case 
0,000 gallons of highly toxic and carcinogenic waste oil 
·ioraring containers where they "present risks of expla-
nation of water supplies, destruction of natural re-
·, genetic damge, or death through personal contact." 
1tes as Amicus Curiae 4, 23; see Joint Appendix, supra, 
3 at New York site); Appendix before the Court of Ap-
;allons at New Jersey site); id., at A46 (deteriorating 
.ppendix, supra, at 11 (deteriorating tanks); id., at 26 
at 12 (risk of fire); id. at 11 (contamination of adjacent 
lith effects of exposure to PCBs and their derivatives). 
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unwilling to presume that by :iia. enactment of§ 554(a), Con-
gress implicitly overturned long-standing restrictions on the 
common-law abandonment power. 
IV 
In the light of the restricted pre-1978 abandonment power 
of the bankruptcy trustee and in the context of the limited 
scope of other Bankruptcy Code provisions, we conclude that 
Congress did not intend for § 554(a) to preempt certain state 
and local laws. l/(. trust not abandon ro ert in 
contravention of a statute or regulation that is reasonably 
ca cu a e to protect the public health or safety from identi-
s The trustee may not a an on azar ous ma-
r;;.te~r~Ia~s~a~n~t~o.Jaggravate already-existing dangers by halting 
'---,., security measures that prevent public entry, vandalism, and 
e.10 Under the Court's ruling, it is not at all clear that the 
rustees are not required to take even relatively minor steps 
o reduce imminent danger, such as security fencing, drain-
ge and diking repairs, sealing deteriorating tanks, and re-
oval of explosive agents not on a school stove. Because I 
elieve that Congress did not grant trustees an apparently 
nlimited license to abandon property of the bankrupt estate, 
dissent . 
• \Joint Appendix before the Court of Appeals 11-12 (affidavit of Richard 
Docyk, Deputy Chief Inspector for NY City Fire Department); id., at 26 
(transcript of proceedings before de Vito, J.). The trustees in this case 
have abandoned 470,000 gallons of highly toxic and carcinogenic waste oil 
in unguarded, deterioraring containers where they "present risks of explo-
sion, fire, contamination of water supplies, destruction of natural re-
sources, and injury, genetic damge, or death through personal contact." 
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 4, 23; see Joint Appendix, supra, 
at 17 (70,000 gallons at New York site); Appendix before the Court of Ap-
peals A7 (400,000 gallons at New Jersey site); id., at A46 (deteriorating 
containers); Joint Appendix, supra, at 11 (deteriorating tanks); id., at 26 
(guard service); id., at 12 (risk of fire); id. at 11 (contamination of adjacent 
areas); id. at 26 (health effects of exposure to PCBs and their derivatives). 
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JUSTICE POWELL, delivered the opinion of the Court. 
These petitions for certiorari, arising out of the same bank-
ruptcy proceeding, present the question whether 11 U. S. C. 
§ 554(a) 1 of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes a trustee in 
bankruptcy to abandon property in contravention of state 
laws or regulations that are reasonably designed to protect 
the public's health or safety. 
I 
Quanta Resources Corporation (Quanta) was once in the 
business of processing waste oil at two facilities, one in Long 
Island City, New York, and the other in Edgewater, New 
1 Title 18 U. S. C. § 554(a) reads: 
"After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of 
the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential 
value to the estate." 
? 
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Jersey. Quanta processed waste oil aJ Edgewater pursuant 
to a temporary operating permit issued by the New Jersey 
Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP), re-
spondent in No. 84-801. In June 198 , NJDEP discovered 
that Quanta had violated a specific prohibition in its operat-
ing permit by accepting more than 400,poo gallons of oil con-
taminated with PCB, a highly toxic cardinogen. NJDEP or-
dered Quanta to cease operations at Edgewater, NJDEP 
and Quanta began negotiations concernipg the cleanup of the 
Edgewater site, .fn*on October 6, 1981, pefore the conclusion 
of negotiations, Quanta filed a petitio~ndlan'Por.uptey. The 
next day, NJDEP issued an administrative order requiring 
Quanta to clean up the site. Quanta's financial condition re-
mained perilous, however, and the following mont , the ac-
tion was converted to li~idation proceeding under Chapter 
~· Thomas J. O'Neill, petitioner in No. 84-805, was ap-
pointed trustee in bankruptcy. 
Investigatiory( the Long Island City facility revealed that 
~ 
Quanta had accepted and stored there over 70,000 gallons of 
toxic, PCB-contaminated oil in deteriorating and leaking con-
tainers. Since the mortg'"age"~xceeded the value of the 
property~ estimated cost of disposing of the waste oil 
plainly rend~red the property a net burden to the estat~. 
After trying without success to sell ong Island City prop-
erty for the benefit of Quanta's ere 1tors, the trustee notified 
the creditors and the Bankrupt Court that he intended to 
abandon the property pursuan lto §554(a). No party to the 
bankruptcy proceeding disp ed the trustee's allegation that 
the site was "burdensome" and of "inconsequential value to 
the estate" within the m aning of § 554. 
The City and the S te of New York (collectively New 
York), respondents in No. 84-805, nevertheless objected, 
contending that aban~nment would threaten the public 
health and safety, and would violate state and federal envi-
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policy" considerations reflected in applicable local laws, and 
on the requirement of 28 U. S. C. § 959(b), that a trustee 
"manage and operate" the property of the estate "according 
to the valid laws of the State in which the property is situ-
ated." New York asked the Bankruptcy Court to order that 
the assets of the estate be used to b'ring the facility into com-
pliance with appl~ble law. After briefing and argument, 
t e ~ ~?urt approved the abandonment, noting 
that "[t]he City and State are in a better position in every re-
spect than either the trustee or debtor's creditors to do what 
needs to be done to protect the public against the dangers 
posed by the PCB-contaminated facility." The District 
Courtl.).affirmed>and New York appealed to the Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit. 
Upon abandonment, the trustee removed the 24-hour 
guard service and shut down the fire-suppression system. It 
became necessary for New York to clean up the facility, with 
the exception of contaminated subsoil, at a cost of about $2.5 
million. 2 
On April 23, 1983, shortly after the District Court had ap-
proved abandonment of the New York site, the trustee gave 
notice of his intention to abandon personal property at the 
Edgewater site, consisting principally of the contaminated 
oil. The Bankruptcy Court approved the abandonment on 
May 20, over NJDEP's objection that the estate had suffi-
cient funds to protect the public from the dangers posed by 
the hazardous waste. 3 
2 The sole issue presented by these petitions is whether a trustee may 
abandon property under § 554 in contravention of local laws designed to 
protect the public's health and safety. New York is claiming reimburse-
ment for its expenditures as an administrative expense. That question, 
however, like the question of the ultimate disposition of the property, is 
not before us. 
3 The trustee was not required to take even relatively minor steps to 
reduce imminent danger, such as security fencing, drainage and diking re-
pairs, sealing deteriorating tanks, and removing explosive agents. 
t!~"' 
L3 ~4...1 
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Because the New Jersey case and the New York ca re-
sented identical issues, the parties§ the New Jersey litiga-
timj consented to NJDEP's taking a direct appeal to the 
Court of Appeals pursuant to 11 U. S. C. § 405(c)(1)(B). 
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit reversed. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F. 2d 912 
(1984); In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F. 2d 927. Al-
though the court found little guidance in~egislative history of 
§ 554, it concluded that Congress had intended to codify the 
judge-made abandonment practice developed under the pre-
vious Bankruptcy Act. Under that law, where state law or 
general equitable principles protected certain public inter-
ests, those interests were not overridden by the judge-made 
abandonment power. The court also found evidence in other 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that Congress~ o 
pre-empt all state regulation, but only that groun~ed onpoli-
cies outweighed by the relevant federal interest. Accord-
ingly, the Court of Appeals held that the Bankruptcy Court 
erred in permitting abandonment, and remanded both cases 
for further proceedings. 4 
Moreover, the trustee's abandonment at both sites aggravated already 
existing dangers by halting security measures that prevented public entry, 
vandalism, and fire. 
Joint Appendix before the Court of Appeals 11-12 (affidavit of Richard 
Docyk, Deputy Chief Inspector for NY City Fire Department); id., at 26 
(transcript of proceedings before de Vito, J .). The trustees in this case 
have abandoned 470,000 gallons of highly toxic and carcinogenic waste oil 
in unguarded, deterioraring containers where they "present risks of explo-
sion, fire , contamination of water supplies, destruction of natural re-
sources, and injury, genetic damge, or death through personal contact." 
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 4, 23; see Joint Appendix, supra, 
at 17 (70,000 gallons at New York site); Appendix before the Court of Ap-
peals A7 (400,000 gallons at New Jersey site); id., at A46 (deteriorating 
containers); Joint Appendix, supra, at 11 (deteriorating tanks); id., at 26 
(guard service); id. , at 12 (risk of fire); id. at 11 (contamination of adjacent 
areas); id. at 26 (health effects of exposure to PCBs and their derivatives). 
•Judge Gibbons dissented, arguing that §554 permits abandonment 
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We granted certiorari and consolidated these cases to de-
termine whether the Court of Appeals properly construed 
§ 554, 469 U.S. -, and affirm. 
II 
Before the 1978 revisions of the Bankruptcy Code, the 
trustee's abandonment power had been limited by a judi-
cially-developed doctrine intended to protect legitimate state 
or federal interests. This was made clear by the few rele-
vant cases. In Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F. 2d 289 (CA4 
1952), the Court of Appeals concluded that a bankruptcy 
trustee, in liquidating the estate of a barge company, could 
not abandon several barges when the abandonment would 
have obstructed a navigable passage in violation of federal 
law. The court stated: 
"The judge-made [abandonment] rule must give way 
when it comes into conflict with a statute enacted in 
order to ensure the safety of navigation; for we are not 
dealing with a burden imposed upon the bankrupt or his 
property by contract, but a duty and a burden imposed 
upon an owner of vessels by an Act of Congress in the 
public interest." I d., at 290. 
In In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F. 2d 1 (CA 7), 
cert. denied, 317 U. S. 683 (1942), the Court of Appeals held 
that the trustee of a debtor transit company could not cease 
its operation of a branch railway line when local law required 
continued operation. While the court did not forbid the 
trustee to abandon property (i. e., to reject an unexpired 
lease), it conditioned his actions to ensure compliance with 
state law. Similarly, in In re Lewis Jones, Inc., 1 B. C. D. 
The dissent further contended that the majority's interpretation of § 554 
raised substantial questions under the takings clause by potentially de-
stroying the interest of secured creditors, see United States v. Security In-
dustrial Bank, 458 U. S. 70 (1982), and that the majority had failed to ad-
dress the important underlying issue of the priority of the states' claims for 
reimbursement. 
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277 (Bkrtcy Ct. ED Pa. 1974), the bankruptcy court invoked 
its equitable power to "safeguard the public interest" by re-
quiring the debtor public utilities to seal underground steam 
lines before abandoning them. 
Thus, when Congress enacted § 554, there were well-rec-
ognized restrictions on a trustee's abandonment power. In 
codifying the judicially-developed rule of abandonment, Con-
gress also presumably included the established corollary that 
a trustee could not exercise his abandonment power in viola-
tion of certain state and federal laws. The normal rule of 
statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legisla-
tion to change the interpretation of a judicially created con-
cept, it makes that intent specific. Edmonds v. Compagnie 
Generale Transatlantique, 443 U. S. 256, 266-267 (1979). 
The Court has followed this rule with particular care in con-
struing the scope of bankruptcy codifications. If Congress 
wishes to grant the trustee an extraordinary exemption from 
non-bankruptcy law, "the intention would be clearly ex-
pressed, not left to be collected or inferred from disputable 
considerations of convenience in administering the estate of 
the bankrupt." Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U. S. 441, 444 
(1904); see Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U. S. 79, 85 (1939) 
("If this old and familiar power of the states [over local rail-
road service] was withdrawn when Congress gave district 
courts bankruptcy powers over railroads, we ought to find 
language fitting for so drastic a change"). 
III 
Neither the Court nor Congress has granted a trustee in 
bankruptcy powers that would lend support to a right to 
abandon property in contravention of state or local laws de-
signed to protect public health or safety. As we held last 
Term when the State of Ohio sought compensation for clean-
ing the toxic waste site of a bankrupt corporation: 
"Finally, we do not question that anyone in possession of 
the site-whether it is [the debtor] or another in the 
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event the receivership is liquidated and the trustee aban-
dons the property, or a vendee from the receiver or the 
bankruptcy trustee-must comply with the environmen-
tal laws of the State of Ohio. Plainly, that person or 
firm may not maintain a nuisance, pollute the waters of 
the State, or refuse to remove the source of such condi-
tions." Ohio v. Kovas, 469 U.S.--,-- (1985) (em-
phasis added). 
Congress has repeatedly expressed its legislative deter-
mination that the trustee is not to have carte blanche to ig-
nore non-bankruptcy law. Where the Bankruptcy Code has 
conferred special powers upon the trustee and where there 
was no common law limitation on that power, Congress has 
expressly provided that the efforts of the trustee to marshal 
and distribute the assets of the estate must yield to govern-
mental interest in public health and safety. Post, at 5. One 
cannot assume that Congress, having placed these limitations 
upon other aspects of trustees' operations, intended to dis-
card a well-established judicial restriction on the abandon-
ment power. As we held last year in the context of the N a-
tiona! Labor Relations Act, "[T]he debtor-in-possession is not 
relieved of all obligations under the [Act] simply by filing a 
petition for bankruptcy." NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 
u. s. 513, 534. 
The automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code, 
§ 362(a),S has been described as "one of the fundamental 
5 Section 362(a) provides: 
"(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed 
under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under sec-
tion 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U. S. C. 
78eee(a)(3)), operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of-
"(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or em-
ployment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding 
against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the com-
mencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the 
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title; 
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debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws." 
S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 54 (1978); H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, 
p. 340 (1977). Despite the importance of§ 362(a) in preserv-
ing the debtor's estate, Congress has enacted several catego-
ries of exceptions to the stay that allow the Government to 
commence or continue legal proceedings. For example, 
§ 362(b)(5) permits the Government to enforce "non-mone-
tary" judgments against a debtor's estate. It is clear from 
the legislative history that one of the purposes of this excep-
tion is to protect public health and safety: 
"Thus, where a governmental unit is suing a debtor to 
prevent or stop violation of fraud, environmental protec-
tion, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or 
regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for viola-
tion of such a law, the action or proceeding is not stayed 
under the automatic stay." H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, 
supra, at 343 (emphasis added); S. Rep. No. 95-989, 
supra, at 52 (emphasis added). 
Petitioners have suggested that the existence of an express 
exception to the automatic stay undermines the inference of a 
similar exception to the abandonment power: had Congress 
"(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the es-
tate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under 
this title; 
"(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property 
from the estate; 
"(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the 
estate; 
"(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor 
any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the 
commencement of the case under this title; 
"(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that 
arose before the commencement of the case under this title; 
"(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the com-
mencement of the case under this title against any claim against the debtor; 
and 
"(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the 
United States Tax Court concerning the debtor." 
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sought to restrict similarly the scope of § 554, it would have 
enacted similar limiting provisions. This argument, how-
ever, fails to acknowledge the differences between the prede-
cessors of§§ 554 and 362. As we have noted, the exceptions 
to the judicially-created abandonment power were firmly es-
tablished. But in enacting § 362 in 1978, Congress signifi-
cantly broadened the scope of the automatic stay, see 1 W. 
Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice§ 20.03, pp. 5-6 (1981), 
an expansion that had begun only five years earlier with the 
adoption of the Bankruptcy Rules in 1973, see id., § 20.02, at 
4-5. Between 1973 and 1978, some courts had stretched the 
expanded automatic stay to foreclose States' efforts to en-
force their antipollution laws, 6 and Congress wanted to over-
rule these interpretations in its 1978 revision. See H. R. 
Rep. 95-595, supra, at 174-175. In the face of the greatly 
increased scope of § 362, it was necessary for Congress to 
limit this new power expressly. ~Title 28 U. S. C. 959(b)1 
provides additional evidence that Congress did not intend for 
the Bankruptcy Code to preempt all state laws. Section 
959(b) commands debtor in possession to "manage and oper-
ate the property in his possession . . . according to the re-
quirements of the valid laws of the State." The petitioners 
have contended that § 959(b) is relevant only when the 
8 See, e. g. , Hillsdale Foundry Co. v. Michigan ex rel. Kelly, 1 BCD 195 
(Bkrtcy Ct. WD Mich. 1974) (action by Michigan Attorney General to en-
force State's anti-pollution laws held subject to automatic stay). The 
House Report also referred to an unreported case from Texas where a stay 
prevented the State of Maine from closing down a debtor's plant that was 
polluting a river in violation of the state's environmental protection laws. 
H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 174-175. 
7 Section 959(b) provides: 
"Except as provided in section 1166 of title 11, a trustee, receiver or 
manager appointed in any cause pending in any court of the United States, 
including a debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the property in 
his possession as such trustee, receiver or manager according to the re-
quirements of the valid laws of the State in which such property is situ-
ated, in the same manner that the owner or possessor thereof would be 
bound to do if in possession thereof." 
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trustee is actually operating the business of the debtor, and 
not when he is liquidating it. 
We conclude that § 959(b) applies when the trustee is 
liquidating a debtor's business because that interpretation 
gives meaning to both the words "manage" and "operate." 
Courts "are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word 
Congress used," Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 339 
(1979), and§ 959(b), on its face, encompasses something more 
than "operation." As the Court of Appeals noted, there is no 
reason why the phrase "'manage[ment]' of the 'property,'" 
could not describe a trustee's custodial care and disposition of 
property in bankruptcy liquidation. In re Quanta Resources 
Corp., 739 F. 2d, at 919. 8 This reading is consistent with 
the section's legislative history, which shows the provision 
was designed to place railroad receiverships within the reach 
of state law. 9 The precept of§ 959(b) is clear: "[T]he goals 
of the federal bankruptcy laws, including rehabilitation of the 
debtor, do not authorize transgression of state laws setting 
requirements for the operation of the business, even if the 
continued operation of the business would be thwarted by 
applying state laws." Ibid. 
IV 
Although the reasons elaborated above suffice for us to 
conclude that Congress did not intend for the abandonment 
power to abrogate certain state and local laws, we find addi-
tional support for restricting that power in repeated congres-
sional emphasis on its "goal of protecting the environment 
against toxic pollution." Chemical Manufacturers Assn., 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U. S. 
8 See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U. S. 
-, - (1985) (stating, after surveying the trustee's various powers, 
that "the Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee wide-ranging management 
authority over the debtor"). 
9 See S. Misc. Doc. No. 44, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1888); S. Misc. Doc. 
No. 7, 50th Cong. , 1st Sess. (1887); S. Misc. Doc. No. 19, 49th Cong. , 2d 
Sess. (1886); H. R. Misc. Doc. No. 45, 49th Cong. , 1st Sess. (1886). 
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--, -- (1985). Congress has enacted a Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S. C. §§6901-6987, to 
regulate the treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous 
wastes by monitoring wastes from their creation until after 
their permanent disposal. That Act authorizes the United 
States to seek judicial or administrative restraint of activities 
involving hazardous wastes that "may present an imminent 
and substantial endangerment to health or the environment." 
42 U. S. C. § 6973; see also S. Rep. No. 98-284, p. 58 (1983). 
Congress broadened the scope of the statute and tightened 
the regulatory restraints in 1984. 10 In the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 
as amended by Pub. L. 98-80, § 2(c)(2)(B), Congress estab-
lished a fund to finance cleanup of some sites and required 
certain responsible parties to reimburse either the fund or 
the parties who paid for the cleanup. The Act also empow-
ers the Federal Government to secure such relief as may be 
necessary to avert "imminent and substantial endangerment 
to the public health or welfare or the environment because of 
an actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance." 
42 U. S. C. § 9606. In the face of Congress' undisputed con-
cern over the risks of the improper storage and disposal of 
hazardous and toxic substances, we are unwilling to presume 
that by enactment of§ 554(a), Congress implicitly overturned 
long-standing restrictions on the common-law abandonment 
power. 
1° Congress eliminated the small generator exception and subjected many 
more facilities to the regulations. Pub. L. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221, 
3248-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6921(d) (Supp. 1985)). Another 
provision automatically broadens the Act's coverage by automatically as-
signing a hazardous rating to substances that the EPA does not classify by 
a set deadline. 98 Stat. 3227-3231 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. §§ 6924(d), 
(e), (f)(3), (g)(6) (Supp. 1985)). Amended enforcement provisions allow 
more citizen suits, 98 Stat. 3271-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6973 
(Supp. 1985)), and authorize administrative orders or suits to compel "cor-
rective action" after a leak has occurred. 98 Stat. 3257-3258 (codified at 
42 U. S. C. A. § 6928(h) (Supp. 1985)). 
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v 
In the light of the restricted pre-1978 abandonment power 
of the bankruptcy trustee and in the context of the limited 
scope of other Bankruptcy Code provisions, we conclude that 
Congress did not intend for § 554(a) to preempt certain state 
and local laws. We hold that a trustee may not abandon 
property in contravention of a state statute or regulation that 
is reasonably designed to protect the public health or safety 
from identified hazards. 11 Accordingly, we affirm the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 
It is so ordered. 
11 This exception to the abandonment power vested in the trustee by 
§ 554 is a narrow one. It does not encompass a speculative or indetermi-
nate future violation of such laws that may stem from abandonment. The 
abandonment power is not to be fettered by laws or regulations not reason-
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JUSTICE POWELL, delivered the opinion of the Court. 
These petitions for certiorari, arising out of the same bank-
ruptcy proceeding, present the question whether 11 U. S. C. 
§ 554(a) 1 of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes a trustee in 
bankruptcy to abandon property in contravention of state 
laws or regulations that are reasonably designed to protect 
the public's health or safety. 
I 
Quanta Resources Corporation (Quanta) was once in the 
business of processing waste oil at two facilities, one in Long 
Island City, New York, and the other in Edgewater, New 
'Title 18 U. S. C. § 554(a) reads: 
"After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of 
the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential 
value to the estate." 
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Jersey. Quanta processed waste oil at Edgewater pursuant 
to a temporary operating permit issued by the New Jersey 
Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP), re-
spondent in No. 84-801. In June 1981, NJDEP discovered 
that Quanta had violated a specific prohibition in its operat-
ing permit by accepting more than 400,000 gallons of oil con-
taminated with PCB, a highly toxic carcinogen. NJDEP or-
dered Quanta to cease operations at Edgewater. NJDEP 
and Quanta began negotiations concerning the cleanup of the 
Edgewater site, but on October 6, 1981, before the conclusion 
of negotiations, Quanta filed a petition in bankruptcy. The 
next day, NJDEP issued an administrative order requiring 
Quanta to clean up the site. Quanta's financial condition re-
mained perilous, however, and the following month, the ac-
tion was converted to liguidation proceeding under Chapter 
7. Thomas J. O'Neill, petitioner in No. 84-805, was ap-
pointed trustee in bankruptcy. 
Investigations the Long Island City facility revealed that 
Quanta had accepted and stored there over 70,000 gallons of 
toxic, PCB-contaminated oil in deteriorating and leaking con-
tainers. Since the mortgages exceeded the value of the 
property, and estimated cost of disposing of the waste oil 
plainly rendered the property a net burden to the estate. 
Mter trying without success to sell Long Island City prop-
erty for the benefit of Quanta's creditors, the trustee notified 
the creditors and the Bankruptcy Court that he intended to 
abandon the property pursuant to § 554(a). No party to the 
bankruptcy proceeding disputed the trustee's allegation that 
the site was "burdensome" and of "inconsequential value to 
the estate" within the meaning of § 554. 
The City and the State of New York (collectively New 
York), respondents in No. 84-805, nevertheless objected, 
contending that abandonment would threaten the public 
health and safety, and would violate state and federal envi-
ronmental law. New York rested its objection on "public 
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policy" considerations reflected in applicable local laws, and 
on the requirement of 28 U. S. C. § 959(b), that a trustee 
"manage and operate" the property of the estate "according 
to the valid laws of the State in which the property is situ-
ated." New York asked the Bankruptcy Court to order that 
the assets of the estate be used to bring the facility into com-
pliance with applicable law. After briefing and argument, 
the Bankruptcy Court approved the abandonment, noting 
that "[t]he City and State are in a better position in every re-
spect than either the trustee or debtor's creditors to do what 
needs to be done to protect the public against the dangers 
posed by the PCB-contaminated facility." The District 
Court affirmed and New York appealed to the Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit. 
Upon abandonment, the trustee removed the 24-hour 
guard service and shut down the fire-suppression system. It 
became necessary for New York to clean up the facility, with 
the exception of contaminated subsoil, at a cost of about $2.5 
million. 2 
On April 23, 1983, shortly after the District Court had ap-
proved abandonment of the New York site, the trustee gave 
notice of his intention to abandon personal property at the 
Edgewater site, consisting principally of the contaminated 
oil. The Bankruptcy Court approved the abandonment on 
May 20, over NJDEP's objection that the estate had suffi-
cient funds to protect the public from the dangers posed by 
the hazardous waste. 3 
2 The sole issue presented by these petitions is whether a trustee may 
abandon property under § 554 in contravention of local laws designed to 
protect the public's health and safety. New York is claiming reimburse-
ment for its expenditures as an administrative expense. That question, 
however, like the question of the ultimate disposition of the property, is 
not before us. 
a The trustee was not required to take even relatively minor steps to 
reduce imminent danger, such as security fencing, drainage and diking re-
pairs, sealing deteriorating tanks, and removing explosive agents. 
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Because the New Jersey case and the New York case pre-
sented identical issues, the parties in the New Jersey litiga-
tion consented to NJDEP's taking a direct appeal to the 
Court of Appeals pursuant to 11 U. S. C. §405(c)(1)(B). 
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit reversed. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F. 2d 912 
(1984); In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F. 2d 927. Al-
though the court found little guidance in legislative history of 
§ 554, it concluded that Congress had intended to codify the 
judge-made abandonment practice developed under the pre-
vious Bankruptcy Act. Under that law, where state law or 
general equitable principles protected certain public inter-
ests, those interests were not overridden by the judge-made 
abandonment power. The court also found evidence in other 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that Congress intended to 
pre-empt all state regulation, but only that grounded on poli-
cies outweighed by the relevant federal interest. Accord-
ingly, the Court of Appeals held that the Bankruptcy Court 
erred in permitting abandonment, and remanded both cases 
for further proceedings. 4 
Moreover, the trustee's abandonment at both sites aggravated already 
existing dangers by halting security measures that prevented public entry, 
vandalism, and fire. 
Joint Appendix before the Court of Appeals 11-12 (affidavit of Richard 
Docyk, Deputy Chief Inspector for NY City Fire Department); id., at 26 
(transcript of proceedings before de Vito, J .). The trustees in this case 
have abandoned 470,000 gallons of highly toxic and carcinogenic waste oil 
in unguarded, deterioraring containers where they "present risks of explo-
sion, fire, contamination of water supplies, destruction of natural re-
sources, and injury, genetic damge, or death through personal contact." 
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 4, 23; see Joint Appendix, supra, 
at 17 (70,000 gallons at New York site); Appendix before the Court of Ap-
peals A7 (400,000 gallons at New Jersey site); id. , at A46 (deteriorating 
containers); Joint Appendix, supra, at 11 (deteriorating tanks); id., at 26 
(guard service); id., at 12 (risk of fire); id. at 11 (contamination of adjacent 
areas); id. at 26 (health effects of exposure to PCBs and their derivatives). 
' Judge Gibbons dissented, arguing that §554 permits abandonment 
without any exception analogous to that provided to the automatic stay. 
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We granted certiorari and consolidated these cases to de-
terinine whether the Court of Appeals properly construed 
§554, 469 U.S.-, and affirm. 
II 
Before the 1978 revisions of the Bankruptcy Code, the 
trustee's abandonment power had been limited by a judi-
cially-developed doctrine intended to protect legitimate state 
or federal interests. This was made clear by the few rele-
vant cases. In Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F. 2d 289 (CA4 
1952), the Court of Appeals concluded that a bankruptcy 
trustee, in liquidating the estate of a barge company, could 
not abandon several barges when the abandonment would 
have obstructed a navigable passage in violation of federal 
law. The court stated: 
"The judge-made [abandonment] rule must give way 
when it comes into conflict with a statute enacted in 
order to ensure the safety of navigation; for we are not 
dealing with a burden imposed upon the bankrupt or his 
property by contract, but a duty and a burden imposed 
upon an owner of vessels by an Act of Congress in the 
public interest." I d., at 290. 
In In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F. 2d 1 (CA 7), 
cert. denied, 317 U. S. 683 (1942), the Court of Appeals held 
that the trustee of a debtor transit company could not cease 
its operation of a branch railway line when local law required 
continued operation. While the court did not forbid the 
trustee to abandon property (i. e., to reject an unexpired 
lease), it conditioned his actions to ensure compliance with 
state law. Similarly, in In re Lewis Jones, Inc., 1 B. C. D. 
The dissent further contended that the majority's interpretation of § 554 
raised substantial questions under the takings clause by potentially de-
stroying the interest of secured creditors, see United States v. Security In-
dustrial Bank, 458 U. S. 70 (1982), and that the majority had failed to ad-
dress the important underlying issue of the priority of the states' claims for 
reimbursement. 
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277 (Bkrtcy Ct. ED Pa. 1974), the bankruptcy court invoked 
its equitable power to "safeguard the public interest" by re-
quiring the debtor public utilities to seal underground steam 
lines before abandoning them. 
Thus, when Congress enacted § 554, there were well-rec-
ognized restrictions on a trustee's abandonment power. In 
codifying the judicially-developed rule of abandonment, Con-
gress also presumably included the established corollary that 
a trustee could not exercise his abandonment power in viola-
tion of certain state and federal laws. The normal rule of 
statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legisla-
tion to change the interpretation of a judicially created con-
cept, it makes that intent specific. Edmonds v. Compagnie 
Generale Transatlantique, 443 U. S. 256, 266-267 (1979). 
The Court has followed this rule with particular care in con-
struing the scope of bankruptcy codifications. If Congress 
wishes to grant the trustee an extraordinary exemption from 
non-bankruptcy law, "the intention would be clearly ex-
pressed, not left to be collected or inferred from disputable 
considerations of convenience in administering the estate of 
the bankrupt." Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U. S. 441, 444 
(1904); see Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U. S. 79, 85 (1939) 
("If this old and familiar power of the states [over local rail-
road service] was withdrawn when Congress gave district 
courts bankruptcy powers over railroads, we ought to find 
language fitting for so drastic a change"). 
III 
Neither the Court nor Congress has granted a trustee in 
bankruptcy powers that would lend support to a right to 
abandon property in contravention of state or local laws de-
signed to protect public health or safety. As we held last 
Term when the State of Ohio sought compensation for clean-
ing the toxic waste site of a bankrupt corporation: 
"Finally, we do not question that anyone in possession of 
the site-whether it is [the debtor] or another in the 
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event the receivership is liquidated and the trustee aban-
dons the property, or a vendee from the receiver or the 
bankruptcy trustee-must comply with the environmen-
tal laws of the State of Ohio. Plainly, that person or 
firm may not maintain a nuisance, pollute the waters of 
the State, or refuse to remove the source of such condi-
tions." Ohio v. Kovas, 469 U.S.--, -- (1985) (em-
phasis added). 
Congress has repeatedly expressed its legislative deter-
mination that the trustee is not to have carte blanche to ig-
nore non-bankruptcy law. Where the Bankruptcy Code has 
conferred special powers upon the trustee and where there 
was no common law limitation on that power, Congress has 
expressly provided that the efforts of the trustee to marshal 
and distribute the assets of the estate must yield to govern-
mental interest in public health and safety. Post, at 5. One 
cannot assume that Congress, having placed these limitations 
upon other aspects of trustees' operations, intended to dis-
card a well-established judicial restriction on the abandon-
ment power. As we held last year in the context of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, "[T]he debtor-in-possession is not 
relieved of all obligations under the [Act] simply by filing a 
petition for bankruptcy." NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 
u. s. 513, 534. 
The automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code, 
§ 362(a), 5 has been described as "one of the fundamental 
5 Section 362(a) provides: 
"(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed 
under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title , or an application filed under sec-
tion 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U. S. C. 
78eee(a)(3)), operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of-
"(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or em-
ployment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding 
against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the com-
mencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the 
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title; 
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debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws." 
S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 54 (1978); H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, 
p. 340 (1977). Despite the importance of§ 362(a) in preserv-
ing the debtor's estate, Congress has enacted several catego-
ries of exceptions to the stay that allow the Government to 
commence or continue legal proceedings. For example, 
§ 362(b)(5) permits the Government to enforce "non-mone-
tary" judgments against a debtor's estate. It is clear from 
the legislative history that one of the purposes of this excep-
tion is to protect public health and safety: 
"Thus, where a governmental unit is suing a debtor to 
prevent or stop violation of fraud, environmental protec-
tion, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or 
regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for viola-
tion of such a law, the action or proceeding is not stayed 
under the automatic stay." H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, 
supra, at 343 (emphasis added); S. Rep. No. 95-989, 
supra, at 52 (emphasis added). 
Petitioners have suggested that the existence of an express 
exception to the automatic stay undermines the inference of a 
similar exception to the abandonment power: had Congress 
"(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the es-
tate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under 
this title; 
"(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property 
from the estate; 
"(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the 
estate; 
"(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor 
any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the 
commencement of the case under this title; 
"(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that 
arose before the commencement of the case under this title; 
"(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the com-
mencement of the case under this title against any claim against the debtor; 
and 
"(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the 
United States Tax Court concerning the debtor." 
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sought to restrict similarly the scope of § 554, it would have 
enacted similar limiting provisions. This argument, how-
ever, fails to acknowledge the differences between the prede-
cessors of §§ 554 and 362. As we have noted, the exceptions 
to the judicially-created abandonment power were firmly es-
tablished. But in enacting § 362 in 1978, Congress signifi-
cantly broadened the scope of the automatic stay, see 1 W. 
Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice§ 20.03, pp. 5-6 (1981), 
an expansion that had begun only five years earlier with the 
adoption of the Bankruptcy Rules in 1973, see id., §20.02, at 
4-5. Between 1973 and 1978, some courts had stretched the 
expanded automatic stay to foreclose States' efforts to en-
force their antipollution laws, 6 and Congress wanted to over-
rule these interpretations in its 1978 revision. See H. R. 
Rep. 95-595, supra, at 174-175. In the face of the greatly 
increased scope of § 362, it was necessary for Congress to 
limit this new power expressly. ~Title 28 U. S. C. 959(b) 7 
provides additional evidence that Congress did not intend for 
the Bankruptcy Code to preempt all state laws. Section 
959(b) commands debtor in possession to "manage and oper-
ate the property in his possession . . . according to the re-
quirements of the valid laws of the State." The petitioners 
have contended that § 959(b) is relevant only when the 
6 See, e. g., Hillsdale Foundry Co. v. Michigan ex rel. Kelly, 1 BCD 195 
(Bkrtcy Ct. WD Mich. 1974) (action by Michigan Attorney General to en-
force State's anti-pollution laws held subject to automatic stay). The 
House Report also referred to an unreported case from Texas where a stay 
prevented the State of Maine from closing down a debtor's plant that was 
polluting a river in violation of the state's environmental protection laws. 
H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 174-175. 
7 Section 959(b) provides: 
"Except as provided in section 1166 of title 11, a trustee, receiver or 
manager appointed in any cause pending in any court of the United States, 
including a debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the property in 
his possession as such trustee, receiver or manager according to the re-
quirements of the valid laws of the State in which such property is situ-
ated, in the same manner that the owner or possessor thereof would be 
bound to do if in possession thereof." 
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trustee is actually operating the business of the debtor, and 
not when he is liquidating it. 
We conclude that § 959(b) applies when the trustee is 
liquidating a debtor's business because that interpretation 
gives meaning to both the words "manage" and "operate." 
Courts "are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word 
Congress used," Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 339 
(1979), and§ 959(b), on its face, encompasses something more 
than "operation." As the Court of Appeals noted, there is no 
reason why the phrase "'manage[ment]' of the 'property,'" 
could not describe a trustee's custodial care and disposition of 
property in bankruptcy liquidation. In re Quanta Resources 
Corp., 739 F. 2d, at 919. 8 This reading is consistent with 
the section's legislative history, which shows the provision 
was designed to place railroad receiverships within the reach 
of state law. 9 The precept of§ 959(b) is clear: "[T]he goals 
of the federal bankruptcy laws, including rehabilitation of the 
debtor, do not authorize transgression of state laws setting 
requirements for the operation of the business, even if the 
continued operation of the business would be thwarted by 
applying state laws." Ibid. 
IV 
Although the reasons elaborated above suffice for us to 
conclude that Congress did not intend for the abandonment 
power to abrogate certain state and local laws, we find addi-
tional support for restricting that power in repeated congres-
sional emphasis on its "goal of protecting the environment 
against toxic pollution." Chemical Manufacturers Assn., 
Inc . v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U. S. 
8 See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U. S. 
- , - (1985) (stating, after surveying the trustee's various powers, 
that "the Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee wide-ranging management 
authority over the debtor"). 
9 See S. Misc. Doc. No. 44, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1888); S. Misc. Doc. 
No. 7, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1887); S. Misc. Doc. No. 19, 49th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1886); H. R. Misc. Doc. No. 45, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. (1886). 
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--, -- (1985). Congress has enacted a Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 6901-6987, to 
regulate the treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous 
wastes by monitoring wastes from their creation until after 
their permanent disposal. That Act authorizes the United 
States to seek judicial or administrative restraint of activities 
involving hazardous wastes that "may present an imminent 
and substantial endangerment to health or the environment." 
42 U. S. C. § 6973; see also S. Rep. No. 98-284, p. 58 (1983). 
Congress broadened the scope of the statute and tightened 
the regulatory restraints in 1984. 10 In the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 
as amended by Pub. L. 98-80, § 2(c)(2)(B), Congress estab-
lished a fund to finance cleanup of some sites and required 
certain responsible parties to reimburse either the fund or 
the parties who paid for the cleanup. The Act also empow-
ers the Federal Government to secure such relief as may be 
necessary to avert "imminent and substantial endangerment 
to the public health or welfare or the environment because of 
an actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance." 
42 U. S. C. § 9606. In the face of Congress' undisputed con-
cern over the risks of the improper storage and disposal of 
hazardous and toxic substances, we are unwilling to presume 
that by enactment of§ 554(a), Congress implicitly overturned 
long-standing restrictions on the common-law abandonment 
power. 
1° Congress eliminated the small generator exception and subjected many 
more facilities to the regulations. Pub. L. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221, 
3248-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6921(d) (Supp. 1985)). Another 
provision automatically broadens the Act's coverage by automatically as-
signing a hazardous rating to substances that the EPA does not classify by 
a set deadline. 98 Stat. 3227-3231 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. §§ 6924(d), 
(e), (f)(3), (g)(6) (Supp. 1985)). Amended enforcement provisions allow 
more citizen suits, 98 Stat. 3271-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6973 
(Supp. 1985)), and authorize administrative orders or suits to compel "cor-
rective action" after a leak has occurred. 98 Stat. 3257-3258 (codified at 
42 U. S. C. A. § 6928(h) (Supp. 1985)). 
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v 
In the light of the restricted pre-1978 abandonment power 
of the bankruptcy trustee and in the context of the limited 
scope of other Bankruptcy Code provisions, we conclude that 
Congress did not intend for § 554(a) to preempt certain state 
and local laws. We hold that a trustee may not abandon 
property in contravention of a state statute or regulation that 
is reasonably designed to protect the public health or safety 
from identified hazards. 11 Accordingly, we affirm the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 
It is so ordered. 
11 This exception to the abandonment power vested in the trustee by 
§ 554 is a narrow one. It does not encompass a speculative or indetermi-
nate future violation of such laws that may stem from abandonment. The 
abandonment power is not to be fettered by laws or regulations not reason-
ably calculated to protect the public health or safety from imminent and 
identifiable harm. 
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APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
[December -, 1985] 
JusTICE POWELL, delivered the opinion of the Court. 
These petitions for certiorari, arising out of the same bank-
ruptcy proceeding, present the question whether 11 U. S. C. 
§ 554(a) ' of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes a trustee in 
bankruptcy to abandon property in contravention of state 
laws or regulations that are reasonably designed to protect 
the public's health or safety. 
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Quanta Resources Corporation (Quanta) @as onde m · =-nfe) 
0 OO.siaess ef f!Peeessiag waste oil at two facilities, one in Long 
Island City, New York, and the other in Edgewater, New 
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' Title 1~ IT S c §it54(a) reads: 
"After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of 
the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential 
value to the estate. " 
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l.._At _ ~_· _ ~_ry-lL..w_e:IA.... _ __;tc;_~_·_~~, hersey. ) Quanta q>rocess:<tWastil oil a; Eagev;ate~rsuant 
to a temporary operating permit issued by the New Jerse-y---,--
Department of Environmental Protection NJDEP) re-
spondent in No. 84-801. In June 1981, NJDEP discovered 
that Quanta had violated a specific prohibition in its operat-
ing permit by accepting more than 400,000 gallons of oil con-
taminated with PCB, a highly toxic carcinogen. NJDEP or-
dered Quanta to cease operations at Edgewate~ 
\..-----4IDJ5in;:;";:dT7'iQh.u~an;:;;t~iilbegan negotiations concerning the cleanup of the ------ Ed ewater sit ut on October 6, 1981, before the conclusion 
of negotiations, Quanta filed a petitionC m bankriipt~. The 
next day, NJDEP issued an administrative order requiring 
Quanta to clean up the site. Quanta's financial condition re-
mame peri ous, owever, an e o owmg mon , .t:Re ae .Q.. 
~ v.ras 49t:WOtte4 to \1I!uidation proceeding under hapter 
7. Thomas J. O'Neil1, petitioner m No. 84-805, Was ap-
~ pointed trustee in bankruptc . 
A~~~GIA.~ \.) .\ ~·.lj ¥fivestigatwn he Long Island City facility revealed that 
~\------.Q~uanta had accepted and stored there over 70,000 gallons of 
toxic, PCB-contaminated oil in deterioratin and leakin con-
tainers. Since the mortgages exceeded --~~~~:.);{ 
·o pPopel"ty, and estimated cost of disposing of the waste oil 
plainly rendered the property a net burden to the estate. 
After trying without success to sell !Long Island City prop-
erty for the benefit of Quanta's creditors, the trustee notified 
the creditors and the Bankruptcy Court that he intended to 
abandon the property pursuant to § 554(a . o party to the 
bankruptcy proceeding disputed the trustee's allegation that 
the site was "burdensome" and of "inconsequential value to 
the estate" within the meaning of § 554. 
The City and the State of New York (collectively New 
York), respondents in No. 84-805, nevertheless objected, , 
contending that abandonment would threaten the publi~
health and safety, and would violate state and federal envi-
ronmental law. New York rested its objection on "public 
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policy" considerations reflected in applicable local laws, and 
on the requirement of 28 U. S. C. § 959(b), that a trustee 
"manage and operate" the property of the estate "according 
to the valid laws of the State in which the property is situ-
ated." New York asked the Bankruptcy Court to order that 
the assets of the estate be used to bring the facility into com-
pliance with applicable law. After briefing and argument, 
the Bawa''npt ey Cii!irt (approved the abandonment, noting 
that "[t]he City and State are in a better position in every re-
spect than either the trustee or debtor's creditors to do what 
needs to be done to protect the public against the dangers 
posed by the PCB-contaminated facility." The District 
ourt affirmed and New York appealed to the Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit. 
Upon abandonment, the trustee removed the 24-hour 
~~~} \'-____ 
guard service and shut down the fire-suppression system. It 1 k + ~ became necessary for New York to @an ® tFle facility, witFl \ \)'(\. w.rv. J 
the exception of contaminate subsoil, at a cost of about $2.5 
million. 2 u~~~~~~;2.J 
On April 23, 1983, shortly after the istrict Court had ap-
proved abandonment of the New York site, the trustee ave -\h.... 
notice of his intention to abandon personal property at the ~ 
Edgewater site, consisting principally of the contaminated 
oil. The Bankruptcy Court approved the abandonment on 
May 20, over NJDEP's objection that the estate had suffi-
cient funds to protect the public from the dangers posed by 
the hazardous waste. 3 
2 The sole issue presented by these petitions is whether a trustee may 
abandon property under § 554 in contravention of local laws designed to 
protect the public's health and safety. New York is claiming reimburse-
ment for its expenditures as an administrative expense. That question, 
however, like the question of the ultimate disposition of the property, is 
not before us. 
3 The trustee was not required to take even relatively minor steps to 
reduce imminent danger, such as security fencing, drainage and diking re-
pairs , sealing deteriorating tanks, and removing explosive agents. 
/ 
~~ 
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Because the New Jersey case and the New York caseipre...--) Nc.w j~ N...., 
sen ted identical issues, the parties in the New Jersey litiga- L 'lc:rJn.. ~o.C:.:l XA~ 
tion consented to NJDEP's taking a direct appeal to the 
Court of Appeals pursuant to 11 U. S. C. §405(c)(1)(.D+w----t~"'UV-
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit reversed. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F. 2d 912 ~ 
(1984); In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F. 2d 927. Al-
though the court found little guidance in legislative history of 
§ 554, it concluded that Congress had intended to codify the 
judge-made abandonment practice developed under the pre-
vious Bankruptcy Act. Under that law, where state law or 
general equitable principles protected certain public inter-
ests, those interests were not overridden by the judge-made 
abandonment power. The court also found evidepce in other 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that CongressJintend 11"'l'"-o--"i-
pre-empt all state regulation, but only that grounded on poli-
cies outweighed by the relevant federal interest!' Accord- L§J 
ingly, the Court of Appeals held that the Bankruptcy Court 
erred in permitting abandonment, and remanded both cases 
for further proceedings. 4 
Moreover, the trustee's abandonment at both sites aggravated already 
existing dangers by halting security measures that prevented public entry, 
vandalism, and fire_0 
<:J omt Appendix before the Court of Appeals 11-12 (affidavit of Richard 
Docyk, .Deputy Chief Inspector for NY City Fire Department); id., at 26 
(transcript of proceedings before de Vito, J.). <J:!ae tf'\i:eteee in tftie eaee 
ave-aba.nJ;ianM 470,000 gallons of highly toxic and carcinQg~ic waste oil 
in unguarded, deterioraring containers wtr~ne~ "present risks of explo-
sion, fire , contamination of water supplies, destruction of natural re-
sources, and injury, genetic damge, or death through personal contact." 
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 4, 23; see Joint Appendix, supra, 
at 17 (70,000 gallons at New York site); Appendix before the Court of Ap-
peals A7 (400,000 gallons at New Jersey site); id., at A46 (deteriorating 
containers); Joint Appendix, supra, at 11 (deteriorating tanks); id., at 26 
(guard service); id., at 12 (risk of fire); id. at 11 (contamination of adjacent 
areas); id. at 26 (health effects of exposure to PCBs and their derivatives). 
'Judge Gibbons dissented, arguing that §554 permits abandonment 
without any exception analogous to that provided to the automatic stay. 
-() 
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We granted certiorari and consolidated these cases to de-
termine whether the Court of Appeals properly construed 
§ 554, 469 U.S. -, and affirm. 
II 
Before the 1978 revisions of the Bankruptcy Code, the 
trustee's abandonment power had been limited by a judi-
cially-developed doctrine intended to protect legitimate state 
or federal interests. This was made clear by the few rele-
vant cases. In Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F. 2d 289 (CA4 
1952), the Court of Appeals concluded that a bankruptcy 
trustee, in liquidating the estate of a barge company, could 
not abandon several barges when the abandonment would 
have obstructed a navigable passage in violation of federal 
law. The court stated: 
"The judge-made [abandonment] rule must give way 
when it comes into conflict with a statute enacted in 
order to ensure the safety of navigation; for we are not 
dealing with a burden imposed upon the bankrupt or his 
property by contract, but a duty and a burden imposed 
upon an owner of vessels by an Act of Congress in the 
public interest." I d., at 290. 
In In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F. 2d 1 (CA 7), 
cert. denied, 317 U. S. 683 (1942), the Court of Appeals held 
that the trustee of a debtor transit company could not cease 
its operation of a branch railway line when local law required 
continued operation. While the court did not forbid the 
trustee to abandon property (i. e., to reject an unexpired 
lease), it conditioned his actions to ensure compliance with 
state law. Similarly, in In re Lewis Jones, Inc., 1 B. C. D. 
The dissent further contended that the majority's interpretation of § 554 
raised substantial questions under the takings clause by potentially de-
stroying the interest of secured creditors, see United States v. Security In-
dustrial Bank, 458 U. S. 70 (1982), and that the majority had failed to ad-
dress the important underlying issue of the priority of the states' claims for 
reimbursement. 
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277 (Bkrtcy Ct. ED Pa. 1974), the bankruptcy court invoked 
its equitable power to "safeguard the public interest" by re-
quiring the debtor public utilities to seal underground steam 
lines before abandoning them. 
Thus, when Congress enacted § 554, there were well-rec-
ognized restrictions on a trustee's abandonment power. In 
codifying the judicially-developed rule of abandonment, Con-
gress also presumably included the established corollary that 
a trustee could not exercise his abandonment power in viola-
tion of certain state and federal laws. The normal rule of 
statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legisla-
tion to change the interpretation of a judicially created con-
cept, it makes that intent specific. Edmonds v. Compagnie 
Generale Transatlantique, 443 U. S. 256, 266-267 (1979). 
The Court has followed this rule with particular care in con-
struing the scope of bankruptcy codifications. If Congress 
wishes to grant the trustee an extraordinary exemption from 
non-bankruptcy law, "the intention would be clearly ex-
pressed, not left to be collected or inferred from disputable 
considerations of convenience in administering the estate of 
the bankrupt." Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U. S. 441, 444 
(1904); see Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U. S. 79, 85 (1939) 
("If this old and familiar power of the states [over local rail-
road service] was withdrawn when Congress gave district 
courts bankruptcy powers over railroads, we ought to find 
language fitting for so drastic a change"). 
III 
Neither the Court nor Congress has granted a trustee in 
bankruptcy powers that would lend support to a right to 
abandon property in contravention of state or local laws de-
signed to protect public health or safety. As we held last 
Term when the State of Ohio sought compensation for clean-
ing the toxic waste site of a bankrupt corporation: 
"Finally, we do not question that anyone in possession of 
the site-whether it is [the debtor] or another in the 
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event the receivership is liquidated and the trustee aban-
dons the property, or a vendee from the receiver or the 
bankruptcy trustee-must comply with the environmen-
tal laws of the State of Ohio. Plainly, that person or 
firm may not maintain a nuisance, pollute the waters of 
the State, or refuse to remove the source of such condi-
tions." Ohio v. Kovas, 469 U.S.--,-- (1985) (em-
phasis added). 
Congress has repeatedly expressed its legislative deter-
mination that the trustee is not to have carte blanche to ig-
nore non-bankruptcy law. Where the Bankruptcy Code has 
conferred special powers upon the trustee and where there 
was no common law limitation on that power, Congress has 
expressly provided that the efforts of the trustee to marshal 
and distribute the assets of the estate must yield to govern-
mental interest in public health and safety. Post, at 5. One 
cannot assume that Congress, having placed these limitations 
upon other aspects of trustees' operations, intended to dis-
card a well-established judicial restriction on the abandon-
ment power. As we held last year in the context of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, "[T]he debtor-in-possession is not 
relieved of all obligations under the [Act] simply by filing a 
petition for bankruptcy." NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 
u. s. 513, 534. 
The automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code, 
§ 362(a), 5 has been described as "one of the fundamental 
5 Section 362(a) provides: 
"(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed 
under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under sec-
tion 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U. S. C. 
78eee(a)(3)), operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of-
"(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or em-
ployment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding 
against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the com-
mencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the 
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title; 
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debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws." 
S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 54 (1978); H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, 
p. 340 (1977). Despite the importance of§ 362(a) in preserv-
ing the debtor's estate, Congress has enacted several catego-
ries of exceptions to the stay that allow the Government to 
commence or continue legal proceedings. For example, 
§ 362(b)(5) permits the Government to enforce "non-mone-
tary" judgments against a debtor's estate. It is clear from 
the legislative history that one of the purposes of this excep-
tion is to protect public health and safety: 
"Thus, where a governmental unit is suing a debtor to 
prevent or stop violation of fraud, environmental protec-
tion, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or 
regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for viola-
tion of such a law, the action or proceeding is not stayed 
under the automatic stay." H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, 
supra, at 343 (emphasis added); S. Rep. No. 95-989, 
supra, at 52 (emphasis added). 
Petitioners have suggested that the existence of an express 
exception to the automatic stay undermines the inference of a 
similar exception to the abandonment power: had Congress 
"(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the es-
tate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under 
this title; 
"(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property 
from the estate; 
"(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the 
estate; 
"(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor 
any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the 
commencement of the case under this title; 
"(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that 
arose before the commencement of the case under this title; 
"(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the com-
mencement of the case under this title against any claim against the debtor; 
and 
"(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the 
United States Tax Court concerning the debtor." 
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sought to restrict similarly the scope of § 554, it would have 
enacted similar limiting provisions. This argument, how-
ever, fails to acknowledge the differences between the prede-
cessors of§§ 554 and 362. As we have noted, the exceptions 
to the judicially-created abandonment power were firmly es-
tablished. But in enacting § 362 in 1978, Congress signifi-
cantly broadened the scope of the automatic stay, see 1 W. 
Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice §20.03, pp. 5-6 (1981), 
an expansion that had begun only five years earlier with the 
adoption of the Bankruptcy Rules in 1973, see id., §20.02, at 
4-5. Between 1973 and 1978, some courts had stretched the 
expanded automatic stay to foreclose States' efforts to en-
force their antipollution laws, 6 and Congress wanted to over-
rule these interpretations in its 1978 revision. See H. R. 
Rep. 95-595, supra, at 174-175. In the face of the greatly 
increased scope of § 362, it was necessary for Congress to 
limit this new power expressly.[]l'itle 28 U. S. C. 959(b) 7 
provides additional evidence that Congress did not intend for 
the Bankruptcy Code to preempt all state laws. Section 
959(b) commands debtor in possession to "manage and oper-
ate the property in his possession . . . according to the re-
quirements of the valid laws of the State." The petitioners 
have contended that § 959(b) is relevant only when the 
' See, e. g., Hillsdale Foundry Co. v. Michigan ex rel. Kelly, 1 BCD 195 
(Bkrtcy Ct. WD Mich. 1974) (action by Michigan Attorney General to en-
force State's anti-pollution laws held subject to automatic stay). The 
House Report also referred to an unreported case from Texas where a stay 
prevented the State of Maine from closing down a debtor's plant that was 
polluting a river in violation of the state's environmental protection laws. 
H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 174-175. 
7 Section 959(b) provides: 
"Except as provided in section 1166 of title 11, a trustee, receiver or 
manager appointed in any cause pending in any court of the United States, 
including a debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the property in 
his possession as such trustee, receiver or manager according to the re-
quirements of the valid laws of the State in which such property is situ-
ated, in the same manner that the owner or possessor thereof would be 
bound to do if in possession thereof." 
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trustee is actually operating the business of the debtor, and 
not when he is liquidating it. 
We conclude that § 959(b) applies when the trustee is 
liquidating a debtor's business because that interpretation 
gives meaning to both the words "manage" and "operate." 
Courts "are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word 
Congress used," Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 339 
(1979), and§ 959(b), on its face, encompasses something more 
than "operation." As the Court of Appeals noted, there is no 
reason why the phrase "'manage[ment]' of the 'property,"' 
could not describe a trustee's custodial care and disposition of 
property in bankruptcy liquidation. In re Quanta Resources 
Corp., 739 F . 2d, at 919. 8 This reading is consistent with 
the section's legislative history, which shows the provision 
was designed to place railroad receiverships within the reach 
of state law. 9 The precept of§ 959(b) is clear: "[T]he goals 
of the federal bankruptcy laws, including rehabilitation of the 
debtor, do not authorize transgression of state laws setting 
requirements for the operation of the business, even if the 
continued operation of the business would be thwarted by 
applying state laws." Ibid. 
IV 
Although the reasons elaborated above suffice for us to 
conclude that Congress did not intend for the abandonment 
power to abrogate certain state and local laws, we find addi-
tional support for restricting that power in repeated congres-
sional emphasis on its "goal of protecting the environment 
against toxic pollution." Chemical Manufacturers Assn., 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U. S. 
8 See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 
- , - (1985) (stating, after surveying the trustee's various powers, 
that "the Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee wide-ranging management 
authority over the debtor") . 
' See S. Misc. Doc. No. 44, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1888); S. Misc. Doc. 
No. 7, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1887); S. Misc. Doc. No. 19, 49th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1886); H. R. Misc. Doc. No. 45, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. (1886). 
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--, -- (1985). Congress has enacted a Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 6901-6987, to 
regulate the treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous 
wastes by monitoring wastes from their creation until after 
their permanent disposal. That Act authorizes the United 
States to seek judicial or administrative restraint of activities 
involving hazardous wastes that "may present an imminent 
and substantial endangerment to health or the environment." 
42 U. S. C. § 6973; see also S. Rep. No. 98-284, p. 58 (1983). 
Congress broadened the scope of the statute and tightened 
the regulatory restraints in 1984. 10 In the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 
as amended by Pub. L. 98-80, § 2(c)(2)(B), Congress estab-
lished a fund to finance cleanup of some sites and required 
certain responsible parties to reimburse either the fund or 
the parties who paid for the cleanup. The Act also empow-
ers the Federal Government to secure such relief as may be 
necessary to avert "imminent and substantial endangerment 
to the public health or welfare or the environment because of 
an actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance." 
42 U. S. C. § 9606. In the face of Congress' undisputed con-
cern over the risks of the improper storage and disposal of 
hazardous and toxic substances, we are unwilling to presume 
that by enactment of§ 554(a), Congress implicitly overturned 
long-standing restrictions on the common-law abandonment 
power. 
10 Congress eliminated the small generator exception and subjected many 
more facilities to the regulations. Pub. L. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221, 
3248-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6921(d) (Supp. 1985)). Another 
provision automatically broadens the Act's coverage by automatically as-
signing a hazardous rating to substances that the EPA does not classify by 
a set deadline. 98 Stat. 3227-3231 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. §§ 6924(d), 
(e), (f)(3), (g)(6) (Supp. 1985)). Amended enforcement provisions allow 
more citizen suits, 98 Stat. 3271-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6973 
(Supp. 1985)), and authorize administrative orders or suits to compel "cor-
rective action" after a leak has occurred. 98 Stat. 3257-3258 (codified at 
42 U. S. C. A. § 6928(h) (Supp. 1985)). 
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v 
In the light of the restricted pre-1978 abandonment power 
of the bankruptcy trustee and in the context of the limited 
scope of other Bankruptcy Code provisions, we conclude that 
Congress did not intend for § 554(a) to preempt certain state 
and local laws. We hold that a trustee may not abandon 
property in contravention of a state statute or regulation that 
is reasonably designed to protect the public health or safety 
from identified hazards. 11 Accordingly, we affirm the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 
It is so ordered 
"'----f 
11 This exception to the abandonment power vested in the trustee by 
§ 554 is a narrow one. It does not encompass a speculative or indetermi-
nate future violation of such laws that may stem from abandonment. The 
abandonment power is not to be fettered by laws or regulations not reason-
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These petitions for certiorari, arising out of the same bank-
ruptcy proceeding, present the question whether 11 U. S. C. 
§ 554(a) 1 of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes a trustee in 
bankruptcy to abandon property in contravention of state 
laws or regulations that are reasonably designed to protect 
the public's health or safety. 
I 
~ 
Quanta Resources Corporation (Quanta) processed) waste 
oil at two facilities, one in Long Island City, New York, and 
the other in Edgewater, New Jersey. At the :8dgewater fa-
1 Section 554(a) reads: 
"After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of 
the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential 
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cility, Quanta handled the oil pursuant to a temporary 
operating permit issued by the New Jersey Department of 
Environmental Protection (NJDEP), respondent in 
No. ~-801. In June 1981, Midlantic National Bank, 
petit'oner in No. 84-801, provided Quanta with a $600,000 
loan"'secured by Quanta's inventoryj accounts receivable, and 
certain equipment. The same month, NJDEP discovered 
that Quanta had violated a specific prohibition in its operat-
ing permit by accepting more than 400,000 gallons of oil con-
taminated with PCB, a highly toxic carcinogen. NJDEP or-
dered Quanta to cease operations at Edgewater, and the two 
began negotiations concerning the cleanup of the Edgewater 
site. But on October 6, 1981, before the conclusion of negoti-
ations, Quanta filed a petition for reorganization under Chap-
ter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. The next day, NJDEP is-
sued an administrative order requiring Quanta to clean up 
the site. Quanta's financial condition remained perilous, 
however, and the following month, it converted the action to 
a liquidation proceeding under Chapter 7. Thomas J. 
O'Neill, petitioner in No. 84-805, was appointed trustee in 
bankruptcy, and subsequently oversaw abandonment of both 
facilities. 
Mter Quanta filed for bankruptcy, an investigation of the 
Long Island City facility revealed that Quanta had accepted 
and stored there over 70,000 gallons of toxic, PCB-contami-
nated oil in deteriorating and leaking containers. Since the 
mortgages on that facility's real property exceeded the prop-
erty's value, the estimated cost of disposing of the waste oil 
plainly rendered the property a net burden to the estate. 
Mter trying without success to sell the Long Island City 
property for the benefit of Quanta's creditors, t';:!.h~e'-""'......,...._,.,'--1 
notified the creditors and the Bankruptcy Court that he in-
tended to abandon the property pursuant to § 554(a). No 
party to the bankruptcy proceeding disputed the trustee's 
) 
.}\ r -fh. 1) 1s~ -n'-+ cJ' 
Nw J~'f<.e. 
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allegation that the site was "burdensome" and of "incon-
sequential value to the estate" within the meaning of § 554. 
The City and the State of New York (collectively New 
York), respondents in No. 84-805, nevertheless objected, 
contending that abandonment would threaten the public's 
health and safety, and would violate state and federal envi-
ronmental law. New York rested its objection on "public 
policy'' considerations reflected in applicable local laws, and 
on the requirement of 28 U. S. C. § 959(b), that a trustee 
"manage and operate" the property of the estate "according 
to the valid laws of the State in which the property is situ-
ated." New York asked the Bankruptcy Court to order that 
the assets of the estate be used to bring the facility into com-
pliance with applicable law. After briefing and argument, 
the court approved the abandonment, noting that "[t]he City 
and State are in a better position in every respect than either 
the trustee or debtor's creditors to do what needs to be done 
to protect the public against the dangers posed by the PCB-
contaminated facility." The District Court for the District of 
New Jersey affirmed and New York appealed to the Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit. 
Upon abandonment, the trustee removed the 24-hour 
guard service and shut down the fire-suppression system. It 
became necessary for New York to decontaminate the facil-
ity, with the exception of the polluted subsoil, at a cost of 
about $2.5 million. 2 
On April 23, 1983, shortly after the District Court had ap-
proved abandonment of the New York site, the trustee gave 
notice of his intention to abandon the personal property at 
the Edgewater site, consisting principally of the contami-
2 The sole issue presented by these petitions is whether a trustee may 
abandon property under § 554 in contravention of local laws designed to 
protect the public's health and safety. New York is claiming reimburse-
ment for its expenditures as an administrative expense. That question, 
however, like the question of the ultimate disposition of the property, is 
not before us. 
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nated oil. The Bankruptcy Court approved the abandon-
ment on May 20, over NJDEP's objection that the estate had 
sufficient funds to protect the public from the dangers posed 
by the hazardous waste. 3 
Because the abandonments of the New Jersey and New 
York facilities presented identical issues, the parties in the 
New Jersey litigation consented to NJDEP's taking a direct 
appeal from the Bankruptcy Court to the Court of Appeals 
pursuant to H U. S. G. § 405(c)(1)(B) 
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit reversed. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F. 2d 912 
(1984); In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F. 2d 927. Al-
though the court found little guidance in legislative history of 
§ 554, it concluded that Congress had intended to codify the 
judge-made abandonment practice developed under the pre-
vious Bankruptcy Act. Under that law, where state law or 
general equitable principles protected certain public inter-
ests, those interests were not overridden by the judge-made 
abandonment power. The court also found evidence in other 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that Congress did not in-
3 The trustee was not required to take even relatively minor steps to 
reduce imminent danger, such as security fencing, drainage and diking re-
pairs, sealing deteriorating tanks, and removing explosive agents. More-
over, the trustee's abandonment at both sites aggravated already existing 
dangers by halting security measures that prevented public entry, vandal-
ism, and fire. Joint Appendix before the Court of Appeals 11-12 (affidavit 
of Richard Docyk, Deputy Chief Inspector for NY City Fire Department); 
id., at 26 (transcript of proceedings before de Vito, J.). The 470,000 gal-
lons of highly toxic and carcinogenic waste oil in unguarded, deterioraring 
containers "present risks of explosion, fire, contamination of water sup-
plies, destruction of natural resources, and injury, genetic damge, or death 
through personal contact." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 4, 
23; see Joint Appendix, supra, at 17 (70,000 gallons at New York site); Ap-
pendix before the Court of Appeals A7 (400,000 gallons at New Jersey 
site); id., at A46 (deteriorating containers); Joint Appendix, supra, at 11 
(deteriorating tanks); id., at 26 (guard service); id., at 12 (risk of fire); id., 
at 11 (contamination of adjacent areas); id., at 26 (health effects of expo-
sure to PCBs and their derivatives). 
~( 
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tend to pre-empt all state regulation, but only that grounded 
on policies outweighed by the relevant federal interests. 
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that the Bankruptcy 
Court erred in permitting abandonment, and remanded both 
cases for further proceedings. 4 
We granted certiorari and consolidated these cases to de-
termine whether th ourt of als ro erl construed 
§ 554, 469 U ~· ---,ce::"~~-=s::ffi=r.::.m .:..0_-__________ _ 
II 
Before the 1978 revisions of the Bankruptcy Code, the 
trustee's abandonment power had been limited by a judi-
cially-developed doctrine intended to protect legitimate state 
or federal interests. This was made clear by the few rele-
vant cases. In Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F. 2d 289 (CA4 
1952), the Court of Appeals concluded that a bankruptcy 
trustee, in liquidating the estate of a barge company, could 
not abandon several barges when the abandonment would 
have obstructed a navigable passage in violation of federal 
law. The court stated: 
"The judge-made [abandonment] rule must give way 
when it comes into conflict with a statute enacted in 
order to ensure the safety of navigation; for we are not 
dealing with a burden imposed upon the bankrupt or his 
property by contract, but a duty and a burden imposed 
upon an owner of vessels by an Act of Congress in the 
public interest." I d., at 290. 
In In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F. 2d 1 (CA 7), 
cert. denied, 317 U. S. 683 (1942), the Court of Appeals held 
'Judge Gibbons dissented, arguing that § 554 permits abandonment 
without any exception analogous to that provided to the automatic stay. 
The dissent further contended that the majority's interpretation of § 554 
raised substantial questions under the takings clause by potentially de-
stroying the interest of secured creditors, see United States v. Security In-
dustrial Bank, 458 U. S. 70 (1982), and that the majority had failed to ad-
dress the important underlying issue of the priority of the states' claims for 
reimbursement. 
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that the trustee of a debtor transit company could not cease 
its operation of a branch railway line when local law required 
continued operation. While the court did not forbid the 
trustee to abandon property (i. e., to reject an unexpired 
lease), it conditioned his actions to ensure compliance with 
state law. Similarly, in In re Lewis Jones, Inc., 1 B. C. D. 
277 (Bkrtcy Ct. ED Pa. 1974), the bankruptcy court invoked 
its equitable power to "safeguard the public interest" by re-
quiring the debtor public utilities to seal underground steam 
lines before abandoning them. 
Thus, when Congress enacted § 554, there were well-rec-
ognized restrictions on a trustee's abandonment power. In 
codifying the judicially-developed rule of abandonment, Con-
gress also presumably included the established corollary that 
a trustee could not exercise his abandonment power in viola-
tion of certain state and federal laws. The normal rule of 
statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legisla-
tion to change the interpretation of a judicially created con-
cept, it makes that intent specific. Edmonds v. Compagnie 
Generale Transatlantique, 443 U. S. 256, 266-267 (1979). 
The Court has followed this rule with particular care in con-
struing the scope of bankruptcy codifications. If Congress 
wishes to grant the trustee an extraordinary exemption from 
non-bankruptcy law, "the intention would be clearly ex-
pressed, not left to be collected or inferred from disputable 
considerations of convenience in administering the estate of 
the bankrupt." Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U. S. 441, 444 
(1904); see Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U. S. 79, 85 (1939) 
("If this old and familiar power of the states [over local rail-
road service] was withdrawn when Congress gave district 
courts bankruptcy powers over railroads, we ought to find 
language fitting for so drastic a change"). 
III 
Neither the Court nor Congress has granted a trustee in 
bankruptcy powers that would lend support to a right to 
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abandon property in contravention of state or local laws de-
signed to protect public health or safety. As we held last 
Term when the State of Ohio sought compensation for clean-
ing the toxic waste site of a bankrupt corporation: 
"Finally, we do not question that anyone in possession of 
the site-whether it is [the debtor] or another in the 
event the receivership is liquidated and the trustee aban-
dons the property, or a vendee from the receiver or the 
bankruptcy trustee-must comply with the environmen-
tal laws of the State of Ohio. Plainly, that person or 
firm may not maintain a nuisance, pollute the waters of 
the State, or refuse to remove the source of such condi-
tions." Ohio v. Kovas, 469 U.S. --, -- (1985) (em-
phasis added). 
Congress has repeatedly expressed its legislative deter-
mination that the trustee is not to have carte blanche to ig-
nore non-bankruptcy law. Where the Bankruptcy Code has 
conferred special powers upon the trustee and where there 
was no common law limitation on that power, Congress has 
expressly provided that the efforts of the trustee to marshal 
and distribute the assets of the estate must yield t~overn­
mental interest in public health and safety. Post, a . One 
cannot assume that Congress, having placed these limitations 
upon other aspects of trustees' operations, intended to dis-
card a well-established judicial restriction on the abandon-
ment power. As we held last year in the context of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, "[T]he debtor-in-possession is not 
relieved of all obligations under the [Act] simply by filing a 
petition for bankruptcy." NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 
u. s. 513, 534. 
The automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code, 
§ 362(a), 5 has been described as "one of the fundamental 
5 Section 362(a) provides: 
"(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed 
under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under sec-
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debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws." 
S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 54 (1978); H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, 
p. 340 (1977). Despite the importance of§ 362(a) in preserv-
ing the debtor's estate, Congress has enacted several catego-
ries of exceptions to the stay that allow the Government to 
commence or continue legal proceedings. For example, 
§ 362(b)(5) permits the Government to enforce "non-mone-
tary" judgments against a debtor's estate. It is clear from 
the legislative history that one of the purposes of this excep-
tion is to protect public health and safety: 
"Thus, where a governmental unit is suing a debtor to 
prevent or stop violation of fraud, environmental protec-
tion, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or 
regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for viola-
tion of such a law, the action or proceeding is not stayed 
tion 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U. S. C. 
78eee(a)(3)), operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of-
"(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or em-
ployment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding 
against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the com-
mencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the 
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title; 
"(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the es-
tate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under 
this title; 
"(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property 
from the estate; 
"(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the 
estate; 
"(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor 
any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the 
commencement of the case under this title; 
"(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that 
arose before the commencement of the case under this title; 
"(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the com-
mencement of the case under this title against any claim against the debtor; 
and 
"(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the 
United States Tax Court concerning the debtor." 
j 
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under the automatic stay." H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, 
supra, at 343 (emphasis added); S. Rep. No. 95-989, 
supra, at 52 (emphasis added). 
Petitioners have suggested that the existence of an express 
exception to the automatic stay undermines the inference of a 
similar exception to the abandonment power: had Congress 
sought to restrict similarly the scope of § 554, it would have 
enacted similar limiting provisions. This argument, how-
ever, fails to acknowledge the differences between the prede-
cessors of§§ 554 and 362. As we have noted, the exceptions 
to the judicially-created abandonment power were firmly es-
tablished. But in enacting § 362 in 1978, Congress signifi-
cantly broadened the scope of the automatic stay, see 1 W. 
Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice§ 20.03, pp. 5-6 (1981), 
an expansion that had begun only five years earlier with the 
adoption of the Bankruptcy Rules in 1973, see id., § 20. 02, at 
4-5. Between 1973 and 1978, some courts had stretched the 
expanded automatic stay to foreclose States' efforts to en-
force their antipollution laws, 6 and Congress wanted to over-
rule these interpretations in its 1978 revision. See H. R. 
Rep. 95-595, supra, at 174-175. In the face of the greatly 
increased scope of § 362, it was necessary for Congress to 
limit this new power expressly. r ~ 
Title 28 U. S. C.J 959(b) 7 provides additional evidence that ~ 
Congress did not i:b'tend for the Bankruptcy Code to preempt 
6 See, e. g., Hillsdale Foundry Co. v. Michigan ex rel. Kelly, 1 BCD 
195 (Bkrtcy Ct. WD Mich. 1974) (action by Michigan Attorney General to 
enforce State's anti-pollution laws held subject to automatic stay). The 
House Report also referred to an unreported case from Texas where a stay 
prevented the State of Maine from closing down a debtor's plant that was 
polluting a river in violation of the state's environmental protection laws. 
H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 174-175. 
' Section 959(b) provides: 
"Except as provided in section 1166 of title 11, a trustee, receiver or 
manager appointed in any cause pending in any court of the United States, 
including a debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the property in 
his possession as such trustee, receiver or manager according to the re-
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all state laws. Section 959(b) commandsl\,debtor in posses-
sion to "manage and operate the property in his possession 
. . . according to the requirements of the valid laws of the 
State." The petitioners have contended that§ 959(b) is rele-
vant only when the trustee is actually operating the business 
of the debtor, and not when he is liquidating it. 
We conclude that § 959(b) applies when the trustee is 
liquidating a debtor's business because that interpretation 
gives meaning to both the words "manage" and "operate." 
Courts "are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word 
Congress used," Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 339 
(1979), and§ 959(b), on its face, encompasses something more 
than "operation." As the Court of Appeals noted, there is no 
reason why the phrase "'manage[ment]' of the 'property,'" 
could not describe a trustee's custodial care and disposition of 
property in bankruptcy liquidation. In re Quanta Resources 
Corp., 739 F. 2d, at 919. 8 This reading is consistent with 
the section's legislative history, which shows the provision 
was designed to place railroad receiverships within the reach 
of state law. 9 The precept of § 959(b) is clear: "[T]he goals of 
the federal bankruptcy laws, including rehabilitation of the 
debtor, do not authorize transgression of state laws setting 
requirements for the operation of the business, even if the 
continued operation of the business would be thwarted by 
applying state laws." Ibid. 
quirements of the valid laws of the State in which such property is situ-
ated, in the same manner that the owner or possessor thereof would be 
bound to do if in possession thereof." 
8 See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U. S. 
- , - (1985) (stating, after surveying the trustee's various powers, 
that "the Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee wide-ranging management 
authority over the debtor"). 
9 See S. Misc. Doc. No. 44, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1888); S. Misc. Doc. 
No. 7, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1887); S. Misc. Doc. No. 19, 49th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1886); H. R. Misc. Doc. No. 45, 4~th Cong., 1st Sess. (1886). 
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IV 
Although the reasons elaborated above suffice for us to 
conclude that Congress did not intend for the abandonment 
power to abrogate certain state and local laws, we find addi-
tional support for restricting that power in repeated congres-
sional emphasis on its "goal of protecting the environment 
against toxic pollution." Chemical Manufacturers Assn., 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U. S. 
--, -- (1985). Congress has enacted a Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 6901-6987, to 
regulate the treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous 
wastes by monitoring wastes from their creation until after 
their permanent disposal. That Act authorizes the United 
States to seek judicial or administrative restraint of activities 
involving hazardous wastes that "may present an imminent 
and substantial endangerment to health or the environment." 
42 U. S. C. § 6973; see also S. Rep. No. 98-284, p. 58 (1983). 
Congress broadened the scope of the statute and tightened 
the regulatory restraints in 1984. 10 In the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 
as amended by Pub. L. 98-80, § 2(c)(2)(B), Congress estab-
lished a fund to finance cleanup of some sites and required 
certain responsible parties to reimburse either the fund or 
the parties who paid for the cleanup. The Act also empow-
ers the Federal Government to secure such relief as may be 
necessary to avert "imminent and substantial endangerment 
10 Congress eliminated the small generator exception and subjected 
many more facilities to the regulations. Pub. L. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221, 
3248-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6921(d) (Supp. 1985)). Another 
provision automatically broadens the Act's coverage by automatically as-
signing a hazardous rating to substances that the EPA does not classify by 
a set deadline. 98 Stat. 3227-3231 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. §§ 6924(d), 
(e), (f)(3), (g)(6) (Supp. 1985)). Amended enforcement provisions allow 
more citizen suits, 98 Stat. 3271-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6973 
(Supp. 1985)), and authorize administrative orders or suits to compel "cor-
rective action" after a leak has occurred. 98 Stat. 3257-3258 (codified at 
42 U. S. C. A. § 6928(h) (Supp. 1985)). 
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to the public health or welfare or the environment because of 
an actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance." 
42 U. S. C. § 9606. In the face of Congress' undisputed con-
cern over the risks of the improper storage and disposal of 
hazardous and toxic substances, we are unwilling to presume 
that by enactment of§ 554(a), Congress implicitly overturned 
long-standing restrictions on the common-law abandonment 
power. 
v 
In the light of the restricted pre-1978 abandonment power 
of the bankruptcy trustee and in the context of the limited 
scope of other Bankruptcy Code provisions, we conclude that 
Congress did not intend for § 554(a) to preempt certain state 
and local laws. We hold that a trustee may not abandon 
property in contravention of a state statute or regulation that 
is reasonably designed to protect the public health or safety 
from identified hazards. 11 Accordingly, we affirm the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 
It is so ordered. 
11 This exception to the abandonment power vested in the trustee by 
§ 554 is a narrow one. It does not encompass a speculative or indetermi-
nate future violation of such laws that may stem from abandonment. The 
abandonment power is not to be fettered by laws or regulations not reason-
ably calculated to protect the public health or safety from imminent and 
identifiable harm. 
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[January-, 1986] 
JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
These petitions for certiorari, arising out of the same bank-
ruptcy proceeding, present the question whether 11 U. S. C. 
§ 554(a) 1 of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes a trustee in 
bankruptcy to abandon property in contravention of state 
laws or regulations that are reasonably designed to protect 
the public's health or safety. 
I 
Quanta Resources Corporation (Quanta) processed waste 
oil at two facilities, one in Long Island City, New York, and 
the other in Edgewater, New Jersey. At the Edgewater fa-
' Section 554(a) reads: 
"After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of 
the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential 
value to the estate." 
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cility, Quanta handled the oil pursuant to a temporary 
operating permit issued by the New Jersey Department 
of Environmental Protection (NJDEP), respondent in 
No. 84-801. In June 1981, Midlantic National Bank, peti-
tioner in No. 84-801, provided Quanta with a $600,000 loan 
secured by Quanta's inventory, accounts receivable, and cer-
tain equipment. The same month, NJDEP discovered that 
Quanta had violated a specific prohibition in its operating 
permit by accepting more than 400,000 gallons of oil contami-
nated with PCB, a highly toxic carcinogen. NJDEP ordered 
Quanta to cease operations at Edgewater, and the two began 
negotiations concerning the cleanup of the Edgewater site. 
But on October 6, 1981, before the conclusion of negotiations, 
Quanta filed a petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of 
the Bankruptcy Code. The next day, NJDEP issued an ad-
ministrative order requiring Quanta to clean up the site. 
Quanta's financial condition remained perilous, however, and 
the following month, it converted the action to a liquidation 
proceeding under Chapter 7. Thomas J. O'Neill, petitioner 
in No. 84-805, was appointed trustee in bankruptcy, and sub-
sequently oversaw abandonment of both facilities. 
After Quanta filed for bankruptcy, an investigation of the 
Long Island City facility revealed that Quanta had accepted 
and stored there over 70,000 gallons of toxic, PCB-contami-
nated oil in deteriorating and leaking containers. Since the 
mortgages on that facility's real property exceeded the prop-
erty's value, the estimated cost of disposing of the waste oil 
plainly rendered the property a net burden to the estate. 
After trying without success to sell the Long Island City 
property for the benefit of Quanta's creditors, the trustee 
notified the creditors and the Bankruptcy Court for the Dis-
trict of New Jersey that he intended to abandon the property 
pursuant to§ 554(a). No party to the bankruptcy proceeding 
disputed the trustee's allegation that the site was "burden-
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some" and of "inconsequential value to the estate" within the 
meaning of § 554. 
The City and the State of New York (collectively New 
York), respondents in No. 84-805, nevertheless objected, 
contending that abandonment would threaten the public's 
health and safety, and would violate state and federal envi-
ronmental law. New York rested its objection on "public 
policy" considerations reflected in applicable local laws, and 
on the requirement of 28 U. S. C. § 959(b), that a trustee 
"manage and operate" the property of the estate "according 
to the valid laws of the State in which the property is situ-
ated." New York asked the Bankruptcy Court to order that 
the assets of the estate be used to bring the facility into com-
pliance with applicable law. After briefing and argument, 
the court approved the abandonment, noting that "[t]he City 
and State are in a better position in every respect than either 
the trustee or debtor's creditors to do what needs to be done 
to protect the public against the dangers posed by the PCB-
contaminated facility." The District Court for the District of 
New Jersey affirmed and New York appealed to the Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit. 
Upon abandonment, the trustee removed the 24-hour 
guard service and shut down the fire-suppression system. It 
became necessary for New York to decontaminate the facil-
ity, with the exception of the polluted subsoil, at a cost of 
about $2.5 million. 2 
On April 23, 1983, shortly after the District Court had ap-
proved abandonment of the New York site, the trustee gave 
notice of his intention to abandon the personal property at 
the Edgewater site, consisting principally of the contami-
2 The sole issue presented by these petitions is whether a trustee may 
abandon property under § 554 in contravention of local laws designed to 
protect the public's health and safety. New York is claiming reimburse-
ment for its expenditures as an administrative expense. That question, 
however, like the question of the ultimate disposition of the property, is 
not before us. 
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nated oil. The Bankruptcy Court approved the abandon-
ment on May 20, over NJDEP's objection that the estate had 
sufficient funds to protect the public from the dangers posed 
by the hazardous waste. 3 
Because the abandonments of the New Jersey and New 
York facilities presented identical issues, the parties in the 
New Jersey litigation consented to NJDEP's taking a direct 
appeal from the Bankruptcy Court to the Court of Appeals 
pursuant to § 405(c)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978. 
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit reversed. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F. 2d 912 
(1984); In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F. 2d 927. Al-
though the court found little guidance in legislative history of 
§ 554, it concluded that Congress had intended to codify the 
judge-made abandonment practice developed under the pre-
vious Bankruptcy Act. Under that law, where state law or 
general equitable principles protected certain public inter-
ests, those interests were not overridden by the judge-made 
abandonment power. The court also found evidence in other 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that Congress did not in-
3 The trustee was not required to take even relatively minor steps to 
reduce imminent danger, such as security fencing, drainage and diking re-
pairs, sealing deteriorating tanks, and removing explosive agents. More-
over, the trustee's abandonment at both sites aggravated already existing 
dangers by halting security measures that prevented public entry, vandal-
ism, and fire. Joint Appendix before the Court of Appeals 11-12 (affidavit 
of Richard Docyk, Deputy Chief Inspector for NY City Fire Department); 
id., at 26 (transcript of proceedings before de Vito, J.). The 470,000 gal-
lons of highly toxic and carcinogenic waste oil in unguarded, deterioraring 
containers "present risks of explosion, fire, contamination of water sup-
plies, destruction of natural resources, and injury, genetic damge, or death 
through personal contact." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 4, 
23; see Joint Appendix, supra, at 17 (70,000 gallons at New York site); Ap-
pendix before the Court of Appeals A7 (400,000 gallons at New Jersey 
site); id., at A46 (deteriorating containers); Joint Appendix, supra, at 11 
(deteriorating tanks); id., at 26 (guard service); id., at 12 (risk of fire); id., 
at 11 (contamination of adjacent areas); id., at 26 (health effects of expo-
sure to PCBs and their derivatives). 
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tend to pre-empt all state regulation, but only that grounded 
on policies outweighed by the relevant federal interests. 
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that the Bankruptcy 
Court erred in permitting abandonment, and remanded both 
cases for further proceedings. 4 
We granted certiorari and consolidated these cases to de-
termine whether the Court of Appeals properly construed 
§ 554, 469 U. S. --. We now affirm. 
II 
Before the 1978 revisions of the Bankruptcy Code, the 
trustee's abandonment power had been limited by a judi-
cially-developed doctrine intended to protect legitimate state 
or federal interests. This was made clear by the few rele-
vant cases. In Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F. 2d 289 (CA4 
1952), the Court of Appeals concluded that a bankruptcy 
trustee, in liquidating the estate of a barge company, could 
not abandon several barges when the abandonment would 
have obstructed a navigable passage in violation of federal 
law. The court stated: 
"The judge-made [abandonment] rule must give way 
when it comes into conflict with a statute enacted in 
order to ensure the safety of navigation; for we are not 
dealing with a burden imposed upon the bankrupt or his 
property by contract, but a duty and a burden imposed 
upon an owner of vessels by an Act of Congress in the 
public interest." I d., at 290. 
In In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F. 2d 1 (CA 7), 
cert. denied, 317 U. S. 683 (1942), the Court of Appeals held 
4 Judge Gibbons dissented, arguing that § 554 permits abandonment 
without any exception analogous to that provided to the automatic stay. 
The dissent further contended that the majority's interpretation of § 554 
raised substantial questions under the takings clause by potentially de-
stroying the interest of secured creditors, see United States v. Security In-
dustrial Bank, 458 U. S. 70 (1982), and that the majority had failed to ad-
dress the important underlying issue of the priority of the states' claims for 
reimbursement. 
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that the trustee of a debtor transit company could not cease 
its operation of a branch railway line when local law required 
continued operation. While the court did not forbid the 
trustee to abandon property (i. e., to reject an unexpired 
lease), it conditioned his actions to ensure compliance with 
state law. Similarly, in In re Lewis Jones, Inc., 1 B. C. D. 
277 (Bkrtcy Ct. ED Pa. 1974), the bankruptcy court invoked 
its equitable power to "safeguard the public interest" by re-
quiring the debtor public utilities to seal underground steam 
lines before abandoning them. 
Thus, when Congress enacted § 554, there were well-rec-
ognized restrictions on a trustee's abandonment power. In 
codifying the judicially-developed rule of abandonment, Con-
gress also presumably included the established corollary that 
a trustee could not exercise his abandonment power in viola-
tion of certain state and federal laws. The normal rule of 
statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legisla-
tion to change the interpretation of a judicially created con-
cept, it makes that intent specific. Edmonds v. Compagnie 
Generale Transatlantique, 443 U. S. 256, 266-267 (1979). 
The Court has followed this rule with particular care in con-
struing the scope of bankruptcy codifications. If Congress 
wishes to grant the trustee an extraordinary exemption from 
non-bankruptcy law, "the intention would be clearly ex-
pressed, not left to be collected or inferred from disputable 
considerations of convenience in administering the estate of 
the bankrupt." Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U. S. 441, 444 
(1904); see Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U. S. 79, 85 (1939) 
("If this old and familiar power of the states [over local rail-
road service] was withdrawn when Congress gave district 
courts bankruptcy powers over railroads, we ought to find 
language fitting for so drastic a change"). 
III 
Neither the Court nor Congress has granted a trustee in 
bankruptcy powers that would lend support to a right to 
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abandon property in contravention of state or local laws de-
signed to protect public health or safety. As we held last 
Term when the State of Ohio sought compensation for clean-
ing the toxic waste site of a bankrupt corporation: 
"Finally, we do not question that anyone in possession of 
the site-whether it is [the debtor] or another in the 
event the receivership is liquidated and the trustee aban-
dons the property, or a vendee from the receiver or the 
bankruptcy trustee-must comply with the environmen-
tal laws of the State of Ohio. Plainly, that person or 
firm may not maintain a nuisance, pollute the waters of 
the State, or refuse to remove the source of such condi-
tions." Ohio v. Kovas, 469 U.S.--, -- (1985) (em-
phasis added). 
Congress has repeatedly expressed its legislative deter-
mination that the trustee is not to have carte blanche to ig-
nore non-bankruptcy law. Where the Bankruptcy Code has 
conferred special powers upon the trustee and where there 
was no common law limitation on that power, Congress has 
expressly provided that the efforts of the trustee to marshal 
and distribute the assets of the estate must yield to govern-
mental interest in public health and safety. Post, at 8-9. 
One cannot assume that Congress, having placed these limi-
tations upon other aspects of trustees' operations, intended 
to discard a well-established judicial restriction on the aban-
donment power. As we held last year in the context of the 
National Labor Relations Act, "[T]he debtor-in-possession is 
not relieved of all obligations under the [Act] simply by filing 
a petition for bankruptcy." NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 
465 u. s. 513, 534. 
The automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code, 
§ 362(a),S has been described as "one of the fundamental 
5 Section 362(a) provides: 
"(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed 
under section 301 , 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under sec-
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debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws." 
8. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 54 (1978); H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, 
p. 340 (1977). Despite the importance of§ 362(a) in preserv-
ing the debtor's estate, Congress has enacted several catego-
ries of exceptions to the stay that allow the Government to 
commence or continue legal proceedings. For example, 
§ 362(b)(5) permits the Government to enforce "non-mone-
tary" judgments against a debtor's estate. It is clear from 
the legislative history that one of the purposes of this excep-
tion is to protect public health and safety: 
"Thus, where a governmental unit is suing a debtor to 
prevent or stop violation of fraud, environmental protec-
tion, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or 
regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for viola-
tion of such a law, the action or proceeding is not stayed 
tion 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U. S. C. 
78eee(a)(3)), operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of-
"(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or em-
ployment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding 
against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the com-
mencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the 
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title; 
"(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the es-
tate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under 
this title; 
"(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property 
from the estate; 
"(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the 
estate; 
"(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor 
any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the 
commencement of the case under this title; 
"(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that 
arose before the commencement of the case under this title; 
"(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the com-
mencement of the case under this title against any claim against the debtor; 
and 
"(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the 
United States Tax Court concerning the debtor." 
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under the automatic stay." H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, 
supra, at 343 (emphasis added); S. Rep. No. 95-989, 
supra, at 52 (emphasis added). 
Petitioners have suggested that the existence of an express 
exception to the automatic stay undermines the inference of a 
similar exception to the abandonment power: had Congress 
sought to restrict similarly the scope of § 554, it would have 
enacted similar limiting provisions. This argument, how-
ever, fails to acknowledge the differences between the prede-
cessors of§§ 554 and 362. As we have noted, the exceptions 
to the judicially-created abandonment power were firmly es-
tablished. But in enacting § 362 in 1978, Congress signifi-
cantly broadened the scope of the automatic stay, see 1 W. 
Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice §20.03, pp. 5-6 (1981), 
an expansion that had begun only five years earlier with the 
adoption of the Bankruptcy Rules in 1973, see id., § 20.02, at 
4-5. Between 1973 and 1978, some courts had stretched the 
expanded automatic stay to foreclose States' efforts to en-
force their antipollution laws,6 and Congress wanted to over-
rule these interpretations in its 1978 revision. See H. R. 
Rep. 95-595, supra, at 174-175. In the face of the greatly 
increased scope of § 362, it was necessary for Congress to 
limit this new power expressly. 
Title 28 U. S. C. § 959(b) 7 provides additional evidence 
that Congress did not intend for the Bankruptcy Code to pre-
6 See, e. g., Hillsdale Foundry Co. v. Michigan ex rel. Kelly, 1 BCD 
195 (Bkrtcy Ct. WD Mich. 1974) (action by Michigan Attorney General to 
enforce State's anti-pollution Jaws held subject to automatic stay). The 
House Report also referred to an unreported case from Texas where a stay 
prevented the State of Maine from closing down a debtor's plant that was 
polluting a river in violation of the state's environmental protection laws. 
H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 174-175. 
7 Section 959(b) provides: 
"Except as provided in section 1166 of title 11, a trustee, receiver or 
manager appointed in any cause pending in any court of the United States, 
including a debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the property in 
his possession as such trustee , receiver or manager according to the re-
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empt all state laws. Section 959(b) commands the debtor in 
possession to "manage and operate the property in his pos-
session ... according to the requirements of the valid laws of 
the State." The petitioners have contended that § 959(b) is 
relevant only when the trustee is actually operating the busi-
ness of the debtor, and not when he is liquidating it. 
We conclude that § 959(b) applies when the trustee is 
liquidating a debtor's business because that interpretation 
gives meaning to both the words "manage" and "operate." 
Courts "are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word 
Congress used," Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 339 
(1979), and§ 959(b), on its face, encompasses something more 
than "operation." As the Court of Appeals noted, there is no 
reason why the phrase "'manage[ment]' of the 'property,'" 
could not describe a trustee's custodial care and disposition of 
property in bankruptcy liquidation. In re Quanta Resources 
Corp., 739 F. 2d, at 919. 8 This reading is consistent with 
the section's legislative history, which shows the provision 
was designed to place railroad receiverships within the reach 
of state law. 9 The precept of§ 959(b) is clear: "[T]he goals of 
the federal bankruptcy laws, including rehabilitation of the 
debtor, do not authorize transgression of state laws setting 
requirements for the operation of the business, even if the 
continued operation of the business would be thwarted by 
applying state laws." Ibid. 
quirements of the valid laws of the State in which such property is situ-
ated, in the same manner that the owner or possessor thereof would be 
bound to do if in possession thereof." 
8 See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U. S. 
-, - (1985) (stating, after surveying the trustee's various powers, 
that "the Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee wide-ranging management 
authority over the debtor"). 
9 See S. Misc. Doc. No. 44, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1888); S. Misc. Doc. 
No. 7, 50th Cong. , 1st Sess. (1887); S. Misc. Doc. No. 19, 49th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1886); H. R. Misc. Doc. No. 45, 49th Cong. , 1st Sess. (1886). 
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IV 
Although the reasons elaborated above suffice for us to 
conclude that Congress did not intend for the abandonment 
power to abrogate certain state and local laws, we find addi-
tional support for restricting that power in repeated congres-
sional emphasis on its "goal of protecting the environment 
against toxic pollution." Chemical Manufacturers Assn., 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U. S. 
--, -- (1985). Congress has enacted a Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 6901-6987, to 
regulate the treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous 
wastes by monitoring wastes from their creation until after 
their permanent disposal. That Act authorizes the United 
States to seek judicial or administrative restraint of activities 
involving hazardous wastes that "may present an imminent 
and substantial endangerment to health or the environment." 
42 U. S. C. § 6973; see also S. Rep. No. 98-284, p. 58 (1983). 
Congress broadened the scope of the statute and tightened 
the regulatory restraints in 1984. 10 In the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 
as amended by Pub. L. 98-80, § 2(c)(2)(B), Congress estab-
lished a fund to finance cleanup of some sites and required 
certain responsible parties to reimburse either the fund or 
the parties who paid for the cleanup. The Act also empow-
ers the Federal Government to secure such relief as may be 
necessary to avert "imminent and substantial endangerment 
10 Congress eliminated the small generator exception and subjected 
many more facilities to the regulations. Pub. L. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221, 
3248-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6921(d) (Supp. 1985)). Another 
provision automatically broadens the Act's coverage by automatically as-
signing a hazardous rating to substances that the EPA does not classify by 
a set deadline. 98 Stat. 3227-3231 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. §§ 6924(d), 
(e), (f)(3), (g)(6) (Supp. 1985)). Amended enforcement provisions allow 
more citizen suits, 98 Stat. 3271-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6973 
(Supp. 1985)), and authorize administrative orders or suits to compel "cor-
rective action" after a leak has occurred. 98 Stat. 3257-3258 (codified at 
42 U. S. C. A. § 6928(h) (Supp. 1985)). 
84-801 & 84-805--0PINION 
12 MIDLANTIC NAT. BANK v. N. J . DEPT. OF E . P. 
to the public health or welfare or the environment because of 
an actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance." 
42 U. S. C. § 9606. In the face of Congress' undisputed con-
cern over the risks of the improper storage and disposal of 
hazardous and toxic substances, we are unwilling to presume 
that by enactment of§ 554(a), Congress implicitly overturned 
long-standing restrictions on the common-law abandonment 
power. 
v 
In the light of the restricted pre-1978 abandonment power 
of the bankruptcy trustee and in the context of the limited 
scope of other Bankruptcy Code provisions, we conclude that 
Congress did not intend for § 554(a) to preempt certain state 
and local laws. We hold that a trustee may not abandon 
property in contravention of a state statute or regulation that 
is reasonably designed to protect the public health or safety 
from identified hazards. 11 Accordingly, we affirm the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 
It is so ordered. 
11 This exception to the abandonment power vested in the trustee by 
§ 554 is a narrow one. It does not encompass a speculative or indetermi-
nate future violation of such laws that may stem from abandonment. The 
abandonment power is not to be fettered by laws or regulations not reason-
ably calculated to protect the public health or safety from imminent and 
identifiable harm. 
.! 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Nos. 84-801 AND 84-805 
MIDLANTIC NATIONAL BANK, PETITIONER 
~-Bill u 
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION 
THOMAS J. O'NEILL, TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY OF 
QUANTA RESOURCES CORPORATION, DEBTOR, 
PETITIONER 
~-805 v. 
CITY OF NEW YORK ET AL. 
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
[January - . , 1986] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
These petitions for certiorari~ arising out of the same bank-
ruptcy proceeding, present the question whether 11 U. S. C. 
§ 554(a) 1 of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes a trustee in 
bankruptcy to abandon property in contravention of state 
laws or regulations that are reasonably designed to protect 
the public's health or safety. 
I 
Quanta Resources Corporation (Quanta) processed waste 
oil at two facilities, one in Long Island City, New York, and 
the other in Edgewater, New Jersey. At the Edgewater fa-
1 Section 554(a) reads: 
"After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of 
the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential 
value to the estate." 
' . ' 
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cility, Quanta handled the oil pursuant to a temporary 
operating pennit issued by the New Jersey Department 
of Environmental Protection (NJDEP), respondent in 
No. 84-801. In June 1981, Midlantic National Bank, peti-
tioner in No. 84-801, provided Quanta with a $600,000 loan 
secured by Quanta's inventory, accounts receivable, and cer-
tain equipment. The same month, NJDEP discovered that 
Quanta had violated a specific prohibition in its operating 
pennit by accepting more than 400,000 gallons of oil contami-
nated with PCB, a highly toxic carcinogen. NJDEP ordered 
Quanta to cease operations at Edgewater, and the two began 
negotiations concerning the cleanup of the Edgewater site. 
But on October 6, 1981, before the conclusion of negotiations, 
Quanta filed a petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of 
the Bankruptcy Code. The next day, NJDEP issued an ad-
ministrative order requiring Quanta to clean up the site. 
Quanta's financial condition remained perilous, however, and 
the following month, it converted the action to a liquidation 
proceeding under Chapter 7. Thomas J. O'Neill, petitioner 
in No. 84-805, was·appointed trustee in bankruptcy, and sub-
sequently oversaw abandonment of both facilities. 
After Quanta filed for bankruptcy, an investigation of the 
Long Island City facility revealed that Quanta had accepted 
and stored there over 70,000 gallons of toxic, PCB-contami-
nated oil in deteriorating and leaking containers. Since the 
mortgages on that facility's real property exceeded the prop-
erty's value, the estimated cost of disposing of the waste oil 
plainly rendered the property a net burden to the estate. 
After trying without success to sell the Long Island City 
property for the benefit of Quanta's creditors, the trustee 
notified the creditors and the Bankruptcy Court for the Dis-
trict of New Jersey that he intended to abandon the property 
pursuant to § 554(a). No party to the bankruptcy proceeding 
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some" and of "inconsequential value to the estate" within the 
meaning of § 554. 
The City and the State of New York (collectively New 
York), respondents in No. 84-805, nevertheless objected, 
contending that abandonment would threaten the public's 
health and safety, and would violate state and federal envi-
ronmental law. New York rested its objection on "public 
policy'' considerations reflected in applicable local laws, and 
on the requirement of 28 U. S. C. §959(b), that a trustee 
"manage and operate" the property of the estate "according 
to the valid laws of the State in which the property is situ-
ated." New York asked the Bankruptcy Court to order that 
the assets of the estate be used to bring the facility into com-
pliance with applicable law. After briefing and argument, 
the court approved the abandonment, noting that "[t]he City 
and State are in a better position in every respect than either 
the trustee or debtor's creditors to do what needs to be done 
to protect the public against the dangers posed by the PCB-
contaminated facility." The District Court for the District of 
New Jersey affirmed and New York appealed to the Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit. 
Upon abandonment, the trustee removed the 24-hour 
guard service and shut down the fire-suppression system. It 
became necessary for New York to decontaminate the facil-
ity, with the exception of the polluted subsoil, at a cost of 
about $2.5 million.2 
On April 23, 1983, shortly after the District Court had ap-
proved abandonment of the New York site, the trustee gave 
notice of his intention to abandon the personal property at 
the Edgewater site, consisting principally of the contami-
1 The sole issue presented by these petitions is whether a trustee may 
abandon property under § 554 in contravention of local laws designed to 
protect the public's health and safety. New York is claiming reimburse-
ment for its expenditures as an administrative expense. That question, 
however, like the question of the ultimate disposition of the property, is 
not before us. 
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nated oil. The Bankruptcy Court approved the abandon-
ment on May 20, over NJDEP's objection that the estate had 
sufficient funds to protect the public from the dangers posed 
by the hazardous waste. 3 
Because the abandonments of the New Jersey and New 
York facilities presented identical issues, the parties in the 
New Jersey litigation consented to NJDEP's taking a direct 
appeal from the Bankruptcy Court to the Court of Appeals 
pursuant to §405(c)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978. 
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit reversed. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F. 2d 912 
(1984); In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F. 2d 927. Al-
though the court found little guidance in legislative history of 
§ 554, it concluded that Congress had intended to codify the 
judge-made abandonment practice developed under the pre-
vious Bankruptcy Act. Under that law, where state law or 
general equitable principles protected certain public inter-
ests, those interests were not overridden by the judge-made 
abandonment power. The court also found evidence in other 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that Congress did not in-
1 The trustee was not required to take even relatively minor steps to 
reduce imminent danger, such as security fencing, drainage and diking re-
pairs, sealing deteriorating tanks, and removing explosive agents. More-
over, the trustee's abandonment at both sites aggravated already existing 
dangers by halting security measures that prevented public entry, vandal-
ism, and fire. Joint Appendix before the Court of Appeals 11-12 (affidavit 
of Richard Docyk, Deputy Chief Inspector for NY City Fire Department); 
id., at 26 (transcript of proceedings before de Vito, J .). The 470,000 gal-
lons of highly toxic and carcinogenic waste oil in unguarded, deterioraring 
containers "present risks of explosion, fire, contamination of water sup-
plies, destruction of natural resources, and injury, genetic damge, or death 
through personal contact." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 4, 
23; see Joint Appendix, supra, at 17 (70,000 gallons at New York site); Ap-
pendix before the Court of Appeals A7 (400,000 gallons at New Jersey 
site); id., at A46 (deteriorating containers); Joint Appendix, supra, at 11 
(deteriorating tanks); id., at 26 (guard service); id., at 12 (risk of fire); id., 
at 11 (contamination of adjacent areas); id., at 26 (health effects of expo-
sure to PCBs and their derivatives). 
-.. 
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tend to pre-empt all state regulation, but only that grounded 
on policies outweighed by the relevant federal interests. 
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that the Bankruptcy 
Court erred in permitting abandonment, and remanded both 
cases for further proceedings. • 
We granted certiorari and consolidated these cases to de-
termine whether the Court of Appeals properly construed 
§ 554, 469 U. S. -. We now affirm. 
II 
Before the 1978 revisions of the Bankruptcy Code, the 
trustee's abandonment power had been limited by a judi-
cially-developed doctrine intended to protect legitimate state 
or federal interests. This was made clear by the few rele-
vant cases. In Ottenheimerv. Whitaker, 198 F. 2d 289 (CA4 
1952), the Court of Appeals concluded that a bankruptcy 
trustee, in liquidating the estate of a barge company, could 
not abandon several barges when the abandonment would 
have obstructed a navigable passage in violation of federal 
law. The court stated: 
"The judge-made [abandonment] rule must give way 
when it comes into conflict with a statute enacted in 
order to ensure the safety of navigation; for we are not 
dealing with a burden imposed upon the bankrupt or his 
property by contract, but a duty and a burden imposed 
upon an owner of vessels by an Act of Congress in the 
public interest." Id., at 290. 
In In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F. 2d 1 (CA 7), 
cert. denied, 317 U. S. 683 (1942), the Court of Appeals held 
• Judge Gibbons dissented, arguing that § 554 pennits abandonment 
without any exception analogous to that provided to the automatic stay. 
The dissent further contended that the majority's interpretation of § 554 
raised substantial questions under the takings clause by potentially de-
stroying the interest of secured creditors, see United States v. Security In-
dustrial Bank, 458 U. S. 70 (1982), and that the majority had failed to ad-
dress the important underlying issue of the priority of the states' claims for 
reimbursement. 
Although these cases 
do not define for us 
the exact contours of 
the trustee IS abandon-
nent power, they do make 
clear that this power 
was subject 'to certain 
restrictions when Con-
gress enacted~ 554(a). 
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that the trustee of a debtor transit company could not cease 
its operation of a branch railway line when local law required 
continued operation. While the court did not forbid the 
trustee to abandon property (i. e., to reject an unexpired 
lease), it conditioned his actions to ensure compliance with 
state law. Similarly, in In re Lewis Jones, Inc., 1 B. C. D. 
277 (Bkrtcy Ct. ED Pa. 1974), the bankruptcy court invoked 
its equitable power to "safeguard the public interest" by re-
quiring the debtor public utilities to seal underground steam 
lines before abandoning them. 
Thus, when Congress enacted § 554, there were well-rec-
ognized restrictions on a trustee's abandonment power. In 
codifying the judicially-developed rule of abandonment, Con-
gress also presumably included the established corollary that 
a trustee could not exercise his abandonment power in viola-
tion of certain state and federal laws. The normal rule of 
statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legisla-
tion to change the interpretation of a judicially created con-
cept, it makes that intent specific. Edmonds v. Compagnie 
Generale Transatlantique, 443 U. S. 256, 266-267 (1979). 
The Court has followed this rule with particular care in con- . 
struing the scope of bankruptcy codifications. If Congress 
wishes to grant the trustee an extraordinary exemption from 
non-bankruptcy law, ''the intention would be clearly ex-
pressed, not left to be collected or inferred from disputable 
considerations of convenience in administering the estate of 
the bankrupt." Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U. S. 441, 444 
(1904); see Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U. S. 79, 85 (1939) 
("If this old and familiar power of the states [over local rail-
road service] was withdrawn when Congress gave district 
courts bankruptcy powers over railroads, we ought to find 
language fitting for so drastic a change")./\ 
III 
Neither the Court nor Congress has granted a trustee in 
bankruptcy powers that would lend support to a right to 
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abandon property in contravention of state or local laws de-
signed to protect public health or safety. As we held last 
Tenn when the State of Ohio sought compensation for clean-
ing the toxic waste site of a bankrupt corporation: 
"Finally, we do not question that anyone in possession of 
the site-whether it is [the debtor] or another in the 
event the receivership is liquidated and the trustee aban-
dons the property, or a vendee from the receiver or the 
bankruptcy trustee-must comply with the environmen-
tal laws of the State of Ohio. Plainly, that person or 
finn may not maintain a nuisance, pollute the waters of 
the State, or refuse to remove the source of such condi-
tions." Ohio v. Kovas, 469 U.S.--,-- (1985) (em-
phasis added). 
Congress has repeatedly expressed its legislative deter-
mination that the trustee is not to have carte blanche to ig-
nore non-bankruptcy law. Where the Bankruptcy Code has 
conferred special powers upon the trustee and where there 
was no common law limitation on that power, Congress has 
expressly provided that the efforts of the trustee to marshal 
and distribute the assets of the estate must yield to govern-
mental interest in public health and safety. Post, at 8-9. 
One cannot assume that Congress, having placed these limi-
tations upon other aspects of trustees' operations, intended 
to discard a well-established judicial restriction on the aban-
donment power. As we held last year in the context of the 
National Labor Relations Act, "[T]he debtor-in-possession is 
not relieved of all obligations under the [Act] simply by filing 
a petition for bankruptcy." NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 
465 u. s. 513, 534. 
The automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code, 
§ 362(a), 6 has been described as "one of the fundamental 
'Section 362(a) provides: 
"(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed 
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debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws." 
S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 54 (1978); H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, 
p. 340 (1977). Despite the importance of§ 362(a) in preserv-
ing the debtor's estate, Congress has enacted several catego-
ries of exceptions to the stay that allow the Government to 
commence or continue legal proceedings. For example, 
§ 362(b)(5) permits the Government to enforce "non-mone-
tary'' judgments against a debtor's estate. It is clear from 
the legislative history that one of the purposes of this excep-
tion is to protect public health and safety: 
"Thus, where a governmental unit is suing a debtor to 
prevent or stop violation of fraud, environmental protec-
tion, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or 
regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for viola-
tion of such a law, the action or proceeding is not stayed 
tion 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U. S. C. 
78eee(a)(3)), operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of-
"(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or em-
ployment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding 
against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the com-
mencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the 
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title; 
"(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the es-
tate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under 
this title; 
"(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property 
from the estate; 
"(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the 
estate; 
"(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor 
any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the 
commencement of the case under this title; 
"(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that 
arose before the commencement of the case under this title; 
"(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the com-
mencement of the case under this title against any claim against the debtor; 
and 
"(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the 
United States Tax Court concerning the debtor." 
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under the automatic stay." H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, 
supra, at 343 (emphasis added); S. Rep. No. 95-989, 
supra, at 52 (emphasis added). 
Petitioners have suggested that the existence of an express 
exception to the automatic stay undermines the inference of a 
similar exception to the abandonment power: had Congress 
sought to restrict similarly the scope of § 554, it would have 
enacted similar limiting provisions. This argument, how-
ever, fails to acknowledge the differences between the prede-
cessors of§§ 554 and 362. As we have noted, the exceptions 
to the judicially-created abandonment power were firmly es-
tablished. But in enacting § 362 in 1978, Congress signifi-
cantly broadened the scope of the automatic stay, see 1 W. 
Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice § 20.03, pp. 5-6 (1981), 
an expansion that had begun only five years earlier with the 
adoption of the Bankruptcy Rules in 1973, see id., § 20.02, at 
4-5. Between 1973 and 1978, some courts had stretched the 
expanded automatic stay to foreclose States' efforts to en-
force their antipollution laws, 8 and Congress wanted to over-
rule these interpretations in its 1978 revision. See H. R. 
Rep. 95-595, supra, at 174-175. In the face of the greatly 
increased scope of § 362, it was necessary for Congress to 
limit this new power expressly. 
Title 28 U. S. C. § 959(b)1 provides additional evidence 
that Congress did not intend for the Bankruptcy Code to pre-
'See, e. g., Hillsdale Foundry Co. v. Michigan ex rel. Kelly, 1 BCD 
195 (Bkrtcy Ct. WD Mich. 1974) (action by Michigan Attorney General to 
enforce State's anti-pollution laws held subject to automatic stay). The 
House Report also refened to an unreported case from Texas where a stay 
prevented the State of Maine from closing down a debtor's plant that was 
polluting a river in violation of the state's environmental protection laws. 
H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 174-175. 
1 Section 959(b) provides: 
"Except as provided in section 1166 of title 11, a trustee, receiver or 
manager appointed in any cause pending in any court of the United States, 
including a debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the property in 
his possession as such trustee, receiver or manager according to the re-
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empt all state laws. Section 959(b) commands the debtor in 
possession to "manage and operate the property in his pos-
session ... according to the requirements of the valid laws of 
the State." The petitioners have contended that §959(b) is 
relevant only when the trustee is actually operating the busi-
ness of the debtor, and not when he is liquidating it. 
We conclude that § 959(b) applies when the trustee is 
liquidating a debtor's business because that interpretation 
gives meaning to both the words "manage" and "operate." 
Courts "are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word 
Congress used," Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 339 
(1979), and§ 959(b), on its face, encompasses something more 
than "operation." As the Court of Appeals noted, there is no 
reason why the phrase "'rnanage[ment]' of the 'property,"' 
coqld not describe a trustee's custodial care and disposition of 
property in bankruptcy liquidation. In re Quanta Resources 
Corp., 739 F. 2d, at 919.8 This reading is consistent with 
the section's legislative history, which shows the provision 
was designed to place railroad receiverships within the reach 
Secticn 959 (b) does not, of state law.• The pFeeept ef § 959(9) is eleaF; "[T]he geals ef 
of course, delimit the the feaef'fH . ei:mle"Qpiey laws, inelaaiRg Feh&9iliiatieR ef the 
precise conditions on an aeeieP, ae Rei aathePise tP&Rs~essieR ef st&te laws setting 
~~~= ~~ (a)pe~emeftts fep. the epeP&tieR. ef the 9asiRess, eveR if the 
' Sectioo 959 (b)'s limita- . eefttlftt:led epe!'fttteft ef tl\e B1:iStftess weald ee th·N&Ptea ey 
1 
tioo, however, SUPJ:X>rts ·applying state laws" Tbid 
our finding that Congress----
.' 
did not intend for the 
Ba.nlauptcy Code to pre .... 
enpt. all state laws. 
quirements of the valid laws of the State in which such property is situ-
ated, in the same manner that the owner or possessor thereof would be 
bound to do if in possession thereof." 
'See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 
-, - (1985) (stating, after surveying the trustee's various powers, 
that ''the Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee wide-ranging management 
authority over the debtor"). 
'SeeS. Misc. Doc. No. 44, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1888); S. Misc. Doc. 
No.7, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1887); S. Misc. Doc. No. 19, 49th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1886); H. R. Misc. Doc. No. 45, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. (1886) . 
I t . 
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IV 
Although the reasons elaborated above suffice for us to 
conclude that Congress did not intend for the abandonment 
power to abrogate certain state and local laws, we find addi-
tional support for restricting that power in repeated congres-
sional emphasis on its "goal of protecting the environment 
against toxic pollution." Chemical Manufacturers Assn., 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U. S. 
--, -- (1985). Congress has enacted a Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 6901-6987, to 
regulate the treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous 
wastes by monitoring wastes from their creation until after 
their permanent di.sposal. That Act authorizes the United 
States to seek judicial or administrative restraint of activities 
involving hazardous wastes that "may present an imminent 
and substantial endangerment to health or the environment." 
42 U. S. C. §6973; see also S. Rep. No. 98-284, p. 58 (1983). 
Congress broadened the scope of the statute and tightened 
the regulatory restraints in 1984.10 In the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 
as amended by Pub. L. 98-80, § 2(c)(2)(B), Congress estab-
lished a fund to finance cleanup of some sites and required 
certain responsible parties to reimburse either the fund or 
the parties who paid for the cleanup. The Act also empow-
ers the Federal Government to secure such relief as may be 
necessary to avert ''imminent and substantial endangerment 
•• Congress eliminated the small generator exception and subjected 
many more facilities to the regulations. Pub. L. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221, 
3248-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6921(d) (Supp. 1985)). Another 
provision automatically broadens the Act's coverage by automatically as-
signing a hazardous rating to substances that the EPA does not classify by 
a set deadline. 98 Stat. 3227-3231 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. §§ 6924(d), 
(e), (f)(3), (gX6) (Supp. 1985)). Amended enforcement provisions allow 
more citizen suits, 98 Stat. 3271-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6973 
(Supp. 1985)), and authorize administrative orders or suits to compel "cor-
rective action" after a leak has occurred. 98 Stat. 3257-3258 (codified at 
42 U. S. C. A. § 6928(h) (Supp. 1985)). 
·I 
·. 
We also 'WOUld have a 
different case when a 
bankruptcy court autho-
rized abandannent con-
ditioned upon the trus-
tee's adequately pro-
tecting the public • s 
health and safety. 
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to the public health or welfare or the environment because of 
an actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance." 
42 U. S. C. § 9606. In the face of Congress' undisputed con-
cern over the risks of the improper storage and disposal of 
hazardous and toxic substances, we are unwilling to presume 
that by enactment of§ 554(a), Congress implicitly overturned 
long-standing restrictions on the common-law abandonment 
power. 
v 
In the light of the restricted pre-1978 abandonment power 
of the bankruptcy trustee and in the context of the limited 
scope of other Bankruptcy Code provisions, we conclude that 
Congress did not intend for § 554(a) to preempt certain state 
and local laws. We hold that a trustee may not abandon 
property in contravention of a state statute or regulation that 
is reasonably designed to protect the public health or safety 
from identified hazards. 11 Accordingly, we affirm the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 
It is so ordered. 
u This exception to the abandonment power vested in the trustee by 
§ 554 is a narrow one. It does not encompass a speculative or indetermi-
nate future violation of such laws that may stem from abandonment. The 
abandonment power is not to be fettered by laws or regulations not reason-
ably calculated to protect the public health or safety from imminent and 
identifiable harm./\ 
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CITY OF NEW YORK ET AL. 
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
[January-, 1986] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
These petitions for certiorari~ arising out of the same bank-
ruptcy proceeding, present the question whether 11 U. S. C. 
§ 554(a) 1 of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes a trustee in 
bankruptcy to abandon property in contravention of state 
laws or regulations that are reasonably designed to protect 
the public's health or safety. 
I 
Quanta Resources Corporation (Quanta) processed waste 
oil at two facilities, one in Long Island City, New York, and 
the other in Edgewater, New Jersey. At the Edgewater fa-
'Section 554(a) reads: 
"After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of 
the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential 
value to the estate. " 
od "0(/) 
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cility, Quanta handled the oil pursuant to a temporary 
operating permit issued by the New Jersey Department 
of Environmental Protection (NJDEP), respondent in 
No. 84-801. In June 1981, Midlantic National Bank, peti-
tioner in No. 84-801, provided Quanta with a $600,000 loan 
secured by Quanta's inventory, accounts receivable, and cer-
tain equipment. The same month, NJDEP discovered that 
Quanta had violated a specific prohibition in its operating 
permit by accepting more than 400,000 gallons of oil contami-
nated with PCB, a highly toxic carcinogen. NJDEP ordered 
Quanta to cease operations at Edgewater, and the two began 
negotiations concerning the cleanup of the Edgewater site. 
But on October 6, 1981, before the conclusion of negotiations, 
Quanta filed a petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of 
the Bankruptcy Code. The next day, NJDEP issued an ad-
ministrative order requiring Quanta to clean up the site. 
Quanta's financial condition remained perilous, however, and 
the following month, it converted the action to a liquidation 
proceeding under Chapter 7. Thomas J. O'Neill, petitioner 
in No. 84-805, was appointed trustee in bankruptcy, and sub-
sequently oversaw abandonment of both facilities. 
After Quanta filed for bankruptcy, an investigation of the 
Long Island City facility revealed that Quanta had accepted 
and stored there over 70,000 gallons of toxic, PCB-contami-
nated oil in deteriorating and leaking containers. Since the 
mortgages on that facility's real property exceeded the prop-
erty's value, the estimated cost of disposing of the waste oil 
plainly rendered the property a net burden to the estate. 
After trying without success to sell the Long Island City 
property for the benefit of Quanta's creditors, the trustee 
notified the creditors and the Bankruptcy Court for the Dis-
trict of New Jersey that he intended to abandon the property 
pursuant to § 554(a). No party to the bankruptcy proceeding 
disputed the trustee's allegation that the site was "burden-
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some" and of "inconsequential value to the estate" within the 
meaning of § 554. 
The City and the State of New York (collectively New 
York), respondents in No. 84-805, nevertheless objected, 
contending that abandonment would threaten the public's 
health and safety, and would violate state and federal envi-
ronmental law. New York rested its objection on "public 
policy'' considerations reflected in applicable local laws, and 
on the requirement of 28 U. S. C. § 959(b), that a trustee 
"manage and operate" the property of the estate "according 
to the valid laws of the State in which the property is situ-
ated." New York asked the Bankruptcy Court to order that 
the assets of the estate be used to bring the facility into com-
pliance with applicable law. After briefing and argument, 
the court approved the abandonment, noting that "[t]he City 
and State are in a better position in every respect than either 
the trustee or debtor's creditors to do what needs to be done 
to protect the public against the dangers posed by the PCB-
contaminated facility." The District Court for the District of 
New Jersey affirmed and New York appealed to the Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit. 
Upon abandonment, the trustee removed the 24-hour 
guard service and shut down the fire-suppression system. It 
became necessary for New York to decontaminate the facil-
ity, with the exception of the polluted subsoil, at a cost of 
about $2.5 million. 2 
On April 23, 1983, shortly after the District Court had ap-
proved abandonment of the New York site, the trustee gave 
notice of his intention to abandon the personal property at 
the Edgewater site, consisting principally of the contami-
2 The sole issue presented by these petitions is whether a trustee may 
abandon property under § 554 in contravention of local laws designed to 
protect the public's health and safety. New York is claiming reimburse-
ment for its expenditures as an administrative expense. That question, 
however, like the question of the ultimate disposition of the property, is 
not before us. 
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nated oil. The Bankruptcy Court approved the abandon-
ment on May 20, over NJDEP's objection that the estate had 
sufficient funds to protect the public from the dangers posed 
by the hazardous waste. 3 
Because the abandonments of the New Jersey and New 
York facilities presented identical issues, the parties in the 
New Jersey litigation consented to NJDEP's taking a direct 
appeal from the Bankruptcy Court to the Court of Appeals 
pursuant to § 405(c)(l)(B) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978. 
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit reversed. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F. 2d 912 
(1984); In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F. 2d 927. Al-
though the court found little guidance in legislative history of 
§ 554, it concluded that Congress had intended to codify the 
judge-made abandonment practice developed under the pre-
vious Bankruptcy Act. Under that law, where state law or 
general equitable principles protected certain public inter-
ests, those interests were not overridden by the judge-made 
abandonment power. The court also found evidence in other 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that Congress did not in-
3 The trustee was not required to take even relatively minor steps to 
reduce imminent danger, such as security fencing, drainage and diking re-
pairs, sealing deteriorating tanks, and removing explosive agents. More-
over, the trustee's abandonment at both sites aggravated already existing 
dangers by halting security measures that prevented public entry, vandal-
ism, and fire. Joint Appendix before the Court of Appeals 11-12 (affidavit 
of Richard Docyk, Deputy Chief Inspector for NY City Fire Department); 
id., at 26 (transcript of proceedings before de Vito, J.). The 470,000 gal-
lons of highly toxic and carcinogenic waste oil in unguarded, deterioraring 
containers "present risks of explosion, fire, contamination of water sup-
plies, destruction of natural resources, and injury, genetic damge, or death 
through personal contact." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 4, 
23; see Joint Appendix, supra, at 17 (70,000 gallons at New York site); Ap-
pendix before the Court of Appeals A7 (400,000 gallons at New Jersey 
site); id., at A46 (deteriorating containers); Joint Appendix, supra, at 11 
(deteriorating tanks); id., at 26 (guard service); id., at 12 (risk of fire); id., 
at 11 (contamination of adjacent areas); id., at 26 (health effects of expo-
sure to PCBs and their derivatives). 
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tend to pre-empt all state regulation, but only that grounded 
on policies outweighed by the relevant federal interests. 
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that the Bankruptcy 
Court erred in permitting abandonment, and remanded both 
cases for further proceedings. 4 
We granted certiorari and consolidated these cases to de-
termine whether the Court of Appeals properly construed 
§554, 469 U.S.--. We now affirm. 
II 
Before the 1978 revisions of the Bankruptcy Code, the 
trustee's abandonment power had been limited by a judi-
cially-developed doctrine intended to protect legitimate state 
or federal interests. This was made clear by the few rele-
vant cases. In Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F. 2d 289 (CA4 
1952), the Court of Appeals concluded that a bankruptcy 
trustee, in liquidating the estate of a barge company, could 
not abandon several barges when the abandonment would 
have obstructed a navigable passage in violation of federal 
law. The court stated: 
"The judge-made [abandonment] rule must give way 
when it comes into conflict with a statute enacted in 
order to ensure the safety of navigation; for we are not 
dealing with a burden imposed upon the bankrupt or his 
property by contract, but a duty and a burden imposed 
upon an owner of vessels by an Act of Congress in the 
public interest." I d., at 290. 
In In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F. 2d 1 (CA 7), 
cert. denied, 317 U. S. 683 (1942), the Court of Appeals held 
•Judge Gibbons dissented, arguing that § 554 permits abandonment 
without any exception analogous to that provided to the automatic stay. 
The dissent further contended that the majority's interpretation of § 554 
raised substantial questions under the takings clause by potentially de-
stroying the interest of secured creditors, see United States v. Security In-
dustrial Bank, 458 U. S. 70 (1982), and that the majority had failed to ad-
dress the important underlying issue of the priority of the states' claims for 
reimbursement. 
Although these cases 
do not define for us 
the exact contours of 
the trustee's abandon-
ment power, they do make 
clear that this power 
was subject 'to certain 
restrictions when Con-
gress enacted~ 554(a). 
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that the trustee of a debtor transit company could not cease 
its operation of a branch railway line when local law required 
continued operation. While the court did not forbid the 
trustee to abandon property (i. e., to reject an unexpired 
lease), it conditioned his actions to ensure compliance with 
state law. Similarly, in In re Lewis Jones, Inc., 1 B. C. D. 
277 (Bkrtcy Ct. ED Pa. 1974), the bankruptcy court invoked 
its equitable power to "safeguard the public interest" by re-
quiring the debtor public utilities to seal underground steam 
lines before abandoning them. 
Thus, when Congress enacted § 554, there were well-rec-
ognized restrictions on a trustee's abandonment power. In 
codifying the judicially-developed rule of abandonment, Con-
gress also presumably included the established corollary that 
a trustee could not exercise his abandonment power in viola-
tion of certain state and federal laws. The normal rule of 
statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legisla-
tion to change the interpretation of a judicially created con-
cept, it makes that intent specific. Edmonds v. Compagnie 
Generate Transatlantique, 443 U. S. 256, 266-267 (1979). 
The Court has followed this rule with particular care in con-
struing the scope of bankruptcy codifications. If Congress 
wishes to grant the trustee an extraordinary exemption from 
non-bankruptcy law, "the intention would be clearly ex-
pressed, not left to be collected or inferred from disputable 
considerations of convenience in administering the estate of 
the bankrupt." Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U. S. 441, 444 
(1904); see Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U. S. 79, 85 (1939) 
("If this old and familiar power of the states [over local rail-
road service] was withdrawn when Congress gave district 
courts bankruptcy powers over railroads, we ought to find 
language fitting for so drastic a change")./\ 
III 
Neither the Court nor Congress has granted a trustee in 
bankruptcy powers that would lend support to a right to 
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abandon property in contravention of state or local laws de-
signed to protect public health or safety. As we held last 
Term when the State of Ohio sought compensation for clean-
ing the toxic waste site of a bankrupt corporation: 
"Finally, we do not question that anyone in possession of 
the site-whether it is [the debtor] or another in the 
event the receivership is liquidated and the trustee aban-
dons the property, or a vendee from the receiver or the 
bankruptcy trustee-must comply with the environmen-
tal laws of the State of Ohio. Plainly, that person or 
firm may not maintain a nuisance, pollute the waters of 
the State, or refuse to remove the source of such condi-
tions." Ohio v. Kovas, 469 U.S.--,-- (1985) (em-
phasis added). 
Congress has repeatedly expressed its legislative deter-
mination that the trustee is not to have carte blanche to ig-
nore non-bankruptcy law. Where the Bankruptcy Code has 
conferred special powers upon the trustee and where there 
was no common law limitation on that power, Congress has 
expressly provided that the efforts of the trustee to marshal 
and distribute the assets of the estate must yield to govern-
mental interest in public health and safety. Post, at 8-9. 
One cannot assume that Congress, having placed these limi-
tations upon other aspects of trustees' operations, intended 
to discard a well-established judicial restriction on the aban-
donment power. As we held last year in the context of the 
National Labor Relations Act, "[T]he debtor-in-possession is 
not relieved of all obligations under the [Act] simply by filing 
a petition for bankruptcy." NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 
465 u. s. 513, 534. 
The automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code, 
§ 362(a), 5 has been described as "one of the fundamental 
5 Section 362(a) provides: 
"(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed 
under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under sec-
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debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws." 
S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 54 (1978); H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, 
p. 340 (1977). Despite the importance of§ 362(a) in preserv-
ing the debtor's estate, Congress has enacted several catego-
ries of exceptions to the stay that allow the Government to 
commence or continue legal proceedings. For example, 
§ 362(b)(5) permits the Government to enforce "non-mone-
tary" judgments against a debtor's estate. It is clear from 
the legislative history that one of the purposes of this excep-
tion is to protect public health and safety: 
"Thus, where a governmental unit is suing a debtor to 
prevent or stop violation of fraud, environmental protec-
tion, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or 
regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for viola-
tion of such a law, the action or proceeding is not stayed 
tion 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U. S. C. 
78eee(a)(3)), operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of-
"(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or em-
ployment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding 
against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the com-
mencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the 
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title; 
"(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the es-
tate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under 
this title; 
"(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property 
from the estate; 
"(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the 
estate; • 
"(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor 
any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the 
commencement of the case under this title; 
"(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that 
arose before the commencement of the case under this title; 
"(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the com-
mencement of the case under this title against any claim against the debtor; 
and 
"(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the 
United States Tax Court concerning the debtor." 
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under the automatic stay." H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, 
supra, at 343 (emphasis added); S. Rep. No. 95-989, 
supra, at 52 (emphasis added). 
Petitioners have suggested that the existence of an express 
exception to the automatic stay undermines the inference of a 
similar exception to the abandonment power: had Congress 
sought to restrict similarly the scope of § 554, it would have 
enacted similar limiting provisions. This argument, how-
ever, fails to acknowledge the differences between the prede-
cessors of§§ 554 and 362. As we have noted, the exceptions 
to the judicially-created abandonment power were firmly es-
tablished. But in enacting § 362 in 1978, Congress signifi-
cantly broadened the scope of the automatic stay, see 1 W. 
Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice § 20. 03, pp. 5-6 (1981), 
an expansion that had begun only five years earlier with the 
adoption of the Bankruptcy Rules in 1973, see id. , § 20.02, at 
4-5. Between 1973 and 1978, some courts had stretched the 
expanded automatic stay to foreclose States' efforts to en-
force their antipollution laws, 6 and Congress wanted to over-
rule these interpretations in its 1978 revision. See H. R. 
Rep. 95-595, supra, at 174-175. In the face of the greatly 
increased scope of § 362, it was necessary for Congress to 
limit this new power expressly. 
Title 28 U. S. C. § 959(b) 7 provides additional evidence 
that Congress did not intend for the Bankruptcy Code to pre-
6 See, e. g., Hillsdale Foundry Co. v. Michigan ex rel. Kelly , 1 BCD 
195 (Bkrtcy Ct. WD Mich. 1974) (action by Michigan Attorney General to 
enforce State's anti-pollution laws held subject to automatic stay). The 
House Report also referred to an unreported case from Texas where a stay 
prevented the State of Maine from closing down a debtor's plant that was 
polluting a river in violation of the state's environmental protection laws. 
H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 174-175. 
7 Section 959(b) provides: 
"Except as provided in section 1166 of title 11, a trustee, receiver or 
manager appointed in any cause pending in any court of the United States, 
including a debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the property in 
his possession as such trustee, receiver or manager according to the re-
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empt all state laws. Section 959(b) commands the @torS!i 
j)ossessioiil to "manage and operate the property in his pos-
session ... according to the requirements of the valid laws of 
the State." The petitioners have contended that § 959(b) is 
relevant only when the trustee is actually operating the busi-
ness of the debtor, and not when he is liquidating it. 
e cone u e a ap rusrM i 
liquidating a debtor's business because that interpretatio 
gives meaning to both the words "manage" and "operate.' 
Courts "are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every wor 
Congress used," Reiter v. Sonotone Corp. , 442 U. S. 330, 339 
(1979), and§ 959(b), on its face, encompasses something more 
han "operation." As the Court of Appeals noted, there is no 
eason why the phrase "'manage[ment]' of the 'property,'" 
ould not describe a trustee's custodial care and disposition of 
roperty in bankruptcy liquidation. In re Quanta Resources t--"'"'--
orp., 739 F. 2d, at 919. 8 This reading is consistent with 
he section's legislative history, which shows the provision 
as designed to place railroad receiverships within the reach 
f state law. 9 The precept of§ 959(b) is clear: "[T]he goals of 
he federal bankruptcy laws, including rehabilitation of the 
debtor, do not authorize transgression of state laws setting 
requirements for the operation of the business, even if th 
ontinued operation of the business would be thwarted b 
lxi_ng_state laws." lbid.r---------~ 
quirements of the valid laws of the State in which such property is situ-
ated, in the same manner that the owner or possessor thereof would be 
bound to do if in possession thereof." 
ommo tty utures ra mg Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U. . 
- , - (1985) (stating, after surveying the trustee's various powers, 
that "the Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee wide-ranging management ........... -
authority over the debtor"). 
9 See S. Misc. Doc. No. 44, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1888); S. Misc. Doc. 
No. 7, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1887); S. Misc. Doc. No. 19, 49th Cong. , 2d 
Sess. (1886); H. R. Misc. Doc. No. 45, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. (1886). 
\V 
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IV 
Although the reasons elaborated above suffice for us to 
conclude that Congress did not intend for the abandonment 
power to abrogate certain state and local laws, we find addi-
tional support for restricting that power in repeated congres-
sional emphasis on its "goal of protecting the environment 
against toxic pollution." Chemical Manufacturers Assn., 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U. S. 
--, -- (1985). Congress has enacted a Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 6901-6987, to 
regulate the treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous 
wastes by monitoring wastes from their creation until after 
their permanent disposal. That Act authorizes the United 
States to seek judicial or administrative restraint of activities 
involving hazardous wastes that "may present an imminent 
and substantial endangerment to health or the environment." 
42 U. S. C. § 6973; see also S. Rep. No. 98-284, p. 58 (1983). 
Congress broadened the scope of~ statute and tightened 
the regulatory restraints in 198~n the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 
as amended by Pub. L. 98-80, § 2(c)(2)(B), Congress estab-
lished a fund to finance cleanup of some sites and required 
certain responsible parties to reimburse either the fund or 
the parties who paid for the cleanup. The Act also empow-
ers the Federal Government to secure such relief as may be 
necessary to avert "imminent and substantial endangerment 
c::;)ongress eliminated the small generator exception and subjected 
many more facilities to the regulations. Pub. L. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221, 
3248-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6921(d) (Supp. 1985)). Another 
provision automatically broadens the Act's coverage by automatically as-
signing a hazardous rating to substances that the EPA does not classify by 
a set deadline. 98 Stat. 3227-3231 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. §§ 6924(d), 
(e), (f)(3), (g)(6) (Supp. 1985)). Amended enforcement provisions allow 
more citizen suits, 98 Stat. 3271-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6973 
(Supp. 1985)), and authorize administrative orders or suits to compel "cor-
rective action" after a leak has occurred. 98 Stat. 3257-3258 (codified at 
42 U. S. C. A. § 6928(h) (Supp. 1985)). 
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to the public health or welfare or the environment because of 
an actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance." 
42 U. S. C. § 9606. In the face of Congress' undisputed con-
cern over the risks of the improper storage and disposal of 
hazardous and toxic substances, we are unwilling to presume 
that by enactment of§ 554(a), Congress implicitly overturned 
long-standing restrictions on the common-law abandonment 
power. 
v 
n the lig t o e restricted pre-1978 abandonment power 
f the bankruptcy trustee and in the context of the limited 
cope of other Bankruptcy Code provisions, we conclude that 
ongress did not intend for § 554(a) to preempt certain state -
nd local laws. We hold that a trustee may not abandon 
roperty in contravention of a state statute or regulation that 
s reasonably designed to protect the public health or safety 
om identified hazards. 11 Accordingly, we affirm the judg-
ent Circui 
It is so ordered. 
11 his exception to the abandonment power vested in the trustee by 
§ 54 is a narrow one. It does not encompass a speculative or indetermi-
nate future violation of such laws that may stem from abandonment. The 
abandonment power is not to be fettered by laws or regulations not reason-
ably calculated to protect the public health or safety from imminent and 
identifiable harm. 
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These petitions for certiorari, arising out of the same bank-
ruptcy proceeding, present the question whether 11 U. S. C. 
§ 554(a) 1 of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes a trustee in 
bankruptcy to abandon property in contravention of state 
laws or regulations that are reasonably designed to protect 
the public's health or safety. 
'Section 554(a) reads: 
"After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of 
the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential 
value to the estate." 
Technical amendments in the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal * 
Judgeship Act of 1984 added the words "and benefit" after "value" in * 
§ 554(a). Pub. L. 98-353, Tit. III, § 468(a), 98 Stat. 380 (1984). * 
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I 
Quanta Resources Corporation (Quanta) processed waste 
oil at two facilities, one in Long Island City, New York, and 
the other in Edgewater, New Jersey. At the Edgewater fa-
cility, Quanta handled the oil pursuant to a temporary 
operating permit issued by the New Jersey Department 
of Environmental Protection (NJDEP), respondent in 
No. 84-801. In June 1981, Midlantic National Bank, peti-
tioner in No. 84-801, provided Quanta with a $600,000 loan 
secured by Quanta's inventory, accounts receivable, and cer-
tain equipment. The same month, NJDEP discovered that 
Quanta had violated a specific prohibition in its operating 
permit by accepting more than 400,000 gallons of oil contami-
nated with PCB, a highly toxic carcinogen. NJDEP ordered 
Quanta to cease operations at Edgewater, and the two began 
negotiations concerning the cleanup of the Edgewater site. 
But on October 6, 1981, before the conclusion of negotiations, 
Quanta filed a petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of 
the Bankruptcy Code. The next day, NJDEP issued an ad-
ministrative order requiring Quanta to clean up the site. 
Quanta's financial condition remained perilous, however, and 
the following month, it converted the action to a liquidation 
proceeding under Chapter 7. Thomas J. O'Neill, petitioner 
in No. 84-805, was appointed trustee in bankruptcy, and sub-
sequently oversaw abandonment of both facilities. 
After Quanta filed for bankruptcy, an investigation of the 
Long Island City facility revealed that Quanta had accepted 
and stored there over 70,000 gallons of toxic, PCB-contami-
nated oil in deteriorating and leaking containers. Since the 
mortgages on that facility's real property exceeded the prop-
erty's value, the estimated cost of disposing of the waste oil 
plainly rendered the property a net burden to the estate. 
After trying without success to sell the Long Island City 
property for the benefit of Quanta's creditors, the trustee 
notified the creditors and the Bankruptcy Court for the Dis-
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trict of New Jersey that he intended to abandon the property 
pursuant to § 554(a). No party to the bankruptcy proceeding 
disputed the trustee's allegation that the site was "burden-
some" and of "inconsequential value to the estate" within the 
meaning of § 554. 
The City and the State of New York (collectively New 
York), respondents in No. 84-805, nevertheless objected, 
contending that abandonment would threaten the public's 
health and safety, and would violate state and federal envi-
ronmental law. New York rested its objection on "public 
policy" considerations reflected in applicable local laws, and 
on the requirement of 28 U. S. C. § 959(b), that a trustee 
"manage and operate" the property of the estate "according 
to the valid laws of the State in which the property is situ-
ated." New York asked the Bankruptcy Court to order that 
the assets of the estate be used to bring the facility into com-
pliance with applicable law. After briefing and argument, 
the court approved the abandonment, noting that "[t]he City 
and State are in a better position in every respect than either 
the trustee or debtor's creditors to do what needs to be done 
to protect the public against the dangers posed by the PCB-
contaminated facility." The District Court for the District of 
New Jersey affirmed and New York appealed to the Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit. 
Upon abandonment, the trustee removed the 24-hour 
guard service and shut down the fire-suppression system. It 
became necessary for New York to decontaminate the facil-
ity, with the exception of the polluted subsoil, at a cost of 
about $2.5 million. 2 
2 The sole issue presented by these petitions is whether a trustee may 
abandon property under § 554 in contravention of local laws designed to 
protect the public's health and safety. New York is claiming reimburse-
ment for its expenditures as an administrative expense. That question, 
however, like the question of the ultimate disposition of the property, is 
not before us. 
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On April 23, 1983, shortly after the District Court had ap-
proved abandonment of the New York site, the trustee gave 
notice of his intention to abandon the personal property at 
the Edgewater site, consisting principally of the contami-
nated oil. The Bankruptcy Court approved the abandon-
ment on May 20, over NJDEP's objection that the estate had 
sufficient funds to protect the public from the dangers posed 
by the hazardous waste. 3 
Because the abandonments of the New Jersey and New 
York facilities presented identical issues, the parties in the 
New Jersey litigation consented to NJDEP's taking a direct 
appeal from the Bankruptcy Court to the Court of Appeals 
pursuant to § 405(c)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978. 
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit reversed. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F. 2d 912 
(1984); In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F. 2d 927. Al-
though the court found little guidance in legislative history of 
§ 554, it concluded that Congress had intended to codify the 
judge-made abandonment practice developed under the pre-
vious Bankruptcy Act. Under that law, where state law or 
3 The trustee was not required to take even relatively minor steps to 
reduce imminent danger, such as security fencing, drainage and diking re-
pairs, sealing deteriorating tanks, and removing explosive agents. More-
over, the trustee's abandonment at both sites aggravated already existing 
dangers by halting security measures that prevented public entry, vandal-
ism, and fire. Joint Appendix before the Court of Appeals 11-12 (affidavit 
of Richard Docyk, Deputy Chief Inspector for NY City Fire Department); 
id., at 26 (transcript of proceedings before de Vito, J.). The 470,000 gal-
lons of highly toxic and carcinogenic waste oil in unguarded, deterioraring 
containers "present risks of explosion, fire, contamination of water sup-
plies, destruction of natural resources, and injury, genetic damge, or death 
through personal contact." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 4, 
23; see Joint Appendix, supra, at 17 (70,000 gallons at New York site); Ap-
pendix before the Court of Appeals A7 (400,000 gallons at New Jersey 
site); id., at A46 (deteriorating containers); Joint Appendix, supra, at 11 
(deteriorating tanks); id., at 26 (guard service); id., at 12 (risk of fire); id., 
at 11 (contamination of adjacent areas); id., at 26 (health effects of expo-
sure to PCBs and their derivatives). 
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general equitable principles protected certain public inter-
ests, those interests were not overridden by the judge-made 
abandonment power. The court also found evidence in other 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that Congress did not in-
tend to pre-empt all state regulation, but only that grounded 
on policies outweighed by the relevant federal interests. 
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that the Bankruptcy 
Court erred in permitting abandonment, and remanded both 
cases for further proceedings. 4 
We granted certiorari and consolidated these cases to de-
termine whether the Court of Appeals properly construed 
§ 554, 469 U. S. --. We now affirm. 
II 
Before the 1978 revisions of the Bankruptcy Code, the 
trustee's abandonment power had been limited by a judi-
cially-developed doctrine intended to protect legitimate state 
or federal interests. This was made clear by the few rele-
vant cases. In Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F. 2d 289 (CA4 
1952), the Court of Appeals concluded that a bankruptcy 
trustee, in liquidating the estate of a barge company, could 
not abandon several barges when the abandonment would 
have obstructed a navigable passage in violation of federal 
law. The court stated: 
"The judge-made [abandonment] rule must give way 
when it comes into conflict with a statute enacted in 
order to ensure the safety of navigation; for we are not 
dealing with a burden imposed upon the bankrupt or his 
property by contract, but a duty and a burden imposed 
'Judge Gibbons dissented, arguing that § 554 permits abandonment 
without any exception analogous to that provided to the automatic stay. 
The dissent further contended that the majority's interpretation of § 554 
raised substantial questions under the takings clause by potentially de-
stroying the interest of secured creditors, see United States v. Security In-
dustrial Bank, 458 U. S. 70 (1982), and that the majority had failed to ad-
dress the important underlying issue of the priority of the states' claims for 
reimbursement. 
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upon an owner of vessels by an Act of Congress in the 
public interest." I d., at 290. 
In In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F. 2d 1 (CA 7), 
cert. denied, 317 U. S. 683 (1942), the Court of Appeals held 
that the trustee of a debtor transit company could not cease 
its operation of a branch railway line when local law required 
continued operation. While the court did not forbid the 
trustee to abandon property (i. e., to reject an unexpired 
lease), it conditioned his actions to ensure compliance with 
state law. Similarly, in In re Lewis Jones, Inc., 1 B. C. D. 
277 (Bkrtcy Ct. ED Pa. 1974), the bankruptcy court invoked 
its equitable power to "safeguard the public interest" by re-
quiring the debtor public utilities to seal underground steam 
lines before abandoning them. 
Thus, when Congress enacted § 554, there were well-rec-
ognized restrictions on a trustee's abandonment power. In 
codifying the judicially-developed rule of abandonment, Con-
gress also presumably included the established corollary that 
a trustee could not exercise his abandonment power in viola-
tion of certain state and federal laws. The normal rule of 
statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legisla-
tion to change the interpretation of a judicially created con-
cept, it makes that intent specific. Edmonds v. Compagnie 
Generale Transatlantique, 443 U. S. 256, 266-267 (1979). 
The Court has followed this rule with particular care in con-
struing the scope of bankruptcy codifications. If Congress 
wishes to grant the trustee an extraordinary exemption from 
non-bankruptcy law, "the intention would be clearly ex-
pressed, not left to be collected or inferred from disputable 
considerations of convenience in administering the estate of 
the bankrupt." Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U. S. 441, 444 
(1904); see Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U. S. 79, 85 (1939) 
("If this old and familiar power of the states [over local rail-
road service] was withdrawn when Congress gave district 
courts bankruptcy powers over railroads, we ought to find 
language fitting for so drastic a change"). Although these 
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cases do not define for us the exact contours of the trustee's * 
abandonment power, they do make clear that this power was* 
subject to certain restrictions when Congress enacted* 
§ 554(a). * 
III 
Neither the Court nor Congress has granted a trustee in 
bankruptcy powers that would lend support to a right to 
abandon property in contravention of state or local laws de-
signed to protect public health or safety. As we held last 
Term when the State of Ohio sought compensation for clean-
ing the toxic waste ~ite of a bankrupt corporation: 
"Finally, we do not question that anyone in possession of 
the site-whether it is [the debtor] or another in the 
event the receivership is liquidated and the trustee aban-
dons the property, or a vendee from the receiver or the 
bankruptcy trustee-must comply with the environmen-
tal laws of the State of Ohio. Plainly, that person or 
firm may not maintain a nuisance, pollute the waters of 
the State, or refuse to remove the source of such condi-
tions." Ohio v. Kovas, 469 U.S. --,-- (1985) (em-
phasis added). 
Congress has repeatedly expressed its legislative deter-
mination that the trustee is not to have carte blanche to ig-
nore non-bankruptcy law. Where the Bankruptcy Code has 
conferred special powers upon the trustee and where there 
was no common law limitation on that power, Congress has 
expressly provided that the efforts of the trustee to marshal 
and distribute the assets of the estate must yield to govern-
mental interest in public health and safety. Post, at 8-9. 
One cannot assume that Congress, having placed these limi-
tations upon other aspects of trustees' operations, intended 
to discard a well-established judicial restriction on the aban-
donment power. As we held last year in the context of the 
National Labor Relations Act, "[T]he debtor-in-possession is 
not relieved of all obligations under the [Act] simply by filing 
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a petition for bankruptcy." NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 
465 u. s. 513, 534. 
The automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code, 
§ 362(a), 5 has been described as "one of the fundamental 
debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws." 
S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 54 (1978); H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, 
p. 340 (1977). Despite the importance of§ 362(a) in preserv-
ing the debtor's estate, Congress has enacted several catego-
ries of exceptions to the stay that allow the Government to 
commence or continue legal proceedings. For example, 
§ 362(b)(5) permits the Government to enforce "non-mone-
tary" judgments against a debtor's estate. It is clear from 
5 Section 362(a) provides: 
"(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed 
under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under sec-
tion 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U. S. C. 
78eee(a)(3)), operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of-
"(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or em-
ployment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding 
against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the com-
mencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the 
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title; 
"(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the es-
tate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under 
this title; 
"(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property 
from the estate; 
"(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the 
estate; 
"(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor 
any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the 
commencement of the case under this title; 
"(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that 
arose before the commencement of the case under this title; 
"(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the com-
mencement of the case under this title against any claim against the debtor; 
and 
"(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the 
United States Tax Court concerning the debtor." 
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the legislative history that one of the purposes of this excep-
tion is to protect public health and safety: 
"Thus, where a governmental unit is suing a debtor to 
prevent or stop violation of fraud, environmental protec-
tion, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or 
regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for viola-
tion of such a law, the action or proceeding is not stayed 
under the automatic stay." H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, 
supra, at 343 (emphasis added); S. Rep. No. 95-989, 
supra, at 52 (emphasis added). 
Petitioners have suggested that the existence of an express 
exception to the automatic stay undermines the inference of a 
similar exception to the abandonment power: had Congress 
sought to restrict similarly the scope of § 554, it would have 
enacted similar limiting provisions. This argument, how-
ever, fails to acknowledge the differences between the prede-
cessors of§§ 554 and 362. As we have noted, the exceptions 
to the judicially-created abandonment power were firmly es-
tablished. But in enacting § 362 in 1978, Congress signifi-
cantly broadened the scope of the automatic stay, see 1 W. 
Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice§ 20.03, pp. 5-6 (1981), 
an expansion that had begun only five years earlier with the 
adoption of the Bankruptcy Rules in 1973, see id., § 20.02, at 
4-5. Between 1973 and 1978, some courts had stretched the 
expanded automatic stay to foreclose States' efforts to en-
force their antipollution laws, 6 and Congress wanted to over-
rule these interpretations in its 1978 revision. See H. R. 
Rep. 95-595, supra, at 174-175. In the face of the greatly 
6 See, e. g., Hillsdale Foundry Co. v. Michigan ex rel. Kelly, 1 BCD 
195 (Bkrtcy Ct. WD Mich. 1974) (action by Michigan Attorney General to 
enforce State's anti-pollution laws held subject to automatic stay). The 
House Report also referred to an unreported case from Texas where a stay 
prevented the State of Maine from closing down a debtor's plant that was 
polluting a river in violation of the state's environmental protection laws. 
H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 174-175. 
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increased scope of § 362, it was necessary for Congress to 
limit this new power expressly. 
Title 28 U. S. C. § 959(b) 7 provides additional evidence 
that Congress did not intend for the Bankruptcy Code to pre-
empt all state laws. Section 959(b) commands the trustee to 
"manage and operate the property in his possession . . . ac-
cording to the requirements of the valid laws of the State." 
The petitioners have contended that § 959(b) is relevant only 
when the trustee is actually operating the business of the 
debtor, and not when he is liquidating it. Even though * 
§ 959(b) does not directly apply to an abandonment under * 
§ 554(a) of the Bankruptcy Code-and therefore does not de- * 
limit the precise conditions on an abandonment-the section * 
nevertheless supports our conclusion that Congress did not * 
intend for the Bankruptcy Code to preempt all state laws * 
that otherwise constrain the exercise of a trustee's powers. * 
IV 
Although the reasons elaborated above suffice for us to 
conclude that Congress did not intend for the abandonment 
power to abrogate certain state and local laws, we find addi-
tional support for restricting that power in repeated congres-
sional emphasis on its "goal of protecting the environment 
against toxic pollution." Chemical Manufacturers Assn., 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U. S. 
--, -- (1985). Congress has enacted a Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S. C. §§6901-6987, to 
regulate the treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous 
wastes by monitoring wastes from their creation until after 
7 Section 959(b) provides: 
"Except as provided in section 1166 of title 11, a trustee, receiver or 
manager appointed in any cause pending in any court of the United States, 
including a debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the property in 
his possession as such trustee, receiver or manager according to the re-
quirements of the valid laws of the State in which such property is situ-
ated, in the same manner that the owner or possessor thereof would be 
bound to do if in possession thereof." 
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their permanent disposal. That Act authorizes the United 
States to seek judicial or administrative restraint of activities 
involving hazardous wastes that "may present an imminent 
and substantial endangerment to health or the environment." 
42 U. S. C. § 6973; see also S. Rep. No. 98-284, p. 58 (1983). 
Congress broadened the scope of the statute and tightened 
the regulatory restraints in 1984.8 In the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 
as amended by Pub. L. 98-80, § 2(c)(2)(B), Congress estab-
lished a fund to finance cleanup of some sites and required 
certain responsible parties to reimburse either the fund or 
the parties who paid for the cleanup. The Act also empow-
ers the Federal Government to secure such relief as may be 
necessary to avert "imminent and substantial endangerment 
to the public health or welfare or the environment because of 
an actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance." 
42 U. S. C. § 9606. In the face of Congress' undisputed con-
cern over the risks of the improper storage and disposal of 
hazardous and toxic substances, we are unwilling to presume 
that by enactment of§ 554(a), Congress implicitly overturned 
long-standing restrictions on the common-law abandonment 
power. 
v 
In the light of the Bankruptcy trustee's restricted pre-1978 * 
abandonment power and the limited scope of other Bank- * 
ruptcy Code provisions, we conclude that Congress did not * 
* 
8 Congress eliminated the small generator exception and subjected 
many more facilities to the regulations. Pub. L. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221, 
3248-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6921(d) (Supp. 1985)). Another 
provision automatically broadens the Act's coverage by automatically as-
signing a hazardous rating to substances that the EPA does not classify by 
a set deadline. 98 Stat. 3227-3231 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. §§ 6924(d), 
(e), (f)(3), (g)(6) (Supp. 1985)). Amended enforcement provisions allow 
more citizen suits, 98 Stat. 3271-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6973 
(Supp. 1985)), and authorize administrative orders or suits to compel "cor-
rective action" after a leak has occurred. 98 Stat. 3257-3258 (codified at 
42 U. S. C. A. § 6928(h) (Supp. 1985)). 
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intend for § 554(a) to preempt all state and local laws. The * 
Bankruptcy Court does not have the power to authorize an * 
abandonment without formulating conditions that will ade- * 
quately protect the public's health and safety. Accordingly, : 
without reaching the question whether certain state laws im- * 
posing conditions on abandonment may be so onerous as to * 
interfere with the bankruptcy adjudication itself, we hold * 
that a trustee may not abandon property in contravention of * 
a state statute or regulation that is reasonably designed to * 
protect the public health or safety from identified hazards. 9 * 
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals * 
for the Third Circuit. * 
It is so ordered. 
9 This exception to the abandonment power vested in the trustee by 
§ 554 is a narrow one. It does not encompass a speculative or indetermi-
nate future violation of such laws that may stem from abandonment. The 
abandonment power is not to be fettered by laws or regulations not reason-
ably calculated to protect the public health or safety from imminent and 
identifiable harm. 
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I 
Quanta Resources Corporation (Quanta) processed waste 
oil at two facilities, one in Long Island City, New York, and 
the other in Edgewater, New Jersey. At the Edgewater fa-
cility, Quanta handled the oil pursuant to a temporary 
operating permit issued by the New Jersey Department 
of Environmental Protection (NJDEP), respondent in 
No. 84-801. In June 1981, Midlantic National Bank, peti-
tioner in No. 84-801, provided Quanta with a $600,000 loan 
secured by Quanta's inventory, accounts receivable, and cer-
tain equipment. The same month, NJDEP discovered that 
Quanta had violated a specific prohibition in its operating 
permit by accepting more than 400,000 gallons of oil contami-
nated with PCB, a highly toxic carcinogen. NJDEP ordered 
Quanta to cease operations at Edgewater, and the two began 
negotiations concerning the cleanup of the Edgewater site. 
But on October 6, 1981, before the conclusion of negotiations, 
Quanta filed a petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of 
the Bankruptcy Code. The next day,. NJDEP issued an ad-
ministrative order requiring Quanta to clean up the site. 
Quanta's financial condition remained perilous, however, and 
the following month, it converted the action to a liquidation 
proceeding under Chapter 7. Thomas J. O'Neill, petitioner 
in No. 84-805, was appointed trustee in bankruptcy, and sub-
sequently oversaw abandonment of both facilities. 
Mter Quanta filed for bankruptcy, an investigation of the 
Long Island City facility revealed that Quanta had accepted 
and stored there over 70,000 gallons of toxic, PCB-contami-
nated oil in deteriorating and leaking containers. Since the 
mortgages on that facility's real property exceeded the prop-
erty's value, the estimated cost of disposing of the waste oil 
plainly rendered the property a net burden to the estate. 
Mter trying without success to sell the Long Island City 
property for the benefit of Quanta's creditors, the trustee 
notified the creditors and the Bankruptcy Court for the Dis-
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trict of New Jersey that he intended to abandon the property 
pursuant to § 554(a). No party to the bankruptcy proceeding 
disputed the trustee's allegation that the site was "burden-
some" and of "inconsequential value to the estate" within the 
meaning of § 554. 
The City and the State of New York (collectively New 
York), respondents in No. 84-805, nevertheless objected, 
contending that abandonment would threaten the public's 
health and safety, and would violate state and federal envi-
ronmental law. New York rested its objection on "public 
policy'' considerations reflected in applicable local laws, and 
on the requirement of 28 U. S. C. § 959(b), that a trustee 
"manage and operate" the property of the estate "according 
to the requirements of the valid laws of the State in which 
such property is .situated." New York asked the Bank-
ruptcy Court to order that the assets of the estate be used to 
bring the facility into compliance with applicable law. After 
briefing and argument, the court approved the abandonment, 
noting that "[t]he City and State are in a better position in 
. every respect than either the Trustee or debtor's creditors to 
do what needs to be done to protect the public against the 
dangers posed by the PCB-contaminated facility." The Dis-
trict Court for the District of New Jersey affirmed, and New 
York appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 
Upon abandonment, the trustee removed the 24-hour 
guard service and shut down the fire-suppression system. It 
became necessary for New York to decontaminate the facil-
ity, with the exception of the polluted subsoil, at a cost of 
about $2. 5 million. 2 
2 The sole issue presented by these petitions is whether a trustee may 
abandon property under § 554 in contravention of local laws designed to 
protect the public's health and safety. New York is claiming reimburse-
ment for its expenditures as an administrative expense. That question, 
however, like the question of the ultimate disposition of the property, is 
not before us. 
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On April23, 1983, shortly after the District Court had ap-
proved abandonment of the New York site, the trustee gave 
notice of his intention to abandon the personal property at 
the Edgewater site, consisting principally of the contami-
nated oil. The Bankruptcy Court approved the abandon-
ment on May 20, over NJDEP's objection that the estate had 
sufficient funds to protect the public from the dangers posed 
by the hazardous waste. 3 
Because the abandonments of the New Jersey and New 
York facilities presented identical issues, the parties in the 
New Jersey litigation consented to NJDEP's taking a direct 
appeal from the Bankruptcy Court to the Court of Appeals 
pursuant to § 405(c)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978. 
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit reversed. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F. 2d 912 
(1984); In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F. 2d 927. Al-
though the court found little guidance in the legislative his-
tory of § 554, it concluded that Congress had intended to cod-
ify the judge-made abandonment practice developed under 
the previous Bankruptcy Act. Under that law, where state 
3 The trustee was not required to take even relatively minor steps to 
reduce imminent danger, such as security fencing, drainage and diking re-
pairs, sealing deteriorating tanks, and removing explosive agents. More-
over, the trustee's abandonment at both sites aggravated already existing 
dangers by halting security measures that prevented public entry, vandal-
ism, and fire. Joint Appendix in No. 83-5142 (CA3), pp. 11-12 (affidavit 
of Richard Docyk, Deputy Chief Inspector for N. Y. City Fire Depart-
ment); id., at 26 (transcript of proceedings before De Vito, J.). The 
470,000 gallons of highly toxic and carcinogenic waste oil in unguarded, de-
teriorating containers "present risks of explosion, fire, contamination of 
water supplies, destruction of natural resources, and injury, genetic dam-
age, or death through personal contact." Brief for United States as Ami-
cus Curiae 4, 23; see Joint Appendix, supra, at 17 (70,000 gallons at New 
York site); Appendix in No. 83-5730 (CA3), p. A7 (400,000 gallons at New 
Jersey site); id., at A46 (deteriorating containers); Joint Appendix, supra, 
at 11 (deteriorating tanks); id., at 26 (guard service); id., at 12 (risk of fire); 
id., at 11 (contamination of adjacent areas); id., at 20 (health effects of ex-
posure to PCBs and their derivatives). 
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law or general equitable principles protected certain public 
interests, those interests were not overridden by the judge-
made abandonment power. The court also found evidence in 
other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that Congress did 
not intend to pre-empt all state regulation, but only that 
grounded on policies outweighed by the relevant federal in-
terests. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that the 
Bankruptcy Court erred in permitting abandonment, and re-
manded both cases for further proceedings. 4 
We granted certiorari and consolidated these cases to de-
termine whether the Court of Appeals properly construed 
§ 554, 469 U. S. --. We now affirm. 
II 
Before the 1978 revisions of the Bankruptcy Code, the 
trustee's abandonment power had been limited by a judicially 
developed doctrine intended to protect legitimate state or 
federal interests. This was made clear by the few relevant 
cases. In Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F. 2d 289 (CA4 
1952), the Court of Appeals concluded that a bankruptcy 
trustee, in liquidating the estate of a barge company, could 
not abandon several barges when the abandonment would 
have obstructed a navigable passage in violation of federal 
law. The court stated: 
"The judge-made [abandonment] rule must give way 
when it comes into conflict with a statute enacted in 
order to ensure the safety of navigation; for we are not 
dealing with a burden imposed upon the bankrupt or his 
property by contract, but a duty and a burden imposed 
'Judge Gibbons dissented, arguing that § 554 permits abandonment 
without any exception analogous to that provided to the automatic stay. 
The dissent further contended that the majority's interpretation of § 554 
raised substantial questions under the Takings Clause by potentially de-
stroying the interest of secured creditors, see United States v. Security In-
dustrial Bank, 459 U. S. 70 (1982), and that the majority had failed to ad-
dress the important underlying issue of the priority of the States' claims for 
reimbursement. 
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upon an owner of vessels by an Act of Congress in the 
public interest." I d., at 290. 
In In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F. 2d 1 (CA7), 
cert. denied, 317 U. S. 683 (1942), the Court of Appeals held 
that the trustee of a debtor transit company could not cease 
its operation of a branch railway line when local law required 
continued operation. While the court did not forbid the 
trustee to abandon property (i. e., to reject an unexpired 
lease), it conditioned his actions to ensure compliance with 
state law. Similarly, in In re Lewis Jones, Inc., 1 BCD 277 
(Bkrtcy Ct. ED Pa. 1974), the bankruptcy court invoked its 
equitable power to "safeguard the public interest" by requir-
ing the debtor public utilities to seal underground steam lines 
before abandoning them. 
Thus, when Congress enacted § 554, there were well-rec-
ognized restrictions on a trustee's abandonment power. In 
codifying the judicially developed rule of abandonment, Con-
gress also presumably included the established corollary that 
a trustee could not exercise his abandonment power in viola-
tion of certain state and federal laws. The normal rule of 
statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legisla-
tion to change the interpretation of a judicially created con-
cept, it makes that intent specific. Edmonds v. Compagnie 
Generale Transatlantique, 443 U. S. 256, 266-267 (1979). 
The Court has followed this rule with particular care in con-
struing the scope of bankruptcy codifications. If Congress 
wishes to grant the trustee an extraordinary exemption from 
non-bankruptcy law, "the intention would be clearly ex-
pressed, not left to be collected or inferred from disputable 
considerations of convenience in administering the estate of 
the bankrupt." Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U. S. 441, 444 
(1904); see Palmer v. Massachusetts , 308 U. S. 79, 85 (1939) 
("If this old and familiar power of the states [over local rail-
road service] was withdrawn when Congress gave district 
courts bankruptcy powers over railroads, we ought to find 
language fitting for so drastic a change"). Although these 
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cases do not define for us the exact contours of the trustee's 
abandonment power, they do make clear that this power was 
subject to certain restrictions when Congress enacted 
§ 554(a). 
III 
Neither the Court nor Congress has granted a trustee in 
bankruptcy powers that would lend support to a right to 
abandon property in contravention of state or local laws de-
signed to protect public health or safety. As we held last 
Terrll when the State of Ohio sought compensation for clean-
ing the toxic waste site of a bankrupt corporation: 
"Finally, we do not question that anyone in possession of 
the site-whether it is [the debtor] or another in the 
event the receivership is liquidated and the trustee aban-
dons the property, or a vendee from the receiver or the 
bankruptcy trustee-must comply with the environmen-
tal laws of the State of Ohio. Plainly, that person or 
firm may not maintain a nuisance, pollute the waters of 
the State, or refuse to remove the source of such condi-
tions." Ohio v. Kovas, 469 U.S. --, -----
(1985) (emphasis added). 
Congress has repeatedly expressed its legislative deter-
mination that the trustee is not to have carte blanche to ig-
nore nonbankruptcy law. Where the Bankruptcy Code has 
conferred special powers upon the trustee and where there 
was no common-law limitation on that power, Congress has 
expressly provided that the efforts of the trustee to marshal 
and distribute the assets of the estate must yield to govern-
mental interest in public health and safety. Post, at 8-9. 
One cannot assume that Congress, having placed these limi-
tations upon other aspects of trustees' operations, intended 
to discard a well-established judicial restriction on the aban-
donment power. As we held nearly two years ago in the 
context of the National Labor Relations Act, "[T]he debtor-
in-possession is not relieved of all obligations under the [Act] 
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simply by filing a petition for bankruptcy." NLRB v. 
Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U. S. 513, 534 (1984). 
The automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code, 
§ 362(a), 5 has been described as "one of the fundamental 
debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws." 
S. Rep. No. 95-989, p. 54 (1978); H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, 
p. 340 (1977). Despite the importance of§ 362(a) in preserv-
ing the debtor's estate, Congress has enacted several catego-
ries of exceptions to the stay that allow the Government to 
commence or continue legal proceedings. For example, 
§ 362(b)(5) permits the Government to enforce "nonmone-
tary" judgments against a debtor's estate. It is clear from 
5 Section 362(a) provides: 
"(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed 
under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under sec-
tion 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U. S. C. 
78eee(a)(3)), operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of-
"(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or em-
ployment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding 
against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the com-
mencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the 
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title; 
"(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the es-
tate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under 
this title; 
"(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property 
from the estate; 
"(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the 
estate; 
"(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor 
any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the 
commencement of the case under this title; 
"(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that 
arose before the commencement of the case under this title; 
"(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the com-
mencement of the case under this title against any claim against the debtor; 
and 
"(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the 
United States Tax Court concerning the debtor." 
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the legislative history that one of the purposes of this excep-
tion is to protect public health and safety: 
"Thus, where a governmental unit is suing a debtor to 
prevent or stop violation of fraud, environmental protec-
tion, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or 
regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for viola-
tion of such a law, the action or proceeding is not stayed 
under the automatic stay." H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, 
supra, at 343 (emphasis added); S. Rep. No. 95-989, 
supra, at 52 (emphasis added). 
Petitioners have suggested that the existence of an express 
exception to the automatic stay undermines the inference of a 
similar exception to the abandonment power: had Congress 
sought to restrict similarly the scope of § 554, it would have 
enacted similar limiting provisions. This argument, how-
ever, fails to acknowledge the differences between the prede-
cessors of §§ 554 and 362. As we have noted, the exceptions 
to the judicially created abandonment power were firmly es-
tablished. But in enacting § 362 in 1978, Congress signifi-
cantly broadened the scope of the automatic stay, see 1 W. 
Norton, Bankruptcy Law and Practice § 20.03, pp. 5-6 
(1981), an expansion that had begun only five years earlier 
with the adoption of the Bankruptcy Rules in 1973, see id., 
§ 20.02, at 4-5. Between 1973 and 1978, some courts had 
stretched the expanded automatic stay to foreclose States' ef-
forts to enforce their antipollution laws, 6 and Congress 
wanted to overrule these interpretations in its 1978 revision. 
See H. R. Rep. 95-595, supra, at 174-175. In the face ofthe 
6 See, e. g., Hillsdale Foundry Co. v. Michigan ex rel . Kelly, 1 BCD 
195 (Bkrtcy Ct. WD Mich. 1974) (action by Michigan Attorney General to 
enforce State's antipollution laws held subject to automatic stay). The 
House Report also referred to an unreported case from Texas where a stay 
prevented the State of Maine from closing down a debtor's plant that was 
polluting a river in violation of the State's environmental protection laws. 
H. R. Rep. No. 95-595, pp. 174-175. 
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greatly increased scope of § 362, it was necessary for Con-
gress to limit this new power expressly. 
Title 28 U. S. C. § 959(b)7 provides additional evidence 
that Congress did not intend for the Bankruptcy Code to pre-
empt all state laws. Section 959(b) commands the trustee to 
"manage and operate the property in his possession . . . ac-
cording to the requirements of the valid laws of the State." 
The petitioners have contended that § 959(b) is relevant only 
when the trustee is actually operating the business of the 
debtor, and not when he is liquidating it. Even though 
§ 959(b) does not directly apply to an abandonment under 
§ 554(a) of the Bankruptcy Code-and therefore does not de-
limit the precise conditions on an abandonment-the section 
nevertheless supports our conclusion that Congress did not 
intend for the Bankruptcy Code to pre-empt all state laws 
that otherwise constrain the exercise of a trustee's powers. 
IV 
Although the reasons elaborated above suffice for us to 
conclude that Congress did not intend for the abandonment 
power to abrogate certain state and local laws, we find addi-
tional support for restricting that power in repeated congres-
sional emphasis on its "goal of protecting the environment 
against toxic pollution." Chemical Manufacturers Assn., 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.; 470 U. S. 
--, -- (1985). Congress has enacted a Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 6901-6987, to 
regulate the treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous 
wastes by monitoring wastes from their creation until after 
7 Section 959(b) provides: 
"Except as provided in section 1166 of title 11 , a tru-stee, receiver or 
manager appointed in any cause pending in any court of the United States, 
including a debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the property in 
his possession as such trustee, receiver or manager according to the re-
quirements of the valid laws of the State in which such property is situ-
ated, in the same manner that the owner or possessor thereof would be 
bound to do if in possession thereof." 
.• 
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their permanent disposal. That Act authorizes the United 
States to seek judicial or administrative restraint of activities 
involving hazardous wastes that "may present an imminent 
and substantial endangerment to health or the environment." 
42 U. S. C. § 6973; see also S. Rep. No. 98-284, p. 58 (1983). 
Congress broadened the scope of the statute and tightened 
the regulatory restraints in 1984.8 In the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 
as amended by Pub. L. 98-80, § 2(c)(2)(B), Congress estab-
lished a fund to finance cleanup of some sites and required 
certain responsible parties to reimburse either the fund or 
the parties who paid for the cleanup. The Act also empow-
ers the Federal Government to secure such relief as may be 
necessary to avert "imminent and substantial endangerment 
to the public health or welfare or the environment because of 
an actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance." 
42 U. S. C. § 9606. In the face of Congress' undisputed con-
cern over the risks of the improper storage and disposal of 
hazardous and toxic substances, we are unwilling to presume 
that by enactment of§ 554(a), Congress implicitly overturned 
long-standing restrictions on the common-law abandonment 
power. 
v 
In the light of the Bankruptcy trustee's restricted pre-1978 
abandonment power and the limited scope of other Bank-
ruptcy Code provisions, we conclude that Congress did not 
8 Congress eliminated the small generator exception and subjected 
many more facilities to the regulations. Pub. L. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221, 
3248-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6921(d) (Supp. 1985)). Another 
provision automatically broadens the Act's coverage by automatically as-
signing a hazardous rating to substances that the EPA does not classify by 
a set deadline. 98 Stat. 3227-3231 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. §§ 6924(d), 
(e), (f)(3), (g)(6) (Supp. 1985)). Amended enforcement provisions allow 
more citizen suits, 98 Stat. 3271-3272 (codified at 42 U. S. C. A. § 6973 
(Supp. 1985)), and authorize administrative orders or suits to compel "cor-
rective action" after a leak has occurred. 98 Stat. 3257-3258 (codified at 
42 U. S. C. A. § 6928(h) (Supp. 1985)). 
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intend for § 554(a) to pre-empt all state and local laws. The 
Bankruptcy Court does not have the power to authorize an 
abandonment without formulating conditions that will ade-
quately protect the public's health and safety. Accordingly, 
without reaching the question whether certain state laws im-
posing conditions on abandonment may be so onerous as to 
interfere with the bankruptcy adjudication itself, we hold 
that a trustee may not abandon property in contravention of 
a state statute or regulation that is reasonably designed to 
protect the public health or safety from identified hazards. 9 
Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit. 
It is so ordered. 
9 This exception to the abandonment power vested in the trustee by 
§ 554 is a narrow one. It does not encompass a speculative or indetermi-
nate future violation of such laws that may stem from abandonment. The 
abandonment power is not to be fettered by laws or regulations not reason-
ably calculated to protect the public health or safety from imminent and 
identifiable harm. 
